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This dissertation concerns the secure processing of distributed data by multi-
ple terminals, using interactive public communication among themselves, in order to
accomplish a given computational task. In the setting of a probabilistic multitermi-
nal source model in which several terminals observe correlated random signals, we
analyze secure distributed data processing protocols that harness the correlation in
the data. The specific tasks considered are: computing functions of the data under
secrecy requirements; generating secretly shared bits with minimal rate of public
communication; and securely sharing bits in presence of a querying eavesdropper.
In studying these various secure distributed processing tasks, we adopt a unified
approach that entails examining the form of underlying common randomness (CR)
that is generated at the terminals during distributed processing. We make the case
that the exact form of established CR is linked inherently to the data processing
task at hand, and its characterization can lead to a structural understanding of the
associated algorithms. An identification of the underlying CR and its decomposi-
tion into independent components, each with a different operational significance, is
a recurring fundamental theme at the heart of all the proofs in this dissertation. In
addition to leading to new theoretical insights, it brings out equivalences between
seemingly unrelated problems. Another distinguishing feature of this work is that it
considers interactive communication protocols. In fact, understanding the structure
of such interactive communication is a key step in proving our results.
We make the following contributions. First, we propose a new information
theoretic formulation to study secure distributed computing using public communi-
cation. The parties observing distributed data are trusted but an eavesdropper has
access to the public communication network. We examine distributed communica-
tion protocols that allow the trusted parties to accomplish their required computa-
tion tasks while giving away negligible information about a specified portion of the
data to an eavesdropper with access to the communication. Our theoretical results
provide necessary and sufficient conditions that characterize the feasibility of vari-
ous secure computing tasks; in many cases of practical importance, these conditions
take a simple form and can be verified easily. When secure computing is feasible,
we propose new algorithms in special cases.
Next, we revisit the problem of generating shared secret keys (SKs). We
investigate minimum communication requirements for generating information theo-
retically secure SKs of maximum rates from correlated observations using interactive
public communication. In particular, our approach allows us to examine the role
of interaction in such communication. On the one hand, we find that interaction
is not needed when the observed correlated bits are symmetrically correlated and
therefore, in this case, simple noninteractive protocols are the most efficient means of
generating optimum rate SKs. On the other hand, we illustrate that interactive pro-
tocols can require a strictly lower rate of overall communication than noninteractive
protocols.
Finally, we consider the task of ensuring security against an eavesdropper who
makes queries about a portion of the distributed data that the terminals share by
communicating over a public network. We introduce an alternative notion of secrecy
which requires rendering the task of a querying eavesdropper as onerous as possible.
Our main contribution in this part is the development of a new technique for proving
converse results for secrecy problems involving CR with interactive communication,
which is employed then to obtain an upper bound for the maximum number of
queries that can be inflicted on the eavesdropper for any CR and corresponding
communication. Surprisingly, there is an equivalence between this notion of secrecy
and that of information theoretic security, which leads to new theoretical results for
SK generation; for instance, we prove a strong converse for the SK capacity.
We conclude by hypothesizing the basic principles of secrecy generation that
emerge from the results developed in this dissertation.
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PREFACE
It is different, they say, from knowledge;
It is different, they say, from ignorance.
- Isha Upanishad
This dissertation started over a coffee conversation with my advisor Professor
Prakash Narayan about his results with Professor Imré Csiszár on secret key gen-
eration. He verbally described the main result: Multiple terminals can generate an
optimum rate secret key by sharing the combined observations of all the terminals.
The prior art, for a two terminal setup, involved generating optimum rate secret
keys by sharing the observations of one of the terminals. However, an extension of
this asymmetric scheme to the multiterminal case was not available. The alternative
scheme of Csiszár and Narayan first recovered the entire data at all the terminals,
using the least rate of public communication, and then extracted an optimum rate
secret key from the recovered data. This scheme has an intriguing interpretation. In
coffee shop parlance, if the observation of each terminal is represented by a slice of
the “randomness cake,” the overall cake can be cut into two (almost) independent
parts: one corresponding to the secret key and the other to the interactive public
communication used to share it. It is clear that such decompositions of common ran-
domness must always underlie secure data processing protocols requiring (almost)
independence of the observations of the eavesdropper and the secure portion of the
data. The question is what constitutes the hypothetical randomness cake – what is
the total common randomness available for decomposition?
This question is the starting point of our research. For various secure data
processing tasks, we characterize the form of common randomness allowed and make
the case that it is connected inherently to the structure of the underlying protocols.
Our presentation is reverse chronological – starting with the technical results, we
conclude by hypothesizing our basic common randomness principles of secrecy that
led to them.
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mcf maximum common function
pmf probability mass function
rv random variable
SK secret key
WSK wiretap secret key
Notation. Let X1, . . . , Xm, m ≥ 2, be rvs with finite alphabets X1, . . . ,Xm, respec-
tively, and a known joint pmf. For any nonempty set A ⊆ M = {1, . . . ,m}, we
denote XA = (Xi, i ∈ A). Similarly, for real numbers R1, . . . , Rm and A ⊆ M, we
denote RA = (Ri, i ∈ A). Let Ac be the set M\A. We denote n i.i.d. repetitions
of XM = (X1, . . . , Xm) with values in XM = X1× . . .×Xm by XnM = (Xn1 , . . . , Xnm)
with values in X nM = X n1 × . . . × X nm. Given ε > 0, for rvs U, V, we say that U is
ε-recoverable from V if P (U 6= f(V )) ≤ ε for some function f(V ) of V . Denote by
‖U‖ the size of the range space of the rv U . All logarithms and exponentials are




This dissertation concerns the secure processing of distributed data by multiple
terminals, using interactive public communication among themselves, in order to
accomplish a given task. In many applications, data is collected and stored at
physically or temporally separated locations. Examples of the former include data
grids and sensor networks. The distributed data is assumed to be correlated, where
the correlation can arise from shared copies of the same data, as in data grids [72]; or
from the nature of the data itself, as in distributed video coding [30, 55] and in sensor
networks [14, 25]. Instances of temporally separated locations with correlated data
arise in biometric authentication [56] and hardware authentication [28], where the
distributed data consists of the original and the noisy versions of signatures recorded
at the registration and the authentication stages, respectively. In all such settings,
the entities at these locations are provided with a communication infrastructure to
exchange information in order to facilitate various tasks such as sharing distributed
data or computing functions of their collective data. For instance, sensor nodes
can communicate over a wireless network to compute average or extreme values of
their measurements, or “helper” data in a biometric security system can be stored
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publicly to correct any errors in subsequent recordings of a biometric signature. We
study the following general question:
If the shared communication is public, how can we guarantee security?
In the setting of a probabilistic multiterminal source model in which different termi-
nals observe correlated random signals [58, 20], we analyze secure distributed data
processing protocols that harness the correlation in the data. The specific tasks con-
sidered are: computing functions of the data under secrecy requirements (Chapters
3, 4); generation of secretly shared bits with minimal rate of public communica-
tion (Chapter 5); and securely sharing bits in presence of a querying eavesdropper
(Chapter 6).
For the first task, we propose a new information theoretic formulation to study
secure distributed computing using public communication. The parties observing
distributed data are trusted but an eavesdropper can access the public communi-
cation network. We examine distributed communication algorithms that allow the
trusted parties to accomplish their required computation tasks while giving away
negligible information about the computed value to an eavesdropper with access to
the communication. This proposed setup is general and provides a unified frame-
work for studying problems of secure computing over sensor networks, secure dis-
tributed storage and secure computing over a data grid. Our theoretical results
provide necessary and sufficient conditions characterizing the feasibility of various
secure computing tasks; in many cases of practical importance, these conditions take
a simple form and can be verified easily. This characterization of secure comput-
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ing provides a basic test that must be undertaken before attempting to construct
algorithms. Furthermore, in special cases, we propose new algorithms for secure
computing when it is feasible.
The second task concerns the problem of generating shared secret keys (SKs), a
common objective in many security applications. Most of the current cryptosystems
rely on the availability of such shared SKs. In the context of biometric and hardware
security, biometric signatures [37] and physically unclonable functions[54], respec-
tively, constitute such shared SKs that have been generated from noisy recordings.
We investigate minimum communication requirements for generating information
theoretically secure SKs of maximum rates from correlated observations using in-
teractive public communication. In particular, our approach allows us to examine
the role of interaction in such communication. For instance, we find that interac-
tion is not needed when the observed correlated bits are symmetrically correlated
and therefore, in this case, simple noninteractive protocols are the most efficient for
generating optimum rate SKs.
The last task considered entails ensuring security against an eavesdropper who
makes queries about a portion of the distributed data that the terminals share by
communicating over a public network. We introduce a new notion of secrecy which
requires rendering the task of a querying eavesdropper as onerous as possible. Ap-
plications include systems secured using biometric authentication where a portion
of the recorded biometric information is stored as (public) helper data to correct
any errors that occur in subsequent recordings of a biometric signature. How many
attempts must a malicious party, with access to this helper data, make in order
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to enter the system? We present a general formulation to answer such questions.
Furthermore, as a surprise, we find that this new notion of secrecy is in essence
equivalent to the notion of information theoretic security. We leverage this connec-
tion to obtain new theoretical results for SK generation; for instance, we prove a
new strong converse for the SK capacity.
In studying these various secure distributed processing tasks, we follow a uni-
fied approach that entails examining the form of underlying common randomness
(CR) (i.e., shared bits [2]) that is generated at the terminals during distributed pro-
cessing. In this dissertation, we make the case that the exact form of established CR
is linked inherently to the data processing task at hand, and its characterization can
lead to a structural understanding of the associated algorithms. An identification of
the underlying CR and its decomposition into independent components, each with
a different operational significance, is a recurring fundamental theme underlying all
the proofs in this dissertation. In addition to leading to new theoretical results,
it brings out equivalences between seemingly unrelated problems with a common
feature that the same CR is established at the terminals. Previously, Csiszár and
Narayan had observed such an equivalence between multiterminal SK generation
and multiterminal data compression [20]. Specifically, a duality was shown between
the generation of an SK of maximum rate and the problem of attaining “omni-
science”, i.e., recovering the entire data at the SK-seeking terminals. This duality,
led to a characterization of multiterminal SK capacity, which is the largest rate of
nearly uniformly distributed CR that meets the security requirement of being nearly
independent of the communication used to generate it. Furthermore, it enabled new
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algorithms for SK generation [81, 83]. In the same spirit, here, too, equivalences of
tasks are uncovered, leading to new structural results and new algorithms for secure
function computation and efficient SK generation.
Another distinguishing feature of this work is that it considers interactive com-
munication protocols. The communication from a terminal can be any (randomized)
function of its own observed signal and of all previous communication. Through-
out this dissertation we assume that the communication is authenticated, i.e., the
“honest but curious” eavesdropper can only observe passively the communication
but cannot tamper with it. Furthermore, it is assumed that the communication is
in a broadcast mode – each terminal observes the communication from every other
terminal. Understanding the structure of such interactive communication is a key
step in proving our results. For instance, the results of Chapter 6 rely on show-
ing that if the observations of two terminals are independent to begin with, then
they remain independent when conditioned upon the value of an interactive com-
munication. Also, we show that for many tasks complex interactive protocols are
not needed and simple noninteractive communication protocols suffice (see the next
section for specific examples).
In the concluding chapter of this dissertation, we hypothesize basic principles
of secrecy generation that have emerged from the precise results as well as heuristics
developed in our work. These principles have important engineering implications
and can serve as guidelines for the design of secure protocols. The theoretical
results presented in this dissertation support these principles, and we conjecture that
even in much broader settings, the proposed principles must hold for appropriately
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chosen notions of security. For instance, in recent work we examine the validity of
these principles in nonasymptotic regime by considering general descriptions of the
observed data with fixed length [70].
1.1 Main contributions
This dissertation makes three main technical contributions, which are summarized
below.
1.1.1 Secure computation
Suppose that the terminals inM = {1, . . . ,m} observe correlated signals, and that
a subset A of them are required to compute “securely” a (single-letter) function g of
all the signals. To this end, the terminals inM are allowed to communicate interac-
tively over a public noiseless channel of unlimited capacity, with the communication
being observed by all the terminals. The terminals in A seek to compute g in such
a manner as to keep its value information theoretically secret from an eavesdropper
that observes the public interterminal communication. A typical application arises
in a wireless network of colocated sensors which seek to compute a given function of
their correlated measurements using public communication that does not give away
the value of the function. In contrast to the classic notion of secure computing in
cryptography [80], we assume that the terminals are trustworthy but their public
communication network can be accessed by an eavesdropper.
We formulate a new Shannon theoretic multiterminal source model that ad-
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dresses the elemental question: When can a function g be computed so that its value
is independent of the public communication used in its computation?
The study of problems of function computation, with and without secrecy
requirements, has a long and varied history in multiple disciplines, to which we
can make only a skimpy allusion here. Examples include: algorithms for exact
function computation by multiple parties (cf. e.g., [40, 79, 27, 29]); algorithms
for asymptotically accurate (in observation length) function computation (cf. e.g.,
[53, 43]); and problems of oblivious transfer [50, 3]. In contrast, our requirement of
secure computation1 is to protect the value of a given function; an instance is [52]
where exact function computation with secrecy was sought.
We establish that the answer to the question posed above is connected innately
to a problem of SK generation for terminals in M, when, in addition to the public
communication, side information is provided to the decoders at the terminals in Ac
in the form of the value of g, and can be used only for recovering the key. Such
a key, termed an aided secret key (ASK), constitutes a modification of the original
notion of an SK in [48, 1, 20, 21]. The largest rate of such an ASK for M is the
ASK capacity C.
Clearly, a function g that is securely computable for A can be recovered se-
curely by all the terminals in M when its value is provided as side information for
decoding to the terminals outside2 A, and so, it will yield an ASK for M of rate
1Unlike in [79] and allied literature, no key is available apriori for secure computation but can
be devised as a part of the computation procedure.
2We do not assume that this value is provided to the terminals in Ac in the actual secure
computing protocol. This is an artifice that is used to derive a necessary condition for secure
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equal to the entropy H of g. Therefore, g necessarily must satisfy H ≤ C. In Theo-
rem 3.4, we show that surprisingly, H < C is a sufficient condition for the existence
of a protocol for the secure computation of g by A. When all the terminals in M
seek to compute g securely, the corresponding ASK capacity reduces to the stan-
dard SK capacity for M [20, 21]. Furthermore, under this sufficient condition, our
proof exhibits a secure computing protocol that uses noninteractive communication.
Therefore, although interaction was allowed, it is not needed to accomplish secure
computing. As a side result of independent interest, we show that a function that
is securely computed by A can be augmented by residual secret CR to yield an SK
for A of optimum rate.
In proving the sufficient condition above, our main technical tool is a new
version of the “balanced coloring lemma” [2, 20]. The latter is an important basic
result that is used to show the existence of (nontrivial) mappings h of a given rv
U such that h(U) is (almost) independent of another rv3 V , where U and V are
correlated. In Section 2.7.1, we present a new balanced coloring lemma, which
builds on and extends the version given in [20].
We also present the capacity for a general ASK model involving arbitrary side
information at the secrecy-seeking set of terminals; such side information is not
available for communication and can be used for key recovery alone. Its capac-
computability of g by A.
3 In spirit, the same purpose is served by the “generalized privacy amplification” result of
Bennett, Brassard, Crépeau and Maurer [7]. Indeed, an alternative proof of some of our results
based on generalized privacy amplification was presented in [11].
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ity is characterized in terms of the classic concept of maximum common function
(mcf) [26]. Although this result is not needed in full dose for characterizing secure
computability, it remains of independent interest.
Next, we consider a generalization where different terminals seek to compute
different functions, without giving away the value of a private function of the data4.
Specifically, the terminals {1, ...,m} wish to compute functions g1, ..., gm, respec-
tively, of their collective data using communication that must not reveal the value
of a specified private function g0 of the data. If such a communication protocol
exists, the functions g0, g1, ..., gm are said to be securely computable.
A characterization of securely computable functions for this general setup re-
mains open. The simplest case of interest when the terminals in a subset A of M
compute only the private function g0 and those not in A perform no computation is
settled in Chapter 3 and was discussed above. For this simple case, our results can
be reinterpreted as follows: If g0 is securely computable (by the terminals in A),
then
H (XM|G0) = H (XM)−H (G0) ≥ R∗, (1.1)
and g0 is securely computable if
H (XM|G0) > R∗, (1.2)
where R∗ has the operational significance of being the minimum overall rate of
4For instance, in a variant of Yao’s millionaire problem [80], two millionaires communicate to
determine the richer between them and they want an eavesdropper not to learn their combined
wealth.
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communication needed for a specific multiterminal source-coding task that involves
the recovery of entire data at all the terminals in M when the terminals in Ac are
provided the value of g0 as side information; this task does not involve any security
constraint. Loosely speaking, denoting the collective data of the terminals by the
random variable (rv) XM and the random value of the function g0 by the rv G0, the
maximum rate of randomness (in the data) that is independent of G0 is H (XM|G0).
The conditions above imply, in effect, that g0 is securely computable if and only if
this residual randomness of rate H (XM|G0) contains an interactive communication,
of rate R∗, for the mentioned source-coding task.
In Theorem 4.1, for a broad class of settings involving the secure computation
of multiple functions, we establish necessary and sufficient conditions for secure
computation of the same form as (1.1) and (1.2), respectively. The rate R∗ now
corresponds to, roughly, the minimum overall rate of communication that allows
each terminal to:
(i) accomplish its required computation task, and,
(ii) recover the entire data ( i.e., attain omniscience) when its decoder alone is
also given the value of the private function.
Using the sufficient condition (1.2), we present a specific secure computing
protocol with communication of rate R∗. For the simple case of a single function
g = g0 discussed above, under (1.2), the secure computing scheme recovers the entire
data, i.e., the collective observations of all the terminals, at the (function-seeking)
terminals in A using communication that is independent of G0. In fact, we observe
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that this is a special case of the following more general principle: A terminal that
computes the private function g0, can recover the entire data without affecting the
conditions for secure computability. This exhibits a structural equivalence between
securely computing g0 at a terminal and recovering the entire data at that termi-
nal without giving away the value of g0 to an eavesdropper observing the public
communication used.
In general, a single-letter formula for R∗ is not known. Nevertheless, conditions
(1.1) and (1.2) provide a structural characterization of securely computable func-
tions in a broader setting. Also, a general recipe for single-letter characterization
is presented, and for the cases in which a single-letter characterization is available,
the aforementioned heuristic interpretation of R∗ is precise.
1.1.2 Communication for optimum rate secret keys
Consider SK generation by a pair of terminals that observe i.i.d. repetitions of two
finite-valued rvs of known joint pmf. The terminals communicate over a noiseless
public channel of unlimited capacity, interactively in multiple rounds, in order to
agree upon the value of an SK which is required to be (almost) independent of the
public communication. The maximum rate of such an SK, termed the SK capacity,
was characterized in [48, 1].
In the works of Maurer and Ahlswede-Csiszár [48, 1], SK generation of maxi-
mum rate entailed both the terminals recovering the observations of any one of the
terminals, using the least rate of communication required to do so. Later, it was
11
shown by Csiszár-Narayan [20] that a maximum rate SK can be generated also by
the terminals recovering the observations of both the terminals. Clearly, the latter
scheme requires more communication than the former. We address the following
question, which was raised in [20, Section VI]:
What is the minimum overall rate of interactive communication RSK required to
establish a maximum rate SK?
Curtailing the rate of communication used in SK generation to a minimum is
an important design objective, especially when engineering lightweight cryptography
systems such as secure sensor networks with limited transmission power available
at sensor nodes [23]. The basic question above is a first step towards understanding
the tradeoff between the rate of communication used and the rate of SK generated.
We answer this question by characterizing the form of CR that the terminals must
establish in order to generate a maximum rate SK; two examples of such CR are the
observations of any one terminal [48, 1] and of both terminals [20]. While our main
result does not yield a single-letter characterization of the minimum rate of commu-
nication above, it nonetheless reveals a central link between secrecy generation and
Wyner’s notion of common information (CI) between two dependent rvs X1 and X2
[77]. Wyner defined CI as the minimum rate of a function of i.i.d. repetitions of
two correlated rvs X1 and X2 that enabled a certain distributed source coding task.
Alternatively, it can be defined as the minimum rate of a function of i.i.d. repeti-
tions of X1 and X2 such that, conditioned on this function, the i.i.d. sequences are
(almost) independent; this definition, though not stated explicitly in [77], follows
from the analysis therein. We introduce a variant of this notion of CI called the
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interactive CI where we seek the minimum rate of CR, established using interactive
communication, that renders the mentioned sequences conditionally independent.
Clearly, interactive CI cannot be smaller than Wyner’s CI, and can exceed it. Our
main contribution in this section is to show a one-to-one correspondence between
the CR corresponding to interactive CI and the CR established for generating an
optimum rate SK. This correspondence is used to characterize the minimum rate of
communication RSK required for generating a maximum rate SK in Theorem 5.1.
It is shown that, in fact, RSK is simply interactive CI minus the SK capacity.
Finding a single-letter expression for interactive CI remains an open problem.
However, when the number of rounds of interaction are bounded, we do obtain a
single-letter formula for interactive CI, which in turn yields a single-letter expression
for RSK in Theorem 5.3. Using this expression for RSK , we show that for generating
an SK of maximum rate, an interactive communication scheme can have lower rate
than a noninteractive one, in general. However, interaction offers no advantage for
binary symmetric sources. The expression for RSK in Theorem 5.3 also illustrates
the role of sufficient statistics in SK generation. We further explore this issue and
show that many CI quantities of interest remain unchanged if the rvs are replaced
by their corresponding sufficient statistics (with respect to each other)5.
5 Interestingly, the effect of substitution by sufficient statistics has been studied in the context
of a rate-distortion problem for a remote source in [24, Lemma 2], and recently, for the lossy and
lossless distributed source coding problems in [78].
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1.1.3 Querying common randomness
A set of terminals observing correlated signals agree on CR, by communicating in-
teractively among themselves. What is the maximum number of queries of the form
“Is CR = l?” with yes-no answers, that an observer of (only) the communication
must ask in order to resolve the value of the CR?6 As an illustration, suppose that
two terminals observe, respectively, n i.i.d. repetitions of the finite-valued rvs X1
and X2. The terminals agree on CR X
n
1 with terminal 1 communicating to terminal
2 a Slepian-Wolf codeword of rate H (X1 | X2) obtained by random binning. An
observer of the bin index can ascertain the value of CR with large probability in
approximately exp [nI (X1 ∧X2)] queries (corresponding to bin size). Our results
show that more queries cannot be incurred by any other form of CR and associated
interactive communication.
In a general setting, terminals 1, ...,m observe, respectively, n i.i.d. repetitions
of the rvs X1, ..., Xm, and communicate interactively to create CR, say L, for the
terminals in a given subset A ⊆ {1, ...,m}. For appropriate CR L and interactive
communication, the number of queries of the form “Is L = l?” that an observer of the
communication must ask to resolve L is exponential in n. In Theorem 6.1, we find a
single-letter formula for the largest exponent E∗. Remarkably, this formula coincides
6This general setup includes the aforementioned biometric application mentioned earlier. When
a user is authenticated, the two versions of the biometric signatures at registration and authenti-
cation match, and they constitute a CR. Here the helper data is a proxy for the communication.
This view is adapted to construct efficient biometric authentication schemes in, for instance, [22].
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with the SK capacity for a multitermial source model with underlying rvs X1, ..., Xm
[20, 21]. While it is to be expected that E∗ is no smaller than SK capacity, the less-
restricted E∗ may seem a priori to be larger. But it is not so. The coincidence brings
out, in effect, an equivalence between inflicting a maximum number of queries on
an observer of communication on the one hand, and imposing the explicit secrecy
constraint requiring (almost) independence of the SK and the communication on the
other hand. In fact, as in the achievability proof of SK capacity in [20], the exponent
E∗ is achieved by the terminals in A attaining omniscience, i.e., by generating CR
L = (Xn1 , ..., X
n
m) for A, using a communication of minimum rate.
Alternatively, E∗ can be interpreted as the smallest rate of a list of CR values
produced by an observer of the communication which contains the CR value with
large probability.
Our main contribution in this section is a new technique for proving converse
results for security problems involving CR with interactive communication, which is
employed here to obtain an upper bound on E∗. It relies on query strategies for the
CR given the communication that do not depend explicitly on the form of the CR or
the communication, and do not require the rvs (X1t, ..., Xmt)
n
t=1 to be finite-valued
or i.i.d. In fact, our converse results hold even when the underlying alphabets are
arbitrary, but under mild technical assumptions. Jointly Gaussian rvs are treated
as a special case. Furthermore, our converses are strong in that the characterization
of E∗ does not depend on the probability of recovery of the CR. This, in turn, leads
to a new strong converse result for the SK capacity of the multiterminal source
model [20], [21], showing the maximum rate of SK that can be generated does not
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depend on the probability of recovery of the SK (at the terminals). A byproduct
of our technique is a simple lossless block coding result for general finite sources,
in terms of Rényi entropies. A particularization recovers the classic lossless block
coding result for i.i.d. sources [58] without recourse to the asymptotic equipartition
property. The technique7 is recorded separately in Section 2.7.2.
The number of queries above can be interpreted as a measure of the correla-
tion among the random signals observed by the terminals: A stronger correlation
necessitates more queries for resolving the CR that can be generated by them. Such
a measure of correlation is in the spirit of the body of work on “guessing” the value
of an rv based on a correlated observation [47, 4, 5, 34].
1.2 Organization of the dissertation
The basic multiterminal source model and the notions of CR and SK, along with
pertinent known results are given in Chapter 2. In the same chapter, we include a
discussion on various measures of CI and point out an interesting invariance property
satisfied by these CI quantities. The last section of Chapter 2 contains two important
technical tools that have been introduced in this dissertation, namely a new version
of the balanced coloring lemma and an estimate of the size of large probability sets
in terms of Rényi entropy. These are of independent interest, too.
The secure computing problem is presented in two parts, with Chapter 3 con-
taining the case of a single computed function and Chapter 4 the general case of
7Recently, it was brought to our attention [75] that alternative forms of this result exist in prior
literature; for instance [59, 13].
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multiple functions. Chapter 5 addresses the problem of minimum communication
requirements for generating an optimum rate SK. This is followed in Chapter 6 by
the problem of querying the value of CR. We conclude in Chapter 7 by hypothesizing




Classical Concepts and New Tools
2.1 Synopsis
We formulate basic concepts that will be of relevance throughout this dissertation.
For a multiterminal source model, the notions of common randomness, omniscience,
and secret key capacity are defined. Also, measures of common information of two
rvs due to Gács-Körner and Wyner are described, and a new invariance property
is established for these measures. In particular, it is shown that for a two-terminal
setup, these common information quantities remain unchanged if the two rvs are
replaced by their respective sufficient statistics (with respect to each other). Finally,
new technical tools are described, which emerge in this dissertation and underlie our
proofs. A key tool used in Chapter 6, estimating the size of a large probability set
in terms of Rényi entropy, is interpreted separately, too, as a lossless block coding
result for general sources. As a specific instance, it yields the classic result for a
discrete memoryless source.
Section 2.2 gives the basic set-up of the multiterminal source model and inter-
active communication that will be used throughout the dissertation. This is followed
by Sections 2.3 and 2.4 on definitions and preliminary results for common random-
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ness and secrecy generation. In Section 2.5, we define various common information
quantities and establish a new invariance property for them in Section 2.6. The
final Section 2.7 formulates technical tools that will be used in this dissertation.
Specifically, a new version of the “balanced coloring lemma” is established, which is
an important tool to extract almost independent rvs, and a new connection between
Rényi entropy and lossless source coding rate is provided. The results in Sections
2.6, 2.7.1 and 2.7.2 are contained, respectively, in [63], [68] and [65].
2.2 Multiterminal source model and interactive communi-
cation
Consider a set of terminals M = {1, ...,m} that observe, respectively, the se-
quences Xn1 , ..., X
n
m of length n. Unless stated otherwise, we assume that the rvs
(X1t, ..., Xmt), t = 1, ..., n, are i.i.d. with known distribution PXM . This basic mul-
titerminal source model was introduced in [20] in the context of SK generation with
public transaction.
The terminals have access to a noiseless public communication network of
unlimited capacity over which they can communicate interactively. The communi-
cation is authenticated and it is assumed that each terminal observes the commu-
nication from every other terminal. Randomization at the terminals is permitted;
we assume that terminal i generates a rv Ui, i ∈M, such that U1, . . . , Um and XnM
are mutually independent. While the cardinalities of range spaces of Ui, i ∈M, are
unrestricted, we assume that H (UM) <∞.
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Definition 2.1. (Interactice Communication) Assume without any loss of general-
ity that the communication of the terminals in M occurs in consecutive time slots
in r rounds; such communication is described in terms of the mappings
f11, . . . , f1m, f21, . . . , f2m, . . . , fr1, . . . , frm,
with fji corresponding to a message in time slot j from terminal i, 1 ≤ j ≤ r,
1 ≤ i ≤ m; in general, fji is allowed to yield any function of (Ui, Xni ) and of
previous communication
φji = {fkl : k < j, l ∈M or k = j, l < i}.
The corresponding rvs representing the communication will be depicted col-
lectively as
F = {F11, . . . , F1m, F21, . . . , F2m, . . . , Fr1, . . . , Frm},
where F = F(n)(UM, XnM); the rv corresponding to φji is denoted by Φji. A spe-
cial form of such communication will be termed noninteractive communication if
F = (F1, ..., Fm), where Fi = fi (Ui, X
n
i ), i ∈ M. The overall rate of all such





It is known from the pioneering work of Gács-Körner [26] (also, see [74]) that cor-
relation does not result in shared bits, in general. Nevertheless, as the terminals
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communicate with each other they are able to share bits. In fact, if the observa-
tions of the terminals are correlated, the rate of the shared bits is greater than the
rate of the communication. The concept of CR introduced by Csiszár-Ahlswede [2]
formalizes this idea.
Definition 2.2. (Common Randomness [2]) Given interactive communication F as
in Definition 2.1, an rv L = L(n) (XnM) is ε-common randomness (ε-CR) for A from1




i ,F), i ∈ A, satisfying
P (Li = L, i ∈ A) ≥ 1− ε. (2.1)
The rv Li will be called an estimate of L at terminal i ∈ A.
2.4 Secret keys and secret key capacity
Shared SKs lie at the heart of all cryptographic applications. Maurer [48] proposed
a framework for studying the generation of (information theoretically secure) SKs
as secret CR from correlated observations at two terminals. As mentioned above, if
the observations of the terminals are correlated, the rate of the overall CR generated
by the communication is greater than the rate of the communication. Heuristically,
this gain in the rate is the root of the generated SK rate. The largest rate of such
an SK that can be generated, the SK capacity, was characterized in [48, 1].
1The rv L is ε-recoverable from (Xni ,F) for every i ∈ A (see the “List of Abbreviations and
Notations” before Chapter 1) but not necessarily from F alone. The deliberate misuse of the
terminology “recoverable from F” economizes our presentation.
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This standard concepts of SK and SK capacity were extended to multiple
terminals in [20, 21]; we will present these general concepts below.
Definition 2.3. (SK capacity [20, 21]) For εn > 0, n ≥ 1, a function K of XnM is
an εn-secret key (εn-SK) for (the terminals in) a given set
2 A′ ⊆ M with |A′| ≥ 2,
achievable from observations of length n, randomization UM and public communi-
cation F = F(n)(UM, XnM) as above if
(i) K is εn-recoverable from (Ui, X
n
i ,F) for every i ∈ A′;
(ii) K satisfies the “strong secrecy” condition [20, 21]
sin(K,F ) , log |K| −H(K | F) = log |K| −H(K) + I(K ∧ F) ≤ εn, (2.2)
where K = K(n) denotes the set of possible values of K; The terminology perfect SK
will be used for a 0-SK.
The SK capacity C(A′) for A′ is the largest rate lim sup
n
(1/n) logH(K) of
εn-SKs for A′ as above,3 such that lim
n
εn = 0.
Remark. The secrecy condition (2.2) is tantamount jointly to a nearly uniform dis-
tribution for K (i.e., log |K| − H(K) is small) and to the near independence of K
and F (i.e., I(K ∧ F) is small).
A single-letter characterization of the SK capacity C(A′) is provided in [20, 21].
2For reasons of notation that will be apparent later, we distinguish between the secrecy seeking
set A′ ⊆M and the set A ⊆M pursuing secure computation.
3In [20, 21], a secret key was defined, in general, as K = K (UM, X
n
M) and SK capacity was







Theorem 2.1. (Characterization of SK Capacity [20, 21]) The SK capacity C(A′)
equals













Ri ≥ H(XB | XBc), B  M,A′ * B
}
. (2.5)
Furthermore, the SK capacity can be achieved with noninteractive communication
and without recourse to randomization at the terminals in M.
Remarks. (i) We recall from [20] that RCO(A′) has the operational significance of
being the smallest rate of “communication for omniscience” for A′, namely the
smallest rate lim
n
(1/n) log ‖F(n)‖ of suitable communication for the terminals in
M whereby XnM is εn-recoverable from (Ui, Xni ,Fn) at each terminal i ∈ A′, with
lim
n
εn = 0; here ‖F(n)‖ denotes the cardinality of the set of values of F(n). Thus,
RCO(A′) is the smallest rate of communication among the terminals in M that
enables every terminal in A′ to reconstruct with high probability all the sequences
observed by all the other terminals in M, with the cooperation of the terminals in
M/A′. The resulting omniscience for A′ corresponds to total CR of rate H(XM).
(ii) For the trivial case |A′| = 1, say with A′ = {1}, we have that C ({1}) = H (X1).
Clearly, K = Xn1 attains C ({1}). On the other hand, if K = K (XnM) is an SK for
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terminal 1, it is also an SK for a relaxed model where terminal 1 remains the same
while terminals 2, ...,m coalesce and have additional access to Xn1 . The SK capacity
for the latter model with two terminals, which is no smaller than C({1}), equals
I (X1 ∧XM) = H (X1) [48, 1]. Hence, C ({1}) = H (X1).
(iii) The SK capacity C(A′) is not increased if the secrecy condition (2.2) is replaced
by the following weaker requirement [48, 20]:
1
n
I(K ∧ F) ≤ εn. (2.6)
In fact, the “weak secrecy” criterion above was first introduced in [48, 1]. Subse-
quently, it was noted in [49, 16] that a capacity achieving SK can be generated that
satisfies the following stronger secrecy criterion:
I(K ∧ F) ≤ εn.
(iv) An alternative security criterion is based on the variational distance:
svar(K,F) , ‖PK,F − UK × PF‖1 , (2.7)
where UK denotes a uniform distribution on the set K. Note that the security index
sin in (2.2) can be expressed as
sin(K,F) = D (PK,F‖UK × PF ) ,







A weaker secrecy criterion than (2.2), which is also widely used in the literature (c.f.
[36] and the follow-up work based on “leftover hash lemma”), is the following:
svar(K,F) ≤ εn. (2.8)
Also, it was observed in [20, Lemma 1] that





nsvar(K,F)→ 0 as n→ 0, (2.9)
then sin(K,F)→ 0. In fact, the achievability scheme in [20] ensures (2.9) by driving
svar(K,F) to 0 exponentially rapidly in n. In Chapter 6, we shall establish a new
“strong converse” for SK capacity under (2.9)4.
(v) The weak secrecy criterion in (2.6) does not imply the security criterion in (2.8).
Also, the former is not implied by (2.9).
The expression for the SK capacity C(A′) in 2.3 can be expressed alternatively
using a (linear programming) dual expression for RCO(A′). Let
B = {B (M : B 6= ∅,A * B} . (2.10)




λB = 1, i ∈M. (2.11)
4The proofs in Chapter 6 can be modified to show a strong converse under (2.8) [73].
25
Every λ ∈ Λ(A) is called a fractional partition of M (see [21, 44, 45, 46]). An
equivalent expression for C(A′) is















λBH (XBc)− (λsum − 1)H (XM)
]
, (2.14)












where the minimum is over all (nontrivial) partitions π = (π1, ..., πk) of M with
|π| = k parts, 2 ≤ k ≤ m [12] (see also [20, Example 4]).
Depending on the task at hand, we shall use these expressions for C(A′) inter-
changeably in this dissertation. Finally, for m = 2, the expression for C(M) reduces
to the omnipresent mutual information.
Theorem 2.2. [48, 1] The SK capacity for A′ =M = {0, 1} is
C({1, 2}) = I(X1 ∧X2).
For further discussion on SKs, see Section 6.7.
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2.5 Common information quantities
The first notion of CI for two rvs was given by Gács and Körner in their seminal
work [26]. One interpretation of the Gács-Körner CI is as the maximum rate of
a CR that can be established by two terminals observing i.i.d. repetitions of two
correlated rvs X1 and X2, without any communication. Formally,
Definition 2.4. A number R ≥ 0 is an achievable Gács-Körner CI rate if for every
0 < ε < 1 there exists an n ≥ 1 and a (finite-valued) rv L = L (Xn1 , Xn2 ) of rate
(1/n)H(L) ≥ R such that L is ε-recoverable from Xn1 and ε-recoverable from Xn2 .
The supremum over all achievable Gács-Körner CI rates is called the Gács-
Körner CI of X1 and X2, denoted CIGK(X1 ∧X2).
For characterizing their CI, Gács and Körner specified the maximal common
function of X1 and X2, denoted here as mcf(X1, X2), as separate functions of X1
and X2 that agree with probability 1, such that any other common function of X1
and X2 is a function of mcf(X1, X2).
Theorem 2.3. [26] The Gács-Körner CI of the rvs X1, X2 is
CIGK(X1 ∧X2) = H(mcf(X1, X2)).
In Chapter 3, we introduce a new multiterminal version of mcf in Definition
3.4.
Subsequently, Wyner defined CI as the minimum rate of a function of i.i.d.
repetitions of two correlated rvs X1 and X2 that facilitated a specific distributed
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source coding task [77]. Alternatively, it can be defined as the minimum rate of a
function of i.i.d. repetitions of X1 and X2 such that, conditioned on this function,
the i.i.d. sequences are (almost) independent; this definition, though not stated
explicitly in [77], follows from the analysis therein. Formally,
Definition 2.5. A number R ≥ 0 is an achievable Wyner CI rate if for every
0 < ε < 1 there exists an n ≥ 1 and a (finite-valued) rv L = L (Xn1 , Xn2 ) of rate
(1/n)H(L) ≤ R that satisfies the property:
1
n
I (Xn1 ∧Xn2 | L) ≤ ε. (2.16)
Obvious examples of such an rv L are L = (Xn1 , X
n





infimum of all achievable CI rates, denoted CIW (X1 ∧X2), is called the Wyner CI
of X1 and X2. The following theorem characterizes CIW (X1 ∧X2).
Theorem 2.4. [77] The Wyner CI of the rvs X1, X2 is
CIW (X1 ∧X2) = min
U
I(X1, X2 ∧ U), (2.17)
where the rv U takes values in a (finite) set U with |U| ≤ |X1||X2| and satisfies the
Markov condition X1 −◦− U −◦−X2.
The direct part follows from [77, equation (5.12)]. The proof of the converse is
straightforward. The following inequality ensues [26, 77]:
CIGK(X1 ∧X2) ≤ I(X1 ∧X2) ≤ CIW (X1 ∧X2).
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2.6 Invariance of common information
The concepts and the results reviewed above, which are standard in multiterminal
information theory, will be used throughout this dissertation. In this section, we
present a new invariance property of CI quantities.
Since any good notion of CI between rvs X1 and X2 measures the correlation
between X1 and X2, it is reasonable to expect the CI to remain unchanged if X1
and X2 are replaced by their respective sufficient statistics. The following theorem
establishes this for the quantities H(mcf(X1, X2)), I(X1 ∧X2) and CIW (X1 ∧X2).
Theorem 2.5. For rvs X1 and X2, let functions g1 of X1 and g2 of X2 be such that
X1 −◦− g1(X1)−◦−X2 and X1 −◦− g2(X2)−◦−X2. Then the following relations hold:
H(mcf(X1, X2)) = H (mcf (g1(X1), g2(X2))) ,
I(X1 ∧X2) = I (g1(X1) ∧ g2(X2)) ,
CIW (X1 ∧X2) = CI (g1(X1) ∧ g2(X2)) ,
Remark. A new notion of CI, termed interactive CI, is introduced in Chapter 5 and
a similar invariance property is established for it in Theorem 5.8
Proof. First note that
I(X1 ∧X2) = I (g1(X1) ∧X2) = I (g1(X1) ∧ g2(X2)) .
Next, we consider the Gács-Körner CI. Note that any common function of
g1(X1) and g2(X2) is also a common function of X1 and X2. Consequently,
H(mcf(X1, X2)) ≥ H(mcf(g1(X1), g2(X2))). (2.18)
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For the reverse inequality, observe that for an rv U such thatH(U |X2) = H(U |X1) =
0 we have
U −◦−X1 −◦− g1(X1)−◦−X2.
Thus, H (U |g1(X1)) ≤ H(U |X2) = 0, and similarly, H (U |g2(X2)) = 0. In particular,
it holds that
H (mcf(X1, X2)|g1(X1)) = H (mcf(X1, X2)|g2(X2)) = 0,
and so,
H(mcf(X1, X2)) ≤ H(mcf(g1(X1), g2(X2))),
which along with (2.18) yields
H(mcf(X1, X2)) = H(mcf(g1(X1), g2(X2))).
Finally, we consider Wyner’s CI and claim that this, too, remains unchanged
upon replacing the rvs with their respective sufficient statistics (for the other rv).
It suffices to show that
CIW (X1 ∧X2) = CIW (g(X1) ∧X2),
for a function g such that X1−◦ g(X1)−◦ X2. Consider an rv U for which X1−◦ U−◦ X2
is satisfied. We have
0 = I(X1 ∧X2 | U) ≥ I (g(X1) ∧X2 | U) .
It follows from (2.17) that
CIW (X1 ∧X2) ≥ CIW (g(X1) ∧X2) . (2.19)
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On the other hand, for an rv L = L (gn (Xn1 ) , X
n
2 ) we have
1
n
I (Xn1 ∧Xn2 | L) =
1
n
I (gn (Xn1 ) ∧Xn2 | L) ,
since
I (Xn1 ∧Xn2 | L, gn (Xn1 )) ≤ I (Xn1 ∧Xn2 , L | gn (Xn1 ))
= I (Xn1 ∧Xn2 | gn (Xn1 )) = 0.
Thus, from the definition of CIW (g(X1) ∧X2) we get
CIW (X1 ∧X2) ≤ CIW (g(X1) ∧X2),
so that, by (2.19),
CIW (X1 ∧X2) = CIW (g(X1) ∧X2).
2.7 Two basic tools
In this section, we present two technical tools that have been developed in this
dissertation and may be of independent interest.
2.7.1 Balanced coloring lemma
Since our security criterion involves almost independence, all our achievability schemes
rely on the existence of a mapping φ of an rv U that is almost independent of an-
other rv V correlated with U . For instance, in the SK generation problem, with the
established CR in the role of U and the eavesdropper’s observations (including the
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public communication) in the role of V , φ is used to extract an SK. In the secure
computing problem, with the local observations at a terminal in the role of U and
the private function value in the role of V , φ constitutes a communication from the
terminal which is almost independent of the private function value. One basic tool
for showing the existence of such a mapping φ is the “balanced coloring lemma” of
Ahlswede and Csiszár [2] stated below5.
Lemma 2.6. [2, Lemma 3.1] Let P be any family of N pmfs on a finite set U , and
let d > 0 be such that P ∈ P satisfies
P
({





for some 0 < ε < (1/9). Then the probability that a randomly selected mapping
















Note that for P =
{
PU |V=v, v ∈ V
}
, the left side of (2.21) is svar(φ(U), V ),
where svar is defined in (2.7). Therefore, we can find a mapping φ such that





< 1. This gives an estimate of the size r
of the range of φ to ensure almost independence of φ(U) and V . In fact, the bound
in (2.20) need not be satisfied for every PU |V=v, and it suffices to require (2.20) for
v ∈ V0 with PV (V0) close to 1. As an illustration, consider rvs Un and V n, the n
5An alternative tool for the same purpose is the “generalized privacy amplification” result of
Bennett, Brassard, Crépeau and Maurer [7].
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i.i.d. repetitions of U, V . Then, the foregoing approach guarantees the existence of
a mapping φ of Un of rate (approximately) H(U | V ) such that svar(φ(Un), V n)→ 0
as n goes to ∞.
A typical application of the lemma above is to the case where V includes the
value of a mapping h : U → {1, . . . , r′}. In [20, Lemma B.2], Csiszár and Narayan
proved a version of the “balanced coloring lemma” that was tailored to handle this
case. When applied to the i.i.d. illustration above, it implied that for a mapping
h(Un) of rate R, there exists a mapping φ(Un) of rate (approximately) H(U | V )−R
such that for Zn = (V
n, h(Un)),
svar(φ(U
n), Zn)→ 0 as n→∞.
In other words, there is a loss equal to R in the rate of the constructed mapping φ
if the eavesdropper additionally knows h(Un) of rate R. As an application, consider
the problem of generating an SK for M. If a CR XnM is established using a com-
munication of rate R, then an SK of rate H(XM)−R can be generated. Therefore
H(XM) − RCO(M) is an achievable SK rate for M, which is optimal by Theorem
2.1.
In this dissertation we need a further generalization of [20, Lemma B.2] when
the bound in (2.20) holds not for U but for another rv U ′ that differs from U with
probability close to 0, i.e., we call for a balanced coloring of U while we have the
bound (2.20) holding for U ′.
Specifically, consider rvs U,U ′, V with values in finite sets U ,U ′,V , respectively,
where U ′ is a function of U , and a mapping h : U → {1, . . . , r′}. For λ > 0, let U0
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be a subset of U such that
(i) P (U ∈ U0) > 1− λ2;
(ii) given the event {U ∈ U0, h(U) = j, U ′ = u′, V = v}, there exists u = u(u′) ∈ U0
satisfying
P (U ′ = u′ | h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0)
= P (U = u | h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0) , (2.22)
for 1 ≤ j ≤ r′ and v ∈ V . Then the following holds.
Lemma 2.7. Let the rvs U,U ′, V and the set U0 be as above. Further, assume that
PUV
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for a constant c > 0.
Remark. Note that the quantity on the left side of (2.24) is svar = svar(φ(U), (h(U), V )).
By [20, Lemma 1] it holds that




where sin is as in (2.2). Since the function f(x) = x log(r/x) is increasing for
0 < x < r/e, it follows from (2.24) that





Therefore, the “balanced coloring lemma” suffices to show security in the sense of
(2.2), too.
The proof of Lemma 2.7 is a variation of the proof of [20, Lemma B.2] and is
given in Appendix C.
2.7.2 Rényi entropy and sets with large probability
The next result relates the cardinalities of large probability sets to Rényi entropy.
The first part is used in the converse proofs in Chapter 6. The mentioned result is
of independent interest and is shown below to yield an elementary alternative proof
of the source coding theorem for an i.i.d. (finite-valued) source.
Definition 2.6. [57] Let µ be a nonnegative measure on U . For 0 ≤ α 6= 1, the







Lemma 2.8. (i) For every 0 < δ < µ(U), there exists a set Uδ ⊆ U such that
µ (Uδ) ≥ µ(U)− δ, (2.26)
and
|Uδ| ≤ δ−α/(1−α) exp (Hα(µ)) , 0 ≤ α < 1. (2.27)
(ii) Conversely, for δ, δ′ > 0, δ+ δ′ < µ(U), any set Uδ ⊆ U with µ (Uδ) as in (2.26)
must satisfy
|Uδ| ≥ (δ′)1/(α−1) (µ(U)− δ − δ′) exp (Hα(µ)) , α > 1. (2.28)
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Proof. (i) For 0 ≤ α < 1, defining Uδ =
{










Writing the summand in the right-side above as µ(u) = µ(u)αµ(u)1−α, we obtain




= µ (Uδ) + δ, (2.29)
which is (2.26). Furthermore,










1−α exp [−αHα(µ)] , (2.30)
which gives (2.27).
(ii) By following the steps in the proof of (i), for α > 1, it can shown that the set
U0 =
{




µ(U0) > µ(U)− δ′,
which, with (2.26), gives
µ(U0 ∩ Uδ) > µ(U)− δ − δ′.
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Since by (2.31)
µ(U0 ∩ Uδ) < |U0 ∩ Uδ| (δ′)1/(1−α) exp[−Hα(µ)],
(2.28) follows.
Lemma 2.8 relating the cardinalities of large probability sets to Rényi entropy
can be interpreted as a source coding result for a general source with finite alphabet
U . Furthermore, it leads to the following asymptotic result.
Consider a sequence of probability measures µn on finite sets Un, n ≥ 1. For
0 < δ < 1, R is a δ-achievable (block) source coding rate if there exists sets Vn ⊆ Un
satisfying
µn(Vn) ≥ 1− δ,





log |Vn| ≤ R.
The optimum source coding rate R∗(δ) is the infimum of all such δ-achievable rates.














Corollary 2.10. If µn is an i.i.d. probability measure on Un = U × ...× U , then
R∗(δ) = H(µ1), 0 < δ < 1.
Proof. The Proposition is a direct consequence of Lemma 2.8 upon taking appropri-
ate limits in (2.27) and (2.28) with Un in the role of U . The Corollary follows since
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for i.i.d. µn,
Hα(µn) = nHα(µ1) and lim
α→1
Hα(µ1) = H(µ1).
Note that the Corollary above is proved without recourse to the “asymptotic
equipartition property”. Moreover, it contains a strong converse for the lossless
coding theorem for an i.i.d. source. In general, Proposition 2.9 implies a strong
converse whenever the lower and upper bounds for R∗(δ) in (2.32) coincide. This
implication is a special case of a general source coding result in [32, Theorem 1.5.1],
[33], where it was shown that a strong converse holds iff for rvs Un with pmfs µn,
















µn(Zn > β) = 0
}
. (2.33)
In fact, a straightforward calculation shows that the lower and upper bounds for






A subset of a set of terminals that observe correlated signals seek to compute a given
function of the signals using public communication. It is required that the value
of the function be concealed from an eavesdropper with access to the communica-
tion. We show that the function is securely computable if and only if its entropy is
less than the capacity of a new secrecy generation model, for which a single-letter
characterization is provided.
The main results in Section 3.3 are organized in three parts: capacity of a (new)
aided secret key model; characterization of the secure computability of a function
g; and a decomposition result for the total entropy of the model, which lies at the
heart of our technical approach. Proofs are provided in Section 3.4 and concluding
remarks in Section 3.5. The results of this chapter were reported in [67, 69, 68].
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3.2 Formulation: Secure function computation by public
communication
Terminals 1, . . . ,m observe, respectively, the sequences Xn1 , . . . , X
n
m, of length n.
Let g : XM → Y be a given mapping, where Y is a finite alphabet. For n ≥ 1, the
mapping gn : X nM → Yn is defined by
gn(xnM) = (g(x11, . . . , xm1), . . . , g(x1n, . . . , xmn)),
xnM = (x
n
1 , . . . , x
n
m) ∈ X nM.
For convenience, we shall denote the rv gn (XnM) by G
n, n ≥ 1, and, in particular,
G1 = g (XM) simply by G. The terminals in a given set A ⊆M wish to “compute
securely” the function gn(xnM) for x
n
M in X nM. To this end, the terminals are allowed
to communicate over a noiseless public channel, possibly interactively in several
rounds. Randomization at the terminals is permitted; we assume that terminal i
generates a rv Ui, i ∈M, such that U1, . . . , Um and XnM are mutually independent.
While the cardinalities of range spaces of Ui, i ∈ M, are unrestricted, we assume
that H (UM) <∞ (see Definition 2.1).
Definition 3.1. For εn > 0, n ≥ 1, we say that g is εn-securely computable (εn- SC)
by (the terminals in) a given set A ⊆ M with |A| ≥ 1 from observations of length
n, randomization UM and public communication F = F(n), if
(i) gn is εn- recoverable from (Ui, X
n









i ,F) 6= Gn
)
≤ εn, i ∈ A, (3.1)
and
(ii) gn satisfies the strong secrecy condition [49, 16, 19].
I(Gn ∧ F) ≤ εn. (3.2)
By definition, an εn-SC function g is recoverable (as g
n) at the terminals
in A and is effectively concealed from an eavesdropper with access to the public
communication F.
Definition 3.2. We say that g is securely computable by A if g is εn- SC by A from




Figure 3.1 shows our setup for secure computing.
3.3 When is a function securely computable?
We consider first the case when all the terminals inM wish to compute securely the
function g, i.e., A =M. Our result for this case will be seen to be linked inherently
to the standard concept of SK capacity for a multiterminal source model described
in the previous chapter (see Definition 2.3), and serves to motivate our approach to
the general case when A ⊆M.
A comparison of the conditions in (3.2) and (2.6) that must be met by a
securely computable g and an SK K, respectively, shows for a given g to be securely
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Figure 3.1: Secure computation of g
computable, it is necessary that
H(G) ≤ C(M). (3.3)
Remarkably, it transpires that H(G) < C(M) is a sufficient condition for g to be
securely computable, and constitutes our first result.
Theorem 3.1. A function g is securely computable by M if
H(G) < C(M). (3.4)
Conversely, if g is securely computable by M, then H(G) ≤ C(M).
Theorem 3.1 is, in fact, a special case of our main result in Theorem 3.4 below.
Example 3.1. Secure Computation of Parity. Let m = 2, and let X1 and X2 be
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{0, 1}-valued rvs with
PX1(1) = p = 1− PX1(0), 0 < p < 1,




such rvs X1 and X2 give rise to binary symmetric sources (BSS). Let g(x1, x2) =
x1 + x2 mod 2.
From Theorem 2.1, C({1, 2}) = h(p∗δ)−h(δ), where p∗δ = (1−p)δ+p(1−δ).
Since H(G) = h(δ), by Theorem 3.1 g is securely computable if
2h(δ) < h(p ∗ δ). (3.5)
We give a simple scheme for the secure computation of g when p = 1/2, that relies on
Wyner’s well-known method for Slepian-Wolf data compression [76] and a derived




n mod 2 (3.6)
with Gn being independent separately of Xn2 and X
n
1 . We observe as in [76] that
there exists a binary linear code, of rate ∼= 1 − h(δ), with parity check matrix P
such that Xn1 , and so G
n, is εn-recoverable from (F1, X
n
2 ) at terminal 2, where the
Slepian-Wolf codeword F1 = PX
n
1 constitutes public communication from terminal
1, and where εn decays to 0 exponentially rapidly in n. Let Ĝn be the estimate
of Gn thereby formed at terminal 2. (We can take Ĝn to have been compressed
losslessly to rate H(G).) Further, let K = K(Xn1 ) be the location of X
n
1 in the
coset of the standard array corresponding to P. By the previous observation, K
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too is εn-recoverable from (F1, X
n
2 ) at terminal 2. From [82], [81], K constitutes a
“perfect” SK for terminals 1 and 2, of rate ∼= I(X1 ∧X2) = 1− h(δ), and satisfying
I(K ∧ F1) = 0. (3.7)
Also, observe from (3.6) that K = K(Xn1 ) = K(X
n
2 + G






n). Since Gn is independent of Xn2 , it follows that conditioned on each




conditional pmf that equals the pmf of Xn2 + g
n which, in turn, coincides with the
pmf of Xn1 + g
n, i.e., a permutation of the pmf of Xn1 . Hence by (3.7),
I(K ∧ F1, Gn) = I(K ∧ F1 | Gn) = 0, (3.8)
since I(K ∧Gn) ≤ I(Xn1 ∧Gn) = 0.
Then terminal 2 communicates Ĝn in encrypted form as
F2 = Ĝn +K mod 2
(all represented in bits), with encryption feasible since
H(G) = h(δ) < 1− h(δ) ∼= 1
n
H(K),
by the sufficient condition (3.5). Terminal 1 then decrypts F2 using K to recover
Ĝn. The computation of gn is secure since
I(Gn ∧ F1, F2) = I(Gn ∧ F1) + I(Gn ∧ F2 | F1)
is small; specifically, the first term equals 0 since I(Gn ∧ F1) ≤ I(Gn ∧ Xn1 ) = 0,
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while the second term is bounded according to
I(Gn ∧ F2 | F1) = H(Ĝn +K | F1)−H(Ĝn +K | F1, Gn)
≤ H(K)−H(Gn +K | F1, Gn) + δn,
with δn → 0
= I(K ∧ F1, Gn) + δn = δn,
where the intermediate step uses Fano’s inequality and the exponential decay of εn
to 0, and the last equality is by (3.8).
Example 3.2. Consider the setup of Example 3.1 for the case p = 1/2, but now
with terminal 1 alone seeking to compute g. Since Gn is independent of Xn2 , secure
computation of g at terminal 1 is possible with terminal 2 simply communicating
Xn2 , even when X1 and X2 are independent. Note that
H(G) = h(δ) ≤ C ({1}) = H (X1) = 1,
for 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1/2.
We now turn to the general model for the secure computability of g by a given
set A ⊆M. Again in the manner of (3.3), it is clear that a necessary condition is
H(G) ≤ C(A).
In contrast, when A  M, the condition H(G) < C(A) is not sufficient for g to be
securely computable by A as seen by the following simple example.
Example 3.3. Omniscience is Forbidden. Let m = 3, A = {1, 2} and consider
rvs X1, X2, X3 with X1 = X2, where X1 is independent of X3 and H(X3) < H(X1).
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Let g be defined by g(x1, x2, x3) = x3, xi ∈ Xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. Clearly, C({1, 2}) =
H(X1). Therefore, H(G) = H(X3) < C({1, 2}). However, for g to be computed
by the terminals 1 and 2, its value must be conveyed to them necessarily by public
communication from terminal 3. Thus, g is not securely computable.
We observe in Example 3.2 that if the value of Gn is given to terminal 2 after it
has communicated Xn2 to terminal 1, then both terminals attain omniscience, with
terminal 1 doing so from communication that is independent of Gn. Terminal 1 then
computes Gn from its omniscience. Interestingly, the secure computability of g can
be examined in terms of a new SK generation problem that contains these features
and is formulated next.
3.3.1 Secret key aided by side information
We consider an extension of the SK generation problem in Definition 2.3, which
involves additional side information ZnA′ that is correlated with X
n
M and is provided
to the terminals in A′ for use in only the recovery stage of SK generation; however,
the public communication F remains as in Definition 2.1. Formally, the extension
is described in terms of generic rvs (X1, . . . , Xm, {Zi, i ∈ A′}), where the rvs Zi too
take values in finite sets Zi, i ∈ A′. The full force of this extension will not be needed
to characterize the secure computability of g; an appropriate particularization will
suffice. Nevertheless, this concept is of independent interest.
Definition 3.3. A function K of (XnM, Z
n
A′) is an εn- secret key aided by side infor-
mation ZnA′ (εn-ASK) for the terminals A′ ⊆M, |A′| ≥ 2, achievable from observa-
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tions of length n, randomization UM and public communication F = F(UM, XnM)




i ,F) in the role of
(Ui, X
n
i ,F) in condition (i). The corresponding ASK capacity C(A′, ZA′) is defined
analogously as in Definition 2.3.
In contrast with the omniscience rate of H(XM) that appears in the passage
following Theorem 2.1, now an underlying analogous notion of omniscience will
involve total CR of rate exceeding H(XM). Specifically, the enhanced CR rate will
equal the entropy of the mcf of the rvs (XM, Zi)i∈A, introduced for a pair of rvs in
[26] (see also [17, Problem 3.4.27] and Chapter 2 above).
Definition 3.4. [26] For two rvs Q,R with values in finite setsQ,R, the equivalence
relation q ∼ q′ in Q holds if there exist N ≥ 1 and sequences (q0, q1, . . . , qN) in Q
with q0 = q, qN = q
′ and (r1, . . . , rN) in R satisfying P (Q = ql−1, R = rl) > 0 and
P (Q = ql, R = rl) > 0, l = 1, . . . , N . Denote the corresponding equivalence classes
in Q by Q1, . . . ,Qk. Similarly, let R1, . . . ,Rk′ denote the equivalence classes in R.
As argued in [26], k = k′ and for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k,




1, i = j,
0, i 6= j.
The mcf of the rvs Q,R is a rv mcf(Q,R) with values in {1, . . . , k}, defined by
mcf(Q,R) = i iff Q ∈ Qi, R ∈ Ri, i = 1, . . . , k.
For rvs Q1, ..., Qm taking values in finite alphabets, we define the mcf(Q1, ..., Qm)
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recursively by
mcf(Q1, ..., Qm) = mcf
(
mcf(Q1, ..., Qm−1), Qm
)
(3.9)
with mcf(Q1, Q2) as above.
Definition 3.5. With Qn denoting n i.i.d. repetitions of the rv Q, we define
mcfn(Q1, ..., Qm) = {mcf (Q1t, ..., Qmt)}nt=1 . (3.10)
Note that mcfn(Q1, ..., Qm) is a function of each individual Q
n
i , i = 1, ...,m.
Remark. As justification for the Definition (3.9), consider a rv ξ that satisfies
H(ξ | Qi) = 0, i = 1, ...,m (3.11)
and suppose for any other rv ξ′ satisfying (3.11) that H(ξ) ≥ H(ξ′). Then Lemma
3.2 below shows that ξ must satisfy H(ξ) = H(mcf(Q1, ..., Qm)).
The following result for the mcf of m ≥ 2 rvs is a simple extension of the
classic result for m = 2 [26, Theorem 1].










≤ H(mcf(Q1, ..., Qm)). (3.12)
Proof: The proof involves a recursive application of [26, Lemma, Section 4] to
mcf(Q1, ..., Qm) in (3.9), and is provided in Appendix A.
We are now in a position to characterize ASK capacity. In a manner analogous
to Theorem 2.1, this is done in terms of H(mcf(XM, Zi)i∈A′) and the smallest rate
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of communication RCO(A′, ZA′) for each terminal in A′ to attain omniscience that
corresponds to n i.i.d. repetitions of mcf ((XM, Zi)i∈A′).
Theorem 3.3. The ASK capacity C(A′;ZA′) is given by













H(XB | XBc , Zj), B  M,A′ * B
}
. (3.13)
The proof of Theorem 3.3 is along the same lines as that of Theorem 2.1 [20]
and is provided in Appendix B.
The remark following Theorem 2.1 also applies to the ASK capacity C(A′;ZA′),
as will be seen from the proof of Theorem 3.3.
3.3.2 Characterization of secure computability
If g is securely computable by the terminals in A, then Gn constitutes an ASK for
M under the constraint (2.6), of rate H(G), with side information in the form of Gn
provided only to the terminals in Ac in the recovery stage of SK generation. Thus,
a necessary condition for g to be securely computable by A, in the manner of (3.3),
is
H(G) ≤ C(M;ZM), (3.14)
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0, i ∈ A
G, i ∈ Ac.
(3.15)
By particularizing Theorem 3.3 to the choice of ZM as above, the right side of (3.14)
reduces to












{ H(XB | XBc), B  M,A * B
H(XB | XBc , G), B  M,A ⊆ B
}
.
Our main result says that the necessary condition (3.14) is tight. Consider a protocol
that enables the terminals in M to attain omniscience using communication that
is independent of Gn, when Gn is provided only as “decoder side information” to
the terminals in Ac but cannot be used for communication. Our proof shows that
condition (3.17) below is sufficient for such a protocol to exist. Clearly, this protocol
also serves for the secure computation of g by the terminals in A upon disregarding
the decoding tasks in Ac (so that the protocol does not depend on a knowledge of
Gn).
Theorem 3.4. A function g is securely computable by A ⊆M if
H(G) < C(M;ZM). (3.17)
Furthermore, under the condition above, g is securely computable with noninteractive
communication and without recourse to randomization at the terminals in M.
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Conversely, if g is securely computable by A ⊆M, then H(G) ≤ C(M;ZM).
Remarks. (i) As in the proof of achievability of SK capacity in [20], our proof of the
sufficiency of (3.17) for the secure computability of g holds with εn in (3.1), (3.2)
decaying to zero exponentially rapidly in n.
(ii) It is easy to see that C(M) ≤ C (M;ZM) ≤ C(A), where ZM is as in (3.15).
In particular, the second inequality holds by noting that an SK for M is also an
SK for A, and that the side information for recovery ZM in (3.15) is not provided
to the terminals in A.
(iii) Observe in Example 3 that C (M;ZM) = C(M) = 0 and so, by Theorem 3.4,
g is not securely computable as noted earlier.
Example 3.4. Secure Computing Using an SK. In certain practical applications,
different terminals observe mutually independent data and each seeks to securely
compute a function g of the totality of all the observations. To enable this, they
share a perfect SK, say K, of rate R. Then, since the SK capacity for this model is
equal to R, by Theorem 3.1 a protocol for securely computing g exists if H(G) < R,
and only if H(G) ≤ R. Therefore, the terminals must share an SK of rate larger
than H(G) to accomplish secure computing.
Concretely, consider the case m = 2 with terminals 1 and 2 observing, re-
spectively, random independent bits B1 and B2. Each terminal wishes to compute
securely B1 ⊕ B2. Furthermore, assume that the terminals share a one-bit SK K,
which is independent of (B1, B2); thus, X1 = (B1, K) and X2 = (B2, K). Then, the
following simple protocol ensures secure computing: F1 = B1, F2 = K ⊕ B1 ⊕ B2.
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In fact, this same protocol can be repeated n times to securely compute the parity
for n i.i.d. pairs of independent random bits observed by the two terminals. But
is this optimal or can we make do with less than n bits of SK? Heuristically, se-
cure computing is feasible owing to the advantage that the legitimate parties have
over the eavesdropper due to the correlation in their observations. In this simple
example, this correlation corresponds to a shared SK. Therefore, the question raised
above is, in effect, an “inverse” problem where we wish to quantify the minimum
correlation needed to ensure secure computing. Specifically, since the SK capacity
in this model is equal to the rate R of the SK, secure computing is feasible only if
R ≥ H(B1 ⊕ B2) = 1 and so, the number of bits of SK cannot be (asymptotically)
less than n for secure computing. Hence, the simple protocol above is asymptotically
optimal.
Example 3.5. Secure Auction. In an online auction, m − 1 bidders acting inde-
pendently of each other, randomly place one of k bids on a secure server. After a
period of independent daily bidding, the server posts a cryptic message on a public
website. We shall see that such a message exists from which each bidder can deduce
securely the highest daily bids, but for m > k + 1 no message exists to allow any of
them to identify securely the daily winners.
Indeed, here A = {1, ...,m − 1} and X1, ..., Xm−1 are i.i.d. rvs distributed
uniformly on {1, ..., k}, while Xm = (X1, ..., Xm−1). Let g1(x1, ..., xm) = max
1≤i≤m−1
xi
and g2(x1, ..., xm) = arg max
1≤i≤m−1
xi. Then, straightforward computation yields that
H(G1) < log k, and for both g1, g2 that C (M;ZM) = C(M), where, by Theorem
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2.1,
C(M) = H(XM)−RCO(M) = (m− 1) log k − (m− 2) log k = log k. (3.18)
Hence, by Theorem 3.4, g1 is securely computable. Since H(G2) = log(m − 1), g2
is securely computable if k > m − 1. However, for k < m − 1, g2 is not securely
computable by any terminal i ∈ {1, ...,m − 1}. This, too, is implied by Theorem
3.4 upon noting that for each i ∈ {1, ...,m− 1} and a restricted choice A = {i} and
ZM as in (3.15),
C (M;ZM) = H(Xi) = log k < log(m− 1) = H(G2),
where the first equality is a consequence of remark (ii) following Theorem 3.4, (3.18)
and remark (i) following Theorem 2.1.
3.3.3 A decomposition result
The sufficiency condition (3.17) prompts the following two natural questions: Does
the difference C (M;ZM)−H(G) possess an operational significance? If g is securely
computable by the terminals in A, clearly Gn forms an SK for A. Can Gn be
augmented suitably to form an SK for A of maximum achievable rate?
The answers to both these questions are in the affirmative. In particular, our
approach to the second question involves a characterization of the minimum rate of
communication for omniscience for A, under the additional requirement that this
communication be independent of Gn. Specifically, we show below that for a securely
computable function g, this minimum rate remains RCO(A) (see (2.4), (2.5)).
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Addressing the first question, we introduce a rv Kg = K
(n)
g such that K =
(Kg, G
n) constitutes an εn-ASK for M with side information ZM as in (3.15) and
satisfying the additional requirement
I (Kg ∧Gn) ≤ εn. (3.19)
Let the largest rate limn(1/n)H (Kg) of such an ASK be C
g (M;ZM). Observe
that since K is required to be nearly independent of F, where F is the public
communication involved in its formation, it follows by (3.19) that Kg is nearly
independent of (Gn,F).






constitutes an εn-SK for A ⊆ M and satisfying (3.19). Let Cg(A)
denote the largest rate of K ′g. As noted above, K
′
g will be nearly independent of
(Gn,F′), where F′ is the public communication involved in the formation of K ′.
Proposition 3.5. If g satisfies (3.17), for A ⊆M it holds that
(i) Cg (M;ZM(A)) = C (M;ZM(A))−H(G),
(ii) Cg(A) = C(A)−H(G).
Remarks. (i) For the case A = M, both (i) and (ii) above reduce to Cg(M) =
C(M)−H(G).
(ii) Theorem 2.1 and Proposition 3.5 (ii) lead to the observation
H(XM) = RCO(A) +H(G) + Cg(A),
which admits the following heuristic interpretation. The “total randomness” XnM
that corresponds to omniscience decomposes into three “nearly mutually indepen-
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dent” components: a minimum-sized communication for omniscience for A and the
independent parts of an optimum-rate SK for A composed of Gn and K ′g.
3.4 Proofs of main results
Proof of Theorem 3.4.
The necessity of (3.14) follows by the comments preceding Theorem 3.4.
The sufficiency of (3.17) will be established by showing the existence of non-
interactive public communication comprising source codes that enable omniscience
corresponding to XnM at the terminals in A, and thereby the computation of g.
Furthermore, the corresponding codewords are selected so as to be simultaneously
independent of Gn, thus assuring security.
First, from (3.17) and (3.16), there exists δ > 0 such that RCO(M;ZM) +
δ < H(XM|G), using G = g(XM). For each i and Ri ≥ 0, consider a (map-
valued) rv Ji that is uniformly distributed on the family Ji of all mappings X ni →
{1, . . . , dexp(nRi)e}, i ∈M. The rvs J1, ..., Jm, XnM are taken to be mutually inde-
pendent.
Fix ε, ε′, with ε′ > mε and ε + ε′ < 1. It follows from the proof of the general














≥ 1− ε, (3.20)
provided RM = (R1, ..., Rm) ∈ R(M;ZM), where εn vanishes exponentially rapidly
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in n. This assertion follows exactly as in the proof of [20, Proposition 1, with
A =M] but with X̃i there equal to (Xi, Zi) rather than Xi, i ∈ M. In particular,
we shall choose RM ∈ R(M;ZM) such that
m∑
i=1




Below we shall establish that
P ({jM ∈ JM : I (jM(XnM) ∧Gn) ≥ εn}) ≤ ε′, (3.22)
for all n sufficiently large, to which end it suffices to show that
P
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Then it would follow from (3.20), (3.22) and definition of ZM in (3.15) that
P
({






, i ∈ A,
and I(jM(X
n
M) ∧Gn) < εn
})
≥ 1− ε− ε′.







for each i ∈ A.
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It now remains to prove (3.23). Fix i ∈ M and note that for each ji ∈ Ji,


































where the right side above denotes the (Kullback-Leibler) divergence between the








and the product of the uniform pmf on






. Using [20, Lemma 1], the right side














is the variational distance between
the pmfs in the divergence above. Therefore, to prove (3.23), it suffices to show that
P
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, i ∈M, (3.26)

















≥ 1− ε. It follows that
P
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− ε, jM\{i} ∈ J̃i,
(3.27)
for all n sufficiently large. Fix jM\{i} ∈ J̃i. We take recourse to Lemma 2.7 and set
U = XnM, U
′ = Xni , V = G
n, h = jM\{i}, and
U0 =
{






, gn (xnM) 1 (i ∈ Ac)
)}
for some mapping ψi. By the definition of J̃i,
P (U ∈ U0) ≥ 1− εn,
so that condition (2.22)(i) preceding Lemma 2.7 is met. Condition (2.22)(ii), too,
is met since conditioned on the events in (2.22)(ii), only those xnM ∈ U0 can occur











in (2.23), the hypotheses of Lemma 2.7 are satisfied with λ =
√
εn for an appropriate
exponentially vanishing εn. Then, by Lemma 2.7, with



















and with Ji in the role of φ, we get from (2.24) and (3.21) that
P
({












decays to 0 doubly exponentially in n, which proves (3.27). This completes the proof
of Theorem 3.4.
Proof of Proposition 3.5. (i) Since the rv (K
(n)
g , Gn), with nearly independent
components, constitutes an ASK forM with side information ZM as in (3.15), it is
clear that
H(G) + Cg (M;ZM) ≤ C (M;ZM) . (3.28)
In order to prove the reverse of (3.28), we show that C (M;ZM) − H(G) is an
achievable ASK rate for Kg that additionally satisfies (3.19). First, note that in the
proof of Theorem 3.4, the assertions (3.20) and (3.23) mean that for all sufficiently
large n, there exists a public communication FM, say, such that I(FM ∧ Gn) < εn
and XnM is εn-recoverable from (X
n
i , FM, Z
n
i ) for every i ∈M, with lim
n
εn = 0. Fix
0 < τ < δ, where δ is as in the proof of Theorem 3.4. Apply Lemma 2.7, choosing























by Lemma 2.7 a randomly chosen φ of rate
1
n
log r = H(XM|G)−RCO (M;ZM)− τ
= C (M;ZM)−H(G)− τ
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will yield an ASK Kg = K
(n)
g = φ (XnM) which is nearly independent of (FM, G
n)
(and, in particular, satisfies (3.19)) with positive probability, for all n sufficiently
large.
(ii) The proof can be completed as that of part (i) upon showing that for a se-
curely computable g, for all τ > 0 and n sufficiently large, there exists a public
communication F ′M that meets the following requirements: its rate does not exceed
RCO(A) + τ ; I(F ′M ∧Gn) < εn; and XnM is εn-recoverable from (Xni , F ′M) for every
i ∈ A. To that end, for RM = (R1, ..., Rm) ∈ R(M;ZM) as in the proof of Theorem




m) ∈ R(A) that satisfies R′i ≤ Ri for all i ∈M and
m∑
i=1
R′i ≤ RCO(A) + τ,
noting that R (M;ZM) ⊆ R(A). Further, for JM and JM as in that proof, define
a (map-valued) rv J ′i that is uniformly distributed on the family J ′i of all map-
pings from {1, . . . , dexp(nRi)e} to {1, . . . , dexp(nR′i)e}, i ∈ M. The rvs J1, ..., Jm,




M are taken to be mutually independent. Define J 0M as the set of map-
pings jM ∈ JM for which there exists a j′M ∈ J ′M such that XnM is εn-recoverable




M))) for every i ∈ A. By the general source network coding
theorem [17, Lemma 3.1.13 and Theorem 3.1.14], applied to the random mapping






This, together with (3.20) and (3.23) in the proof of Theorem 3.4, imply that for
a securely computable g there exist jM ∈ JM and j′M ∈ J ′M for which the public
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communication F ′M , j
′
M(jM) satisfies the aforementioned requirements. Finally,

















log r = H(XM|G)−RCO (A)− τ = C (A)−H(G)− τ
which is nearly independent of (F ′M, G
n) (and, hence, satisfies (3.19)) exists for all
n sufficiently large.
3.5 Discussion
We obtain simple necessary and sufficient conditions for secure computability ex-
pressed in terms of function entropy and ASK capacity. The latter is the largest
rate of an SK for a new model in which side information is provided for use in only
the recovery stage of SK generation. This model could be of independent interest.
In particular, a function is securely computable if its entropy is less than the ASK
capacity of an associated secrecy model. The difference is shown to correspond
to the maximum achievable rate of an ASK which is independent of the securely
computed function and, together with it, forms an ASK of optimum rate. Also, a
function that is securely computed by A can be augmented to form an SK for A of
maximum rate.
Our results extend trivially to functions defined on a block of symbols of
fixed length in an obvious manner by considering larger alphabets composed of
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supersymbols of such length. However, they do not cover sequences of functions of
symbols of increasing length (in n), e.g., a running average (in n).
In our proof of Theorem 3.4, g was securely computed from omniscience at all
the terminals in A ⊆M that was attained using noninteractive public communica-
tion. However, omniscience is not necessary for the secure computation of g, and
it is possible to make do with communication of rate less than RCO(A) using an
interactive protocol. A related unresolved question is: What is the minimum rate
of public communication for secure computation?
A natural generalization of the conditions for secure computability of g by A ⊆
M given here entails a characterization of conditions for the secure computability of
multiple functions g1, ..., gk by subsets A1, ...,Ak of M, respectively. This unsolved
problem, in general, will not permit omniscience for any Ai, i = 1, ..., k. For instance
with m = 2, A1 = {1}, A2 = {2}, and X1 and X2 being independent, the functions
gi(xi) = xi, i = 1, 2, are securely computable trivially, but not through omniscience
since, in this example, public communication is forbidden for the secure computation
of g1, g2. The next chapter addresses a version of the mentioned generalization.
Yet another direction involves a model in which the terminals in M securely
compute G = g (XM), and the eavesdropper has additional access to correlated
side information that may not be available to the terminals in M. Specifically, the
eavesdropper observes n i.i.d. repetitions Zn of a Z-valued rv Z that has a given
joint pmf with XM, in addition to the public communication F of the terminals in
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M. The secrecy condition (2.2) is replaced by
I (Gn ∧ F | Zn) ≤ εn, (3.30)
noting that G need not be independent of Z. Having computed g securely, the
terminals in M can extract a rv K = K (Gn), of rate H(G | Z), that is (nearly)
independent of Zn. Together with (3.30), this means that K is similarly independent
of (F, Zn). Since K constitutes a wiretap secret key (WSK), its rate H(G | Z)
necessarily cannot exceed the corresponding WSK capacity [48, 1, 20]. A single-
letter characterization of WSK capacity remains unresolved in general (cf. [31]). The
sufficiency of the previous necessary condition is unclear even when WSK capacity is
known. In the special circumstance in which the terminals inM, too, have access to
Zn, a single-letter characterization of WSK capacity is known [20]. In this case, our
proof technique shows that the aforementioned necessary condition is also sufficient.
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CHAPTER 4
Secure Computation: Multiple Functions
4.1 Synopsis
This chapter generalizes and extends the results of the previous chapter to the com-
putation of multiple given functions of the observations at the terminals while main-
taining the privacy of a specified function. Specifically, multiple terminals observe
correlated data and seek to compute functions of the data using interactive public
communication. At the same time, it is required that the value of a private function
of the data remain concealed from an eavesdropper observing this communication.
In general, the private function and the functions computed by the terminals can
be all different. We show that a class of functions are securely computable if and
only if the conditional entropy of data given the value of private function is greater
than the least rate of interactive communication required for a related multiterminal
source-coding task. A single-letter formula is provided for this rate in special cases.
The problem of secure computing for multiple functions is formulated in the
next section, followed by our results in Section 4.3. The proofs are given in Sections
4.4 and 4.5. The final section discusses alternative forms of the necessary conditions.
The results of this chapter were reported in [62, 64].
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4.2 Formulation: Secure computation of multiple functions
We consider a multiterminal source model for function computation using public
communication, with a confidentiality requirement. Terminals 1, . . . ,m observe,
respectively, the sequences Xn1 , . . . , X
n
m of length n. For 0 ≤ i ≤ m, let gi : XM → Yi
be given mappings, where the sets Yi are finite. Further, for 0 ≤ i ≤ m and n ≥ 1,
the (single-letter) mapping gni : X nM → Yni is defined by
gni (x
n
M) = (gi(x11, . . . , xm1), . . . , gi(x1n, . . . , xmn)),
xnM = (x
n
1 , . . . , x
n
m) ∈ X nM.




i , n ≥ 1, and, in particular,
G1i = gi (XM) simply by Gi.





M ∈ X nM. To this end, the terminals are allowed to communicate over
a noiseless public channel, possibly interactively in several rounds. An interactive
communication protocol is as in Definition 2.1 but, for simplicity, in this chapter
we do not allow local randomization, i.e., UM = ∅. The rate of the interactive
communication F is 1
n
log ‖F‖.
Definition 4.1. For εn > 0, n ≥ 1, we say that functions1 gM = (g0, g1, ..., gm),
with private function g0, are εn-securely computable (εn- SC) from observations of
length n, and public communication F = F(n), if
(i) Gni is εn- recoverable from (X
n
i ,F) for every i ∈M, and
1 The abuse of notation gM = (g0, g1, ..., gm) simplifies our presentation.
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(ii) F satisfies the secrecy condition
1
n
I (Gn0 ∧ F) ≤ εn.
Remark. The definition of secrecy here corresponds to the notion of weak secrecy.
When our results have a single-letter form, our achievability schemes for secure
computing attain strong secrecy (see Definition 2.3 and remarks (ii), (iii) following
Theorem 2.1).
By definition, for εn-SC functions gM, the private function G0 is effectively
concealed from an eavesdropper with access to the public communication F.
Definition 4.2. For private function g0, we say that functions gM are securely com-
putable if gM are εn- SC from observationsXnM of length n and public communication
F = F(n), such that lim
n
εn = 0.
Figure 4.1 shows the setup for secure computing.
In this dissertation, we give necessary and sufficient conditions for the secure
computability of certain classes of functions gM = (g0, g1, ..., gm). The formulation
in Chapter 3, in which the terminals in a given subset A of M are required to





g0, i ∈ A,
constant, otherwise.
(4.1)
Upon rearranging the terms in Theorem 3.4, we see that conditions















Interactive Communication F, 1nI (F ∧Gn0) ≈ 0
F1 F2
Figure 4.1: Secure computation of g1, ..., gm with private function g0
and
H (XM | G0) > R∗ (4.3)
constitute, respectively, necessary and sufficient conditions for the functions above
to be securely computable, with R∗ being the minimum rate of interactive com-
munication F that enables all the terminals in M to attain omniscience, using F
and with decoder side information Gn0 given to the terminals in M \ A. In fact,
it was shown that when condition (4.3) holds, it is possible to recover XnM using
communication that is independent of Gn0 .
The guiding heuristic in this chapter is the following general principle, which
is also consistent with the results of the previous chapter:
Conditions (4.2) and (4.3) constitute, respectively, the necessary and sufficient
conditions for functions gM = (g0, g1, ..., gm) to be securely computable, where R∗
is the infimum of the rates of interactive communication F′ such that, for each
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1 ≤ i ≤ m, the following hold simultaneously:









′), i.e., terminals attain omniscience,
with Gn0 as side information that is used only for decoding (but is not used for
the communication F′),
where εn → 0 as n→∞.
Thus, (P1) and (P2) require any terminal computing g0 to become omniscient,
an observation that was also made for the special case in Chapter 3. The first con-
dition (P1) above is straightforward and ensures the computability of the functions
g1, ..., gm, by the terminals 1, ...,m, respectively. The omniscience condition (P2) fa-
cilitates the decomposition of total entropy into mutually independent components
that include the random values of the private function Gn0 and the communication
F′. For the specific case in (4.1), R∗ above has a single-letter formula. In general, a
single-letter expression for R∗ is not known.
Our results, described in section 4.3, are obtained by simple adaptations of this
principle. However, unlike in the previous chapter, our conditions, in general, are
not of a single-letter form. Nevertheless, they provide a structural characterization
of secure computability. As an application, our results provide simple conditions for
secure computability in the following illustrative example.
Example 4.1. Secure Computing for Binary Symmetric Sources. We consider
the case of m = 2 terminals that observe BSS (see Example 3.1) with underlying
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rvs X1, X2 with joint pmf given by








where 0 < δ < 1/2 (cf. Example 3.1). The results of this dissertation will allow
us to provide conditions for the secure computability of the four choices of g0, g1, g2
below; it will follow by Theorem 4.1 that functions g0, g1, g2 are securely computable
if
h(δ) < τ,
and conversely, if the functions above are securely computable, then
h(δ) ≤ τ,
where h(τ) = −τ log τ−(1−τ) log(1−τ), and the constant τ = τ(δ) depends on the
choice of the function. These characterizations are summarized in the next table.
Denote the AND and the OR of two random bits X1 and X2 by X1.X2 and X1⊕X2,
respectively.
g0 g1 g2 τ
X1 ⊕X2 X1 ⊕X2 X1 ⊕X2 1/2
X1 ⊕X2 X1 ⊕X2 φ 1
X1 ⊕X2, X1.X2 X1 ⊕X2, X1.X2 X1.X2 2δ/3
X1 ⊕X2 X1 ⊕X2 X1.X2 2/3
The results for the first two settings follow from Examples 3.1, 3.2. The third
and fourth results are new. In these settings, terminal 1 is required to recover
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the private function; our results below show that the conditions for the secure com-
putability in these cases remain unchanged even if this terminal is required to attain
omniscience. Note that since h(δ) < 1 for all 0 < δ < 1/2, there exists a commu-
nication protocol for securely computing the functions in the second setting. By
contrast, a secure computing protocol for the functions in the third setting does not
exist for any 0 < δ < 1/2, since h(δ) > 2δ/3.
4.3 Characterization of securely computable functions
In this section, we characterize securely computable functions for three settings.
Our necessary and sufficient conditions entail the comparison of H (XM|G0) with a
rate R∗; the specific choice of R∗ depends on the functions gM. Below we consider
three different classes of functions gM. Although the first class is a special case of
the second, the two are handled separately as the more restrictive case is amenable
to simpler analysis. Furthermore, for m = 2, the obtained necessary and sufficient
conditions for secure computability take a single-letter form in the first case (see
Corollary 4.4).
(1) In the first class we consider, values of all the functions g1, ..., gm must be kept
secret. In addition, at least one of the terminals must compute all the functions
g1, ..., gm. This case arises in distributed function computation over a network where
all the computed values are collated at a single sink node, and we are interested in
securing the collated function values. Alternatively, denoting the function computed
at the sink node by the private function g0, the computed functions g1, ..., gm can
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g0, i ∈ [1,m0] ,
gi (g0) , i ∈ [m0 + 1,m] .
(4.4)
(2) The next case is a relaxation of the previous model in that the restriction
gi = gi (g0) for i ∈ [m0 + 1,m] is dropped. For this general case, our analysis
below implies roughly that requiring the terminals [1,m0] that compute the private
function g0 to recover the entire data X
n
M does not change the conditions for secure
computability, which is a key observation of this dissertation.
(3) The last class of problems we study is an instance of secure multiterminal source
coding , which arises in the data download problems in sensor networks where each
node is interested in downloading the data observed by a subset of nodes. Specifi-
cally, we consider the situation where each terminal wishes to recover some subset
XnMi of the sources where Mi ⊆M\ {i}, i.e.,
gi (XM) = XMi , i ∈M. (4.5)
This last case appears at first blush to be disconnected from the previous two cases.
However, our characterizations of secure computability below have the same form
for all cases above. Moreover, the same heuristic principle, highlighted in (P1) and
(P2), leads to a characterization of secure computability in all three cases.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for secure computability are stated in
terms of quantities R∗i (gM), i = 1, 2, 3, which are defined next. The subscript
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i corresponds to case (i) above. In particular, the quantity R∗ corresponds to
the minimum rate of communication needed for an appropriate modification of the
source-coding task in (P1), (P2). Below we give specific expressions for R∗i , i =
1, 2, 3, along with their operational roles (for a complete description of this role see
the sufficiency proof in Section 4.4).







I (Gn0 ∧ F)
)
,











H (Gni |Xni ,F) + inf RM, (4.6)
with the infimum taken over the rates R1, ..., Rm satisfying the following constraints:




















F corresponds to the solution of a multiterminal source coding
problem. Specifically, it is the infimum of the rates of interactive communication
that satisfy (P1) and (P2) above (see [18, Theorem 13.15], [20]).
2The first term accounts for the rate of the communication and the second term tracks the
information about Gn0 leaked by F (see (4.11)) below
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I (Gn0 ∧ F)
)
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with the infimum taken over the rates R1, ..., Rm and R
′
m0+1
, ..., R′m satisfying the
following constraints:
































F corresponds to the solution of a multiterminal source coding
problem, and is the infimum of the rates of interactive communication F′ that satisfy
(P1) and (P2) above, and additionally satisfies:





′), m0 < j ≤ m.
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This modification corresponds to the introduction of m − m0 dummy terminals,
with the jth dummy terminal observing Gnj , m0 < j ≤ m (see section 4.6); the
dummy terminals can be realized by a terminal i in [1, ...,m0] that recovers X
n
M
from (Xni ,F). The conditions (P2) and (P3) above correspond to the omniscience
at the terminals in the extended model, with Gn0 provided as side information only
for decoding.







I (Gn0 ∧ F)
)
,






H(F) + inf RM, (4.8)
with rates R1, ..., Rm satisfying the following constraints:


















As before, the quantity infn,FR
(3)
F corresponds to the infimum of the rates of inter-
active communication that satisfy (P1) and (P2) above.
Our main result below characterizes securely computable functions for the
three settings above.
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Theorem 4.1. For i = 1, 2, 3, with functions g0, g1, ..., gm as in the case (i) above,
the functions gM are securely computable if the following condition holds:
H (XM|G0) > R∗i (gM) . (4.9)
Conversely, if the functions above are securely computable, then
H (XM|G0) ≥ R∗i (gM) , (4.10)
where
R∗i (gM) = inf
(x,0)∈R∗i (gM)
x, i = 1, 2, 3. (4.11)
Remark. Although the first setting above is a special case of the second, it is unclear
if for gM in (4.4) the quantities R∗1(gM) and R
∗
2(gM) are identical (also, see Section
4.6). In general, the multi-letter characterizations of secure computability of gM
above can have different forms. For case (1) with m = 2, Corollary 4.4 below
provides a single-letter formula for R∗1(gM). However, a similar single-letter formula
for R∗2(gM) is not known.
Theorem 4.1 affords the following heuristic interpretation. The quantityH (XM|G0)
represents the maximum rate of randomness in XnM that is (nearly) independent of
Gn0 . On the other hand, R
∗
i (gM) is an appropriate rate of communication for the
computation of gM; we show that latter being less than H (XM|G0) guarantees the
secure computability of gM.
Although the characterization in Theorem 4.1 is not of a single-letter form,
the following result provides a sufficient condition for obtaining such forms. Denote
by R
(i)
constant, i = 1, 2, 3, the quantity R
(i)
F for F = constant.
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The proof is a simple consequence of the definition of R∗i (gM) in (4.11). Note
that R
(i)
constant has a single-letter form.
Remark. As mentioned before, the quantity infn,FR
(i)
F is the infimum of the rates
of interactive communication that satisfies (P1), (P2) for i = 1, 3, and satisfies
(P1)-(P3) for i = 2. Thus, when the conditions of Lemma 4.2 hold, we have from
Theorem 4.1 that gM are securely computable if
H (XM|G0) > R(i)constant,
and if gM are securely computable then
H (XM|G0) ≥ R(i)constant,
where R
(i)
constant is the minimum rate of communication that satisfies (P1), (P2) for
i = 1, 3, and satisfies (P1)-(P3) for i = 2.
As a consequence of Lemma 4.2, we obtain below a single-letter characteriza-
tion of securely computable functions, with m = 2, in a special case; the following
lemma is instrumental to our proof.
Lemma 4.3. Let m = 2. For an interactive communication F, we have
H(F) ≥ H (F|Xn1 ) +H (F|Xn2 ) .
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Proof. Lemma 4.3 is a special case of [21, Lemma B.1] (also, see [46]). We provide
a proof here for completion.
H(F) = H(F1) +H(F | F1)
≥ H(F1 | Y n) +H(F | F1)
≥ H(F1 | Y n) +H(F2 | F1) +H(F | F1, F2)
≥ H(F1 | Y n) +H(F2 | F1, Xn) +H(F | F1, F2)
= H(F1, F2 | Y n) +H(F1, F2 | Xn) +H(F | F1, F2),
where the last step uses H(F1 | Xn) = H(F2 | F1, Y n) = 0. The proof is completed
by an iterative application of these steps.
We next consider case (1) for two terminals.
Corollary 4.4. For m = 2, for functions g0, g1, g2 with g1 = g0 and g2 = g2 (g0),
we have
R∗1 (gM) = H (X2|X1) +H (G2|X2) +H (X1|X2, G0) . (4.13)






















constant equals the term on the right side of (4.13). Upon manipulating the
expression for R
(1)






[H(F)−H (F|Xn1 )−H (F|Xn2 , Gn0 )− I (Gn2 ∧ F|Xn2 )] +R(1)constant. (4.15)
Further, since H (G2|G0) = 0, it holds that
I (Gn2 ∧ F|Xn2 ) ≤ I (Gn0 ∧ F|Xn2 ) ,













where the last inequality follows from Lemma 4.3. The result then follows from
Lemma 4.2.
We next derive simple conditions for secure computability for the BSS in Ex-
ample 4.1
Example 4.2. Consider the setup of Example 4.1, with g0 = g1 = X1 ⊕ X2, X1.X2
and g2 = X1.X2. By Corollary 4.4 and the observation H (G2|X2) = h(δ)/2, we get
R∗1 (gM) = 3h(δ)/2. SinceH (X1, X2 | G0) = H (X1, X2 | X1 ⊕X2)−H (X1.X2 | X1 ⊕X2) =
δ, the characterization of secure computability claimed in Example 4.1 follows from
Theorem 4.1.
Example 4.3. In the setup of Example 4.1, consider g0 = g1 = X1 ⊕ X2 and g2 =
X1.X2. This choice of g0, g1, g2 is an instance of case (2) above. For an interactive
















H (Xn1 , X
n




H (Gn2 |Xn2 ,F) .
Therefore, inf [R1 +R2 +R
′
2] with R1, R2, R
′




H (Xn1 |Xn2 , Gn0 , Gn2 ,F) + max {H (Xn2 |Gn0 , Gn2 ,F) , H (Xn2 |Xn1 ,F)}










H(F) +H (Xn1 |Xn2 , Gn0 , Gn2 ,F) + max {H (Xn2 |Gn0 , Gn2 ,F) , H (Xn2 |Xn1 ,F)}
+H (Gn2 |Xn2 ,F)
]
. (4.16)
It follows from H (Xn1 |Xn2 , Gn0 , Gn2 ,F) = 0 that
R
(2)




+ max {δ, h(δ)} = 3
2
h(δ), (4.17)
as h(δ) > δ for 0 < δ < 1/2.
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[H(F) +H (Xn2 |Xn1 )−H (F|Xn1 ) +H (Gn2 ,F|Xn2 )−H (F|Xn2 )]
≥ 1
n
[H(F)−H (F|Xn1 )−H (F|Xn2 )] +H (G2|X2) +H (X2|X1)




where the last inequality above follows from Lemma 4.3. The characterization in
Example 4.1 follows from (4.17), (4.18), and H (X1, X2|G0) = 1, using Lemma 4.2
and Theorem 4.1.
4.4 Proof of sufficiency
Sufficiency of (4.9) for i = 1: We propose a two step protocol for securely computing
g0, g1, ..., gm. In the first step, for sufficient large N , the terminals [1,m0] (g0-seeking












where ε > 0 is sufficiently small. Next, upon attaining omniscience, one of the
terminals in [1,m0] computes the following for m0 < j ≤ m:




of appropriate rates R′j for a recovery
of GNj by a decoder with the knowledge of X
N
j and previous communication
F′′, and
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Note that Kj ⊕ F̂j denotes the encrypted version of the Slepian-Wolf code F̂j, en-
crypted with a one-time pad using the SK Kj. Thus, terminal j, with the knowledge
of Kj, can recover F̂j from Kj ⊕ F̂j, and hence can recover GNj . The operation
Kj ⊕ F̂j is valid since the SK Kj has size greater than ‖F̂j‖. Furthermore, we have





























log ‖Kj ⊕ F̂j‖H
(









































where the third inequality above uses (4.20) and the last inequality follows from





of GN0 , since Gj is a function of G0. We note that this is the only place in the proof
where the functional relation between Gj and G0 is used.
Thus, the communication
(




secure computing protocol for gM. It remains to show the existence of F′′ and Kj,
m0 < j ≤ m that satisfy (4.19)-(4.21).
Specifically, when (4.9) holds for i = 1, we have from the definition of R∗1 (gM)
in (4.11) that for all 0 < ε ≤ ε0 (ε0 to be specified later), there exists n ≥ 1 and
interactive communication F = F (XnM) such that
1
n










F is as in (4.6). This further implies that there exist R1, ..., Rm satisfying










Gnj | Xnj ,F
)
+RM ≤ R∗1 (gM) + ε. (4.24)
Choosing
ε0 < H (XM | G0)−R∗1 (gM)− δ,








Gnj | Xnj ,F
)
+RM + δ <
1
n
H (XnM | Gn0 ,F) . (4.25)





1 ≤ i ≤ k. Further, let N = nk. In Appendix D, we follow the approach in the
proof of Theorem 3.4 and use (4.25) to show that for sufficiently large k there exists




of overall rate RM + δ/2 that satisfies
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the following:




















The proposed communication F′′ comprises F′,Fk, and condition (4.19) follows from
(4.23) and (4.27). Finally, we show the existence of F̂j and Kj, m0 < j ≤ m, as





















, m0 < j ≤ m, for k sufficiently
large. Suppose the rvs Km0+1, Km0+2, ..., Kj of rates R
′
m0+1
, R′m0+2, ..., R
′
j, respec-
tively, satisfy (4.20) and (4.21) for some j ≤ m− 1. Denote by F′(j) the communi-
cation
(
F′, Ki ⊕ F̂i,m0 < i ≤ j
)
of rate R(j) that satisfies







GNi | XNi ,Fk
)
+ δ (4.29)














































of rate R′j+1 is almost
jointly-independent of GN0 ,F
k,F′(j) (see [16]). This argument is made rigorous
using a version of the balanced coloring lemma. Specifically, in Lemma 2.7, set
U = XNM, U
′ = XNj+1, V = G
N
0 ,F
k, h = F′(j), and
U0 =
{










for some mapping ψj+1, where f
′ (XNM
)
= F′ is as in (4.26). By the definition of F′,
P (U ∈ U0) ≥ 1− ε,
so that condition (2.22)(i) preceding Lemma 2.7 is met. Condition (2.22)(ii), too,











in (2.23), the hypotheses of Lemma 2.7 are satisfied for appropriately chosen λ, and




















that satisfies (4.20) and (4.21), for k sufficiently large. The proof is
completed upon repeating this argument for m0 < j < m.
Sufficiency of (4.9) for i = 2: The secure computing protocol for this case
also consists of two stages. In the first stage, as before, the terminals [1,m0] (g0-





. The second stage, too, is similar to the previous case and involves one





to the terminals j, for m0 < j ≤ m. However, the encryption-based
scheme of the previous case is not applicable here; in particular, (4.22) no longer
holds. Instead, the communication F̂j now consists of the Slepian-Wolf codewords
for GNj given X
N
j , and previous communication F
′′. We show below that if (4.9)
holds, then there exist communication F′′ and F̂j, m0 < j ≤ m, of appropriate rate





GN0 ∧ F′′, F̂m0+1, ..., F̂m
)
< ε,
for sufficiently large N .
Specifically, when (4.9) holds for i = 2, using similar manipulations as in the
previous case we get that for all 0 < ε < ε0, there exist interactive communication
F = F (XnM), and rates R1, ..., Rm, R
′
m0+1
















H (XnM | Gn0 ,F) , (4.31)
with δ < H (XM | G0)−R∗2 (gM)− ε0; (4.31) replaces (4.25) in the previous case.
Next, for N = nk consider 2m − m0 correlated sources XNj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
and GNj , m0 < j ≤ m. Since R1, ..., Rm, R′m0+1, ..., R′m satisfy (2a)-(2c), random











rates R′j, m0 < j ≤ m satisfy the following with high probability, for k sufficiently
large (see [18, Lemma 13.13 and Theorem 13.14]):
(i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, XnkM is ε-recoverable from
(












(iii) for m0 < j ≤ m, XnkM is ε-recoverable from
(















, 1 ≤ i ≤ k. It
follows from (4.31) in a manner similar to the proof in Appendix D that there exist








for sufficiently large k.
The first stage of the protocol entails transmission of Fk, followed by the trans-









. The second stage of communication
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F̂j is given by F
′
j+m−m0 , for m0 < j ≤ m.
Sufficiency of (4.9) for i = 3: Using the definition of R∗3 (gM) and the manip-
ulations above, the sufficiency condition (4.9) implies that for all 0 < ε < ε0, there
exist interactive communication F = F (XnM), and rates R1, ..., Rm satisfying (3a),
(3b) (for F) such that
1
n





RM + δ <
1
n
H (XnM | Gn0 ,F) , (4.32)





, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, it follows from (3a) and (3b) that for N = nk the






of rates Ri, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, satisfy the following with
high probability, for k sufficiently large (see [18, Lemma 13.13 and Theorem 13.14]):





(ii) for i ∈M, XnkM is ε-recoverable from
(





From (4.32), proceeding along the lines of the arguments in Appendix D, it follows













protocol for securely computing gM, where gi (XM) = XMi , i ∈M.
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4.5 Proof of necessity
Necessity of (4.10) for i = 1: If functions gM are securely computable then there






I (Gn0 ∧ F) < εn, (4.33)
where εn → 0 as n→∞. It follows from the Fano’s inequality that3
1
n
H (Gni | Xni ,F) < c1εn, i ∈M. (4.34)






H (Gn0 ,F) +
1
n
H (XnM | Gn0 ,F)
≥ 1
n




















Xni | Xn[1,i−1], Gn0 ,F
)
− εn. (4.36)

























XnL | XnM\L, Gn0 ,F
)
+ c1εn,
where the last step follows from (4.34) and the assumption that gi = g0 for i ∈
3The constants c1, c2, c3, c4 depend only on log ‖XM‖, m, m0 (and not on n).
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Xni | Xn[1,i−1], Gn0 ,F
)
+ c1εn, i ∈M,
by (4.37) R1, ..., Rm satisfy (1a) and (1b) for F, whereby it follows from (4.34) and
(4.36) that








H (Gni | Xni ,F) +RM − c2εn
≥ R(1)F − c2εn,
where F satisfies (4.33). Taking the limit n → ∞, and using the definition of
R∗1 (gM) we get H (XM | G0) ≥ R∗1 (gM) .
Necessity of (4.10) for i = 2: If gM are securely computable, the approach
above implies that there exists an interactive communication F satisfying (4.33) and









Xni | Xn[1,i−1], Gn0 ,F
)





Xni | Xn[1,i−1], Gn[m0+1,i−1], Gn0 ,F
)
+ c1εn, m0 < i ≤ m,
R′j = c1εn, m0 < j ≤ m,
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we have by (4.35),










































































and similarly, for [1,m0] ⊆ L ⊆ M, L′ ⊆ [m0 + 1,m], with either L 6= M or




















XnL | XnM\L, Gn0 ,F
)
≤ RL +R′L′ , (4.40)
Therefore, (4.39), (4.34) and (4.40) imply that R1, ..., Rm, R
′
m0
, ..., R′m satisfy (2a)-
(2c) for F, which along with (4.38) yields




F is as in (4.7), and F satisfies (4.33), which completes the proof of necessity
(4.10) for i = 2 upon taking the limit n→∞.
Necessity of (4.10) for i = 3: If the functions gM in (4.5) are securely com-
putable then, as above, there exists an interactive communication F that satisfies






Xni | Xn[1,i−1], Gn0 ,F
)
+ c1εn, i ∈M,
similar manipulations as above yield
H (XM | G0) ≥
1
n
H(F) +RM − c4εn. (4.41)
Further, from (4.34) we get that R1, ..., Rm satisfy (3a) and (3b) for F. It follows
from (4.41) that
H (XM | G0) ≥ R(3)F − c4εn,
where R
(2)
F is as in (4.8), and F satisfies (4.33), which completes the proof of necessity
(4.10) for i = 3 as above.
4.6 Discussion: Alternative necessary conditions for secure
computability
The necessary condition (4.10) for secure computing given in section 4.3 is in terms
of quantities R
(i)
F , i = 1, 2, 3, defined in (4.6), (4.7), (4.8), respectively. As remarked
before, for i = 1, 3, the quantity infFR
(i)
F is the infimum over the rates of interactive
communication that satisfy conditions (P1) and (P2). However, this is not true for
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i = 2. Furthermore, although i = 1 is special case of i = 2, it is not clear if the
necessary condition (4.10) for i = 2 reduces to that for i = 1 upon imposing the
restriction in (4.4). In this section, we shed some light on this baffling observation.
First, consider the functions gM in (4.1). For this choice of functions, denot-
ing by R∗0 the minimum rate of interactive communication that satisfies (P1) and
(P2), the results in [68] imply that (4.2) constitutes a necessary condition for secure
computability, with R∗ = R∗0.
Next, consider an augmented model obtained by introducing a new terminal
m+1 that observes rv Xm+1 = g̃ (XM) and seeks to compute gm+1 = ∅. Further, the
terminal does not communicate, i.e., observation Xnm+1 is available only for decoding.
Clearly, secure computability in the original model implies secure computability in
the new model. It follows from the approach of [68] that for the new model also,
(4.2) constitutes a necessary condition for secure computability, with R∗ now being
the minimum rate of interactive communication that satisfies (P1) and (P2) when
terminal m+ 1 does not communicate; this R∗ is given by
max{H (XM | g̃(XM), G0) , R∗0}.
Note that the new necessary condition (4.2) is
H (XM | G0) ≥ R∗0 = max{H (XM | g̃(XM), G0) , R∗0},
which is, surprisingly, same as the original condition
H (XM | G0) ≥ R∗0.
Our necessary condition (4.10) for i = 2 is based on a similar augmentation
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that entails introduction ofm−m0 new terminals observing gm0+1 (XM) , ..., gm (XM)




Common Randomness and Minimal
Communication for Optimum Rate Secret Keys
5.1 Synopsis
We focus on the generation of a secret key of maximum rate by a pair of terminals
observing correlated data and with the means to communicate over a noiseless public
communication channel. Our main result establishes a structural equivalence be-
tween the generation of a maximum rate secret key and the generation of a common
randomness that renders the observations of the two terminals conditionally inde-
pendent. The minimum rate of such common randomness, termed interactive com-
mon information, is related to Wyner’s notion of common information, and serves
to characterize the minimum rate of interactive public communication required to
generate an optimum rate secret key. This characterization yields a single-letter ex-
pression for the aforementioned communication rate when the number of rounds of
interaction are bounded. An application of our results shows that interaction does
not reduce this rate for binary symmetric sources. Further, we provide an example
for which interaction does reduce the minimum rate of communication.
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The definition of interactive common information and the heuristics underlying
our approach are given in Section 5.2. Our main results are provided in Section 5.3,
followed by illustrative examples in the subsequent section. Section 5.5 shows an
invariance property of interactive common information. A discussion of our results
and possible extensions is given in the final section. The results of this chapter were
reported in [61, 63].
5.2 Interactive common information
The results of this chapter are for the case of two terminals; for convenience, we
simplify our notations for the interactive communication F. Terminals 1 and 2 com-
municate interactively, with, say, terminal 1 transmitting first. Each terminal then
communicates alternately for r rounds. Specifically, an r-interactive communication
f = (f1, f2, ..., fr) is a sequence of finite-valued mappings with
f2i+1 : X n1 ×F2i → F2i+1, 0 ≤ i ≤ b(r − 1)/2c,
f2i : X n2 ×F2i−1 → F2i, 1 ≤ i ≤ br/2c,
where {Fi}ri=1 are finite sets and F0 = ∅. As in Chapter 2, this set-up subsumes
protocols where terminal 2 initiates the communication upon choosing f1 = con-
stant. Let F = f (Xn1 , X
n
2 ) describe collectively the corresponding rv. The rate of




We assume that the communication from each terminal is a (deterministic) function
of its knowledge. In particular, randomization is not allowed. This is not a limiting
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assumption; see Section 5.6.1.
We define a new notion of CI, termed interactive CI, which will be a key
concept for this chapter. Recall from Chapter 2 that Wyner’s CI is defined as the
minimum rate of rvs L = L(n)(Xn1 , X
n
2 ) such that for all ε > 0, the following holds
for n sufficiently large:
1
n
I (Xn1 ∧Xn2 | L) ≤ ε. (5.1)
Interactive CI is defined by restricting the rvs L to be CR.
Definition 5.1. An achievable r-interactive CI rate is defined in a manner analogous
to the achievable CI rate, but with the restriction that the rvs L in (5.1) be ε-CR, i.e.,
L = (J,F), where F is an r-interactive communication and J is ε-recoverable from F.
The infimum of all achievable r-interactive CI rates, denoted CIri (X1;X2), is called
the r-interactive CI of the rvs X1 and X2. By definition, the nonnegative sequence
{CIri (X1;X2)}∞r=1 is nonincreasing in r and is bounded below by CIW (X1 ∧ X2).
Define
CIi(X1 ∧X2) = lim
r→∞
CIri (X1;X2).
Then CIi(X1 ∧ X2) ≥ CIW (X1 ∧ X2) ≥ 0. Note that CIri (X1;X2) may not
be symmetric in X1 and X2 since the communication is initiated at terminal 1.
However, since
CIr+1i (X1;X2) ≤ CIri (X2;X1) ≤ CIr−1i (X1;X2),
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clearly,
CIi(X1 ∧X2) = lim
r→∞
CIri (X1;X2) = lim
r→∞
CIri (X2;X1) = CIi(X2 ∧X1). (5.2)
Further, for all 0 < ε < 1, J = Xn1 is ε-recoverable from X
n
2 and a communication
(of a Slepian-Wolf codeword) F = F (Xn1 ), and L = (J, F ) satisfies (5.1). Hence,
CIi(X1 ∧X2) ≤ H(X1); similarly, CIi(X1 ∧X2) ≤ H(X2). To summarize, we have
0 ≤ CIW (X1 ∧X2) ≤ CIi(X1 ∧X2) ≤ min{H(X1);H(X2)}, (5.3)
where the first and the last inequalities can be strict. In Section 5.4.1 we show that
the second inequality is strict for BSS X1, X2.
The r-interactive CI plays a pivotal role in optimum rate SK generation.
Loosely speaking, our main result asserts the following. A CR that satisfies (5.1)
can be used to generate an optimum rate SK and conversely, an optimum rate SK
yields a CR satisfying (5.1). In fact, such a CR of rate R can be recovered from an
interactive communication of rate R − C, where C is the SK capacity for X1 and
X2. Therefore, to find the minimum rate of interactive communication needed to
generate an optimum rate SK, it is sufficient to characterize CIi(X1 ∧X2).
5.3 Formulation and main results
Definition 5.2. A number R′ ≥ 0 is an achievable r-interactive communication
rate for CIri if, for all 0 < ε < 1, there exists, for some n ≥ 1, an r-interactive
communication F of rate (1/n) log ‖F‖ ≤ R′ + ε, and an ε-CR J recoverable from
F, with L = (J,F) satisfying (5.1). Let RrCI denote the infimum of all achievable
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r-interactive communication rates for CIri . Similarly, R
′′ ≥ 0 is an achievable r-
interactive communication rate for SK capacity if, for all 0 < ε < 1, there exists, for
some n ≥ 1, an r-interactive communication F of rate (1/n) log ‖F‖ ≤ R′′ + ε, and
an ε-SK K, recoverable from F, of rate (1/n)H(K) ≥ I(X1 ∧X2)− ε; RrSK denotes
the infimum of all achievable r-interactive communication rates for SK capacity.
Note that by their definitions, both RrCI and R
r
SK are nonincreasing with increasing
r, and are bounded below by zero. Define
RCI = lim
r→∞
RrCI , RSK = lim
r→∞
RrSK .
Although RrCI(X1;X2) and R
r
SK(X1;X2) are not equal to R
r
CI(X2;X1) and
RrSK(X2;X1), respectively, the quantities RCI and RSK are symmetric in X1 and
X2 using an argument similar to the one leading to (5.2).





i (X1;X2)− I(X1 ∧X2). (5.4)
Corollary 5.2. It holds that
RSK = RCI = CIi(X1 ∧X2)− I(X1 ∧X2). (5.5)
Remark. The relation (5.5) can be interpreted as follows. Any CR J recoverable from
(interactive communication) F, with L = (J,F) satisfying (5.1), can be decomposed
into two mutually independent parts: An SK K of maximum rate and the interactive
communication F. It follows upon rewriting (5.5) as CIi(X1∧X2) = I(X1∧X2)+RCI
that the communication F is (approximately) of rate RCI . Furthermore, RCI is the
same as RSK .
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A computable characterization of the operational term CIi(X1 ∧ X2) is not
known. However, the next result gives a single-letter characterization of CIri (X1;X2).
Theorem 5.3. Given rvs X1, X2 and r ≥ 1, we have
CIri (X1;X2) = min
U1,...,Ur
I(X1, X2 ∧ U1, ..., Ur), (5.6)
where the minimum is taken over rvs U1, ..., Ur taking values in finite sets U1, ...,Ur,
respectively, that satisfy the following conditions
(P1) U2i+1 −◦−X1, U2i −◦−X2, 0 ≤ i ≤ b(r − 1)/2c,
U2i −◦−X2, U2i−1 −◦−X1, 1 ≤ i ≤ br/2c,
(P2) X1 −◦− U r −◦−X2,
(P3) |U2i+1| ≤ |X1|
2i∏
j=1




|Uj|+ 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ br/2c,
with U0 = ∅ and U0 = constant.
Remark. Note that (5.6) has the same form as the expression for CIW (X1 ∧X2) in
(2.17) with W replaced by (U1, ..., Ur) satisfying the conditions above.
Before presenting the proof of our main Theorems 5.1 and 5.3, we give perti-
nent technical results that will constitute central tools for the proofs.







, 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
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log ‖F′‖ ≤ 1
n
[H (F|Xn1 ) +H (F|Xn2 )] + ε, (5.7)
such that Fk is an ε-CR recoverable from F′.
Proof. From the Slepian-Wolf theorem [60], there exist mappings f1, ..., fr of F
k






log ‖f2i+1‖ ≤ H(F2i+1 | Xn2 , F1, ..., F2i) +
nε
2r
, 0 ≤ i ≤ b(r − 1)/2c,
1
k
log ‖f2i‖ ≤ H(F2i | Xn1 , F1, ..., F2i−1) +
nε
2r

































, 1 ≤ i ≤ br/2c,





1 ≤ i ≤ r constitutes the required communication of rate
1
nk
log ‖F′‖ ≤ 1
n
[H (F|Xn1 ) +H (F|Xn2 )] + ε.
Remark. Lemma 5.4 says that, in essence, for an optimum rate communication F,
1
n
log ‖F‖ ≈ 1
n
[H (F|Xn1 ) +H (F|Xn2 )] .
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Lemma 5.5. (A General Decomposition) For a CR J recoverable from an interactive
communication F we have
nI(X1 ∧X2) = I (Xn1 ∧Xn2 | J,F) +H(J,F)−H (F | Xn1 )
−H (F | Xn2 )−H (J | Xn1 ,F)−H (J | Xn2 ,F) . (5.8)
Proof. For T = T (Xn1 , X
n
2 ) we have,
nI(X1 ∧X2)
= H (Xn1 , X
n
2 )−H (Xn1 | Xn2 )−H (Xn2 | Xn1 )
= H (Xn1 , X
n
2 | T )−H (Xn1 | Xn2 , T )−H (Xn2 | Xn1 , T )
+H(T )−H (T | Xn1 )−H (T | Xn2 )
= I (Xn1 ∧Xn2 | T ) +H(T )−H (T | Xn1 )−H (T | Xn2 ) .
Lemma 5.5 follows upon choosing T = J,F.













H(J | Xn1 ,F) +H(J | Xn2 ,F)
]
≤ 2ε log |X1||X2|+ 2h(ε) = δ(ε), say, (5.10)














[I (Xn1 ∧Xn2 | J,F) +H(J,F)−H(F)]− δ(ε). (5.12)
Proof of Theorem 5.1.
In this section we give a proof for (5.4). The proof of (5.5) then follows upon
taking limit r → ∞ on both sides of (5.4). The proof of (5.4) follows from claims
1-3 below. In particular, the proofs of claims 1-3 establish a structural equivalence
between a maximum rate SK and an SK of rate ≈ 1
n
H(J | F) extracted from a CR
J recoverable from F such that L = (J,F) satisfies (5.1).
Claim 1: RrCI ≥ CIri (X1;X2)− I(X1 ∧X2).
Proof. By the definition of RrCI , for every 0 < ε < 1 there exists, for some n ≥ 1,
an r-interactive communication F of rate
1
n
log ‖F‖ ≤ RrCI + ε, (5.13)
and J , an ε-CR recoverable from F, such that L = (J,F) satisfies (5.1). It follows
upon rearranging the terms in (5.12) that
1
n




which with (5.13) gives
1
n




I (Xn1 ∧Xn2 | J,F) ≤ ε ≤ ε+ δ(ε),
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the inequality (5.14), along with the fact that (ε + δ(ε)) → 0 as ε → 0, implies
that I(X1 ∧X2) +RrCI is an achievable r-interactive CI rate; hence, CIri (X1;X2) ≤
I(X1 ∧X2) +RrCI .
Claim 2: RrSK ≥ RrCI .
Proof. Using the definition of RrSK , for 0 < ε < 1 there exists, for some n ≥ 1,
an r-interactive communication F of rate 1
n
log ‖F‖ ≤ RrSK + ε, and an ε-SK K
recoverable from F of rate
1
n
H(K) ≥ I(X1 ∧X2)− ε. (5.15)
By choosing J = K in (5.12) and rearranging the terms we get,
1
n
I (Xn1 ∧Xn2 | K,F) ≤ I(X1 ∧X2)−
1
n
H(K | F) + δ(ε).
Next, from (1/n)I(K ∧ F) < ε, we have
1
n
I (Xn1 ∧Xn2 | K,F) ≤ I(X1 ∧X2)−
1
n
H(K) + ε+ δ(ε)
≤ 2ε+ δ(ε),
where the last inequality follows from (5.15). Since (2ε + δ(ε)) → 0 as ε → 0, RrSK
is an achievable r-interactive communication rate for CIri , and thus, R
r
SK ≥ RrCI .
Claim 3: RrSK ≤ CIri (X1;X2)− I(X1 ∧X2).




H(J,F) ≤ CIri (X1;X2) + ε, (5.16)
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such that L = (J,F) satisfies (5.1), and so, by (5.9),
1
n
[H(F | Xn1 ) +H(F | Xn2 )] ≤
1
n
H(J,F)− I(X1 ∧X2) + ε
≤ CIri (X1;X2)− I(X1 ∧X2) + 2ε. (5.17)
To prove the assertion in claim 3, we show that for some N ≥ 1 there exists ∆(ε)-SK
K = K(XN1 , X
N
2 ) of rate
1
n
log ‖K‖ ≥ I(X1 ∧X2)−∆(ε)
recoverable from an r-interactive communication F′′ = F′′(XN1 , X
N
2 ) of rate
1
N
log ‖F′′‖ ≤ 1
n
[H(F | Xn1 ) +H(F | Xn2 )] + ∆(ε)− 2ε, (5.18)
where ∆(ε)→ 0 as ε→ 0. Then (5.18), along with (5.17), would yield
1
N
log ‖F′′‖ ≤ CIri (X1;X2)− I(X1 ∧X2) + ∆(ε), (5.19)
so that CIri (X1;X2)− I(X1∧X2) is an achievable r-interactive communication rate
for SK capacity, thereby establishing the claim.
It remains to find K and F′′ as above. To that end, let J be recovered as
J1 = J1(X
n
1 ,F) and J2 = J2(X
n
2 ,F) by terminals 1 and 2, respectively, i.e.,
P (J = J1 = J2) ≥ 1− ε.









, 1 ≤ i ≤ k,






. For odd r, we find an r-interactive com-





is a ε-CR recoverable from F′′, for all k sufficiently
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The proof for even r is similar and is obtained by interchanging the roles of J1 and J2.
In particular, by Lemma 5.4, for all k sufficiently large there exists an r-interactive
communication F′ such that Fk is ε-CR recoverable from F′ of rate given by (5.7).
Next, from Fano’s inequality
1
n
max{H(J | J1);H(J1 | J2)} ≤ ε log |X1||X2|+ h(ε). (5.20)
By the Slepian-Wolf theorem [60] there exists a mapping f of Jk1 of rate
1
k
log ‖f‖ ≤ H(J1 | J2) + nε, (5.21)
such that









for all k sufficiently large. It follows from (5.20), (5.21) that
1
nk
log ‖f‖ ≤ ε+ ε log |X1||X2|+ h(ε). (5.23)







F ′′i = F
′
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1,










is 2ε-CR recoverable from F′′, where, by (5.7) and (5.23), the rate






[H (F|Xn1 ) +H (F|Xn2 )] + 2ε+ ε log |X1||X2|+ h(ε). (5.24)
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, using the corollary of Balanced
Coloring Lemma in [20, Lemma B.3], with
U = (J1,F), V = φ, n = k, g = F
′,




log ‖K‖ ≥ H(U)− 1
k
log ‖F′′‖
≥ H(J1,F)−H(F | Xn1 )−H(F | Xn2 )− n(2ε+ ε log |X1||X2|+ h(ε)),
(5.25)
and
I(K ∧ F′) ≤ exp(−ck),
where c > 0, for all sufficiently large k. We get from (5.25) and (5.9) that the rate
of K is bounded below as follows:
1
nk
log ‖K‖ ≥ I(X1 ∧X2)−
1
n
I (Xn1 ∧Xn2 | J1,F)− 2ε− ε log |X1||X2| − h(ε).
(5.26)
Observe that
I(Xn1 ∧Xn2 | J,F) = I(J1, Xn1 ∧Xn2 | J,F)
≥ I(Xn1 ∧Xn2 | J, J1,F)
≥ I(Xn1 ∧Xn2 | J1,F)−H(J | J1),
which along with (5.20), and the fact that L = (J,F) satisfies (5.1), yields
1
n
I(Xn1 ∧Xn2 | J1,F) ≤ ε+ ε log |X1||X2|+ h(ε). (5.27)
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Upon combining (5.26) and (5.27) we get,
1
nk
log ‖K‖ ≥ I(X1 ∧X2)− 3ε− 2ε log |X1||X2| − 2h(ε).
Thus, for ∆(ε) = 4ε+2ε log |X1||X2|+2h(ε), K is a ∆(ε)-SK of rate (1/nk) log ‖K‖ ≥
I(X1 ∧ X2) − ∆(ε), recoverable from r-interactive communication F′′, which with
(5.24), completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 5.3.
Achievability. Consider rvs U1, ..., Ur satisfying conditions (P1)-(P3) in the
statement of Theorem 5.3. It suffices to show for every 0 < ε < 1, for some n ≥ 1,
there exists an r-interactive communication F, and ε-CR J recoverable from F, such
that
I(X1, X2 ∧ U r)− ε ≤
1
n




H(F) ≤ I(X1, X2 ∧ U r)− I(X1 ∧X2) + ε, (5.29)
since from (5.12), (5.28) and (5.29), we have
1
n





H(J,F) + I(X1 ∧X2) + δ(ε)
≤ 2ε+ δ(ε).
We show below that
I(X1, X2 ∧ U r)− I(X1 ∧X2) =
b(r−1)/2c∑
i=0
I(X1 ∧ U2i+1 | X2, U2i) +
br/2c∑
i=1
I(X2 ∧ U2i | X1, U2i−1). (5.30)
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Thus, the proof will be completed upon showing that there exists an ε-CR J , recov-






I(X1 ∧ U2i+1 | X2, U2i) +
br/2c∑
i=1
I(X2 ∧ U2i | X1, U2i−1) + ε,
(5.31)
such that (J,F) satisfies (5.28). For r = 2, such a construction was given by
Ahlswede-Csiszár [2, Theorem 4.4]. (In their construction, F was additionally a
function of J .) The extension of their construction to a general r is straightforward,
and is relegated to Appendix E.
It remains to prove (5.30). Note that
I(X1, X2 ∧ U r)−
b(r−1)/2c∑
i=0
I(X1 ∧ U2i+1 | X2, U2i)−
br/2c∑
i=1




I(X2 ∧ U2i+1 | U2i) +
br/2c∑
i=1
I(X1 ∧ U2i | U2i−1). (5.32)
Further, from conditions (P1)-(P3) it follows that
b(r−1)/2c∑
i=0
I(X2 ∧ U2i+1 | U2i) +
br/2c∑
i=1




I(X2 ∧ U2i+1 | U2i) +
br/2c∑
i=2
I(X1 ∧ U2i | U2i−1)




I(X2 ∧ U2i+1 | U2i) +
br/2c∑
i=2
I(X1 ∧ U2i | U2i−1)




I(X2 ∧ U2i+1 | U2i) +
br/2c∑
i=2
I(X1 ∧ U2i | U2i−1)− I(X1 ∧X2 | U1, U2)
= ... = −I(X1 ∧X2 | U r) = 0. (5.33)
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Combining (5.32) and (5.33) we get (5.30).
Converse. Let R ≥ 0 be an achievable r-interactive CI rate. Then, for all
0 < ε < 1, for some n ≥ 1, there exists an r-interactive communication F, and ε-CR
J recoverable from F, such that (1/n)H(J,F) ≤ R+ ε and L = (J,F) satisfies (5.1).
Let J be recovered as J1 = J1(X
n
1 ,F) and J2 = J2(X
n
2 ,F) by terminals 1 and 2,
respectively, i.e., P (J = J1 = J2) ≥ 1− ε. Further, let rv T be distributed uniformly
over the set {1, ..., n}. Define rvs U r as follows:










(Fr, J1), r odd,
(Fr, J2), r even.
We complete the proof for odd r; the proof for even r can be completed similarly.
It was shown by Kaspi [39, equations (3.10)-(3.13)] that
U2i+1 −◦−X1T , U2i −◦−X2T , 0 ≤ i ≤ b(r − 1)/2c,
U2i −◦−X2T , U2i−1 −◦−X1T , 1 ≤ i ≤ br/2c.
Next, note from (5.27) that
ε+ ε log |X1||X2|+ h(ε) ≥
1
n










I(X1i ∧X2i | X i−11 , Xn2(i+1), J1,F)
= I(X1T ∧X2T | U r). (5.34)
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Similarly, it holds that
ε+ ε log |X1||X2|+ h(ε) ≥ I(X1T ∧Xn2(T+1) | XT−11 , J1,F, T ). (5.35)


















2 ∧ J1,F)− ε log |X1||X2| − h(ε)






H(Xn2 | Xn1 , J1,F)− ε log |X1||X2| − h(ε)
= H(X1T , X2T )−H(X1T | XT−11 , J1,F, T )
−H(X2T | XT−11 , Xn2(T+1), X1T , Xn1(T+1), J1,F, T )− ε log |X1||X2| − h(ε)
≥ I(X1T , X2T ∧ U r)− ε− 2ε log |X1||X2| − 2h(ε),
where the second inequality follows from Fano’s inequality, and the last inequality
follows from (5.35). Consequently,
R ≥ 1
n
H(J,F)− ε ≥ I(X1T , X2T ∧ U r)− 2(ε+ ε log |X1||X2|+ h(ε)). (5.36)
We now replace the rvs U1, ..., Ur with those taking values in finites sets U1, ...,Ur, re-
spectively, with U1, ...,Ur satisfying the cardinality bounds in condition (iii). Similar
bounds were derived in the context of interactive function computation in [42]. For
1 ≤ l ≤ r, assume that rvs U1, ...,Ul−1 satisfy the cardinality bounds. We consider
odd l; the steps for even l are similar. If the rv Ul does not satisfy the cardinality
bound, from the Support Lemma [18, Lemma 15.4], we can replace it with another
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rv Ũl that takes less than or equal to |X1|
∏l−1
i=1 |Ui| + 1 values, while keeping the
following quantities unchanged:
PX1TU l−1 , I(X1T ∧X2T | U r), and I(X1T , X2T ∧ U r).
Note that we have only altered PUl in the joint pmf PX1TX2TUr = PUlPX1TU l−1|UlPX2T |X1TU l−1 .
Hence, the Markov relations in (P1) remain unaltered. Furthermore, PX1TX2T =
PX1X2 . Finally, since the set of pmfs on a finite alphabet is compact, and the choice
of ε above was arbitrary, it follows upon taking ε→ 0 in (5.34) and (5.36) that there
exists U r1 satisfying (P1)-(P3) such that
R ≥ I(X1, X2 ∧ U r),
which completes the proof.
5.4 Can interaction reduce the communication rate?
It is well known that the SK capacity can be attained by using a simple one-way
communication from terminal 1 to terminal 2 (or from X2 to X1). Here we derive
the minimum rate RNI of such noninteractive communication using the expression
for CIri (X1;X2) in (5.6). Since this expression has a double Markov structure, it can
be simplified by the following observation (see [18, Problem 16.25]): If rvs U,X1, X2
satisfy
U −◦−X1 −◦−X2, X1 −◦− U −◦−X2, (5.37)
then there exist functions f = f(U) and g = g(X1) such that
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(i) P (f(U) = g(X1)) = 1;
(ii) X1 −◦− g(X1)−◦−X2.
In particular, for rvs U,X1, X2 that satisfy (5.37), it follows from (i) above that
I(X1, X2 ∧ U) = I(X1 ∧ U) ≥ I(g(X1) ∧ f(U)) = H(g(X1)).
Turning to (5.6), for rvs U r with r odd, the observations above applied to the rvs
X1 and X2 conditioned on each realization U
r−1 = ur−1 implies that there exists a





r−1) , U r−1 −◦−X2, (5.38)
and
I (X1, X2 ∧ U r) ≥ I
(







r−1) | U r−1
)
,
where rv U r−1 satisfies (P1), (P3). Similar observations hold for even r. Thus,
for the minimization in (5.6), conditioned on arbitrarily chosen rvs U r−1 satisfying
(P1), (P3), the rv Ur is selected as a sufficient statistic for X2 given the observation
X1 (sufficient statistic for X1 given the observation X2) when r is odd (r is even).
Specifically, for r = 1, we have
CI1i (X1;X2) = min
X1−◦g1(X1)−◦X2
H (g1(X1)) , (5.39)
and
CI1i (X2;X1) = min
X2−◦g2(X2)−◦X1
H (g2(X2)) . (5.40)
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The answer to the optimization problems in (5.39) and (5.40) can be given explicitly.
In fact, we specify next a minimal sufficient statistic forX2 on the basis ofX1. Define
an equivalence relation on X1 as follows:
x ∼ x′ ⇔ PX2|X1 (y | x) = PX2|X1 (y | x′) , y ∈ X2. (5.41)
Let g∗1 be the function corresponding to the equivalence classes of ∼. We claim that
g∗1 is a minimal sufficient statistic for X2 on the basis of X1. This expression for
the minimal sufficient statistic was also given in [38, Lemma 3.5(4)]. Specifically,
X1 −◦− g∗1(X1)−◦−X2 since with g∗1(X1) = c, say, we have
PX2|g∗1(X1) (y | c) =
∑
x∈X1




PX1|g∗1(X1) (x | c) PX2|X1,g∗1(X1) (y | x, c)
= PX2|X1,g∗1(X1) (y | x, c) , ∀x with g
∗
1(x) = c.
Also, if g1(X1) satisfies X1 −◦− g1(X1)−◦−X2 then g∗1 is a function of g1. To see this,
let g1(x) = g1(x
′) = c for some x, x′ ∈ X1. Then,
PX2|g1(X1) (y | c) = PX2|X1 (y | x) = PX2|X1 (y | x′) , y ∈ X2,
so that g∗1(x) = g
∗
1(x
′). Since g∗1 is a minimal sufficient statistic for X2 on the basis
of X1, it follows from (5.39) that
CI1i (X1;X2) = H (g
∗
1(X1)) ,
and similarly, with g∗2(X2) defined analogously,




Therefore, from (5.4), the minimum rate RNI of a noninteractive communication for
generating a maximum rate SK is given by
RNI = min {H (g∗1(X1)) ;H (g∗1(X1))} − I(X1 ∧X2). (5.42)
From the expression for RNI , it is clear that the rate of noninteractive com-
munication can be reduced by replacing X1 and X2 with their respective minimal
sufficient statistics g∗1(X1) and g
∗
2(X2). Can the rate of communication required
for generating an optimum rate SK be reduced by resorting to complex interactive
communication protocols? To answer this question we must compare the expression
for RNI with RSK . Specifically, from Theorem 5.1 and the Corollary following it,
interaction reduces the rate of communication iff, for some r > 1,
CIri (X1;X2) < min {H (g∗1(X1)) ;H (g∗1(X1))} , (5.43)
where g∗1 and g
∗
2 are as in (5.42); interaction does not help iff
CIi(X1 ∧X2) = min {H (g∗1(X1)) ;H (g∗1(X1))} .
Note that instead of comparing with CIri (X1;X2) in (5.43), we can also compare
with CIri (X2;X1).
We shall explore this question here, and give an example where the answer is
in the affirmative. In fact, we first show that interaction does not help in the case
of BSS. Then we give an example where interaction does help.
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5.4.1 Binary symmetric sources
For BSS X1 and X2, we note a property of rvs U
r that satisfy the conditions (P1)-
(P3) in Theorem 5.3.
Lemma 5.6. Let X1 and X2 be {0, 1} valued rvs with I(X1∧X2) 6= 0. Then, for rvs
U1, ..., Ur that satisfy the conditions (P1)-(P3) in Theorem 5.3, for every realization
u1, ..., ur of U1, ..., Ur, one of the following holds:
H(X1 | U r = ur) = 0, or H(X2 | U r = ur) = 0. (5.44)
Proof. Given a sequence ur, assume that
H(X1 | U r = ur) > 0 and H(X2 | U r = ur) > 0,
which is equivalent to
PX1|Ur (1 | ur) PX1|Ur (0 | ur) > 0 and PX2|Ur (1 | ur) PX2|Ur (0 | ur) > 0. (5.45)
We consider the case when r is even; the case of odd r is handled similarly. From
the Markov conditions X1 −◦− U r −◦−X2 and X1 −◦−X2, U r−1 −◦− Ur, we have
PX1,X2|Ur (x, y | ur) = PX1|Ur (x | ur) PX2|Ur (y | ur)
= PX1|X2,Ur−1
(
x | y, ur−1
)
PX2|Ur (y | ur) , x, y ∈ {0, 1}.
Since PX2|Ur (y | ur) > 0 from (5.45), we have
PX1|Ur (x | ur) = PX1|X2,Ur−1
(
x | y, ur−1
)









x | 0, ur−1
)
,
x ∈ {0, 1}.










we can do the same analysis as above, again for r − 1. Upon repeating this process
r times we get I(X1 ∧X2) = 0, which is a contradiction. Therefore, either H(X1 |
U r = ur) = 0 or H(X2 | U r = ur) = 0 holds.
Note that
CIri (X1;X2) = H(X1, X2)−max
Ur
H(X1, X2 | U r),




X1 ∧X2 | U i = ui
)
= 0, and
H(X1, X2 | U i = ui, U ri+1) = H(X2 | U i = ui, U ri+1)
≤ H(X2 | U i = ui). (5.46)
Similarly, H(X2 | U i = ui) = 0 implies
I
(
X1 ∧X2 | U i = ui
)
= 0, and
H(X1, X2 | U i = ui, U ri+1) ≤ H(X1 | U i = ui). (5.47)
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For a sequence ur with PUr (u
r) > 0, let τ(ur) be the minimum value of i such that
H(X1 | U i = ui) = 0 or H(X2 | U i = ui) = 0;
if X1 and X2 are independent, τ(u
r) = 0. Note that τ is a stopping-time adapted to
U1, ..., Ur. Then, from (5.46), (5.47), CI
r
i (X1;X2) remains unchanged if we restrict
the support of U r to sequences ur with ui = φ for all i > τ(u
r). Furthermore, the
Markov condition (P1) implies that if for a sequence ur, τ = τ(ur) is odd then
PX2|X1,Uτ (y | x, uτ ) = PX2|X1,Uτ−1
(




PX1|Uτ (1 | uτ ) PX1|Uτ (0 | uτ ) > 0,
it holds from the definition of τ that
PX2|Uτ (1 | uτ ) PX2|Uτ (0 | uτ ) > 0,
which is a contradiction. Therefore, we have H(X1 | U τ = uτ ) = 0. Similarly,
H(X2 | U τ = uτ ) = 0 holds for even τ . To summarize,
CIri (X1;X2) = min
Uτ
I (X1, X2 ∧ U τ ) , (5.48)
where U r are rvs satisfying (P1)-(P3), and τ is the stopping-time defined above.
We show next that for BSS, interaction can never reduce the rate of commu-
nication for optimum rate SK generation. In fact, we conjecture that for any BSS
X1, X2, RNI = RSK.
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Theorem 5.7. Let X1 and X2 be {0, 1}-valued rvs, with




P (X1 = 0, X2 = 1) = P (X1 = 1, X2 = 0) =
1
2





CIi(X1 ∧X2) = min{H(X1);H(X2)},
i.e., interaction does not help to reduce the communication required for optimum
rate SK generation.
Remark. As a consequence of Theorem 5.7, for sources with joint distribution as
in (5.49), the second inequality in (5.3) can be strict. Specifically, it was noted by
Wyner (see the discussion following equation (1.19) in [77]) that for BSS, CIW (X1∧
X2) < 1. From Theorem 5.7, we have
CIi(X1 ∧X2) = min{H(X1);H(X2)} = 1.
Thus, for BSS X1 and X2, CIW (X1 ∧X2) < CIi(X1 ∧X2).
Proof. Denote by U r0 the following set of stopped sequences in U r:
For i ≤ r, for a sequence ur ∈ U r the stopped sequence ui ∈ U r0 if:
H
(




X2 | U j = uj
)
> 0, ∀ j < i, and
H
(
X1 | U i = ui
)
= 0 or H
(
X2 | U i = ui
)
= 0.
For i ∈ {0, 1}, define the following subsets of U r0 :
U1i =
{









By their definition the sets U10 ,U11 ,U20 , and U21 are disjoint, whereby we have























For uτ ∈ U r0 , denote by p(uτ ) the probability PUτ (uτ ). Further, for uτ ∈ U10
⋃U11 ,
denote by W u
τ
: X1 → X2 the stochastic matrix corresponding to PX2|X1,Uτ (· | ·, uτ ),
and for uτ ∈ U20
⋃U21 , denote by T u
τ
: X2 → X1 the stochastic matrix corresponding
to PX1|X2,Uτ (· | ·, uτ ). With this notation, the following holds:
1
2











(i | i), i ∈ {0, 1}, (5.51)















 = (1− δ).

































Similarly, using for i 6= j, i, j ∈ {0, 1},
1
2
































1− T uτ (i | i)
)
(5.53)
On adding (5.52) and (5.53) we get






















Note that the right-side above equals H(X1, X2 | U τ ), which yields
h(δ) = max{H(X1 | X2);H(X2 | X1)} ≥ H(X1, X2 | U τ ).
Since rvs U r above were arbitrary, we have from (5.48),
CIri (X1;X2) ≥ H(X1, X2)−max{H(X1 | X2);H(X2 | X1)}
= min{H(X1);H(X2)}.
Combining this with (5.3), we obtain
CIri (X1;X2) = min{H(X1);H(X2)}.
5.4.2 An example where interaction does help










where a, b, c are nonnegative, 7a+ b+ c = 1, and c 6= a, which holds iff b 6= 1− 8a.
Assume that
2a > b > a. (5.54)
From (5.43), to show that interaction helps, it suffices to find rvs U1, ..., Ur satisfying
(P1)-(P3) such that
I (X1, X2 ∧ U1, ..., Ur) < min {H (g∗1(X1)) ;H (g∗2(X2))} , (5.55)
where g∗1 and g
∗


















does not depend on y. Therefore, for the pmf above, g∗1(X1)
and g∗2(X2) are equivalent to X1 and X2, respectively. Thus,
min {H (g∗1(X1)) ;H (g∗2(X2))} = min{H(X1);H(X2)},
where H(X1) = H(X2) for the given pmf.





1, x = 2,
2, x = 0, 1,




1, y = 0,
2, y = 1, 2.
Clearly, U1 and U2 satisfy (P1) and (P2). For (P3), note that if (U1, U2) = (1, 0),
then X1 = 2, and if (U1, U2) = (2, 1), then X2 = 0. Finally, if (U1, U2) = (2, 2), then
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X1 ∈ {0, 1} and X2 ∈ {1, 2}, implying






, ∀ (x, y) ∈ {0, 1} × {1, 2}.
Therefore, I(X1 ∧X2 | U1, U2) = 0, and so U1, U2 satisfy (P3). We show that (5.55)
holds for this choice of U1, U2. Specifically, I (X1, X2 ∧ U1, U2) = H (U1, U2), and
the following holds:
H(X2)−H (U1, U2) = H(X1)−H (U1, U2)
= H (X1|U1)−H (U2|U1)
= P (f1(X1) = 2)
[



































which implies (5.55) for U1, U2.
5.5 Interactive common information and sufficient statistics
In Chapter 2, we saw that several CI quantities remain unchanged if X1 and X2
are replaced, respectively, with their sufficient statistics (for the other). This is true
even for the interactive CI.
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Theorem 5.8. For rvs X1 and X2, let functions g1 of X1 and g2 of X2 be such that
X1 −◦− g1(X1)−◦−X2 and X1 −◦− g2(X2)−◦−X2. Then the following relations hold:
CIri (X1;X2) = CI
r
i (g1(X1); g2(X2)) , r ≥ 1,
CIi(X1 ∧X2) = CIi (g1(X1) ∧ g2(X2)) .
Remark. (i) Theorem 5.8 implies that the minimum rate of communication for gen-
erating a maximum rate SK remains unchanged if X1 and X2 are replaced by g1(X1)
and g2(X2) as above, respectively.
(ii) Note that g1(X1) and g2(X2) above are, respectively, functions of g
∗
1(X1) and
g∗2(X2) defined through (5.41).
Proof. First note that
I(X1 ∧X2) = I (g1(X1) ∧X2) = I (g1(X1) ∧ g2(X2)) . (5.57)
Proof. . From (5.57), any protocol that generates an optimum rate SK for the
sources g1(X1) and g2(X2) also generates an optimum rate SK for the sources X1
and X2. Thus, the minimum communication rate for prior protocols is bounded
below by the minimum communication rate for the latter protocols, so that by
Theorem 5.1,
CIri (g1(X1); g2(X2))− I (g1(X1) ∧ g2(X2)) ≥ CIri (X1;X2)− I (X1 ∧X2) ,
which, by (5.57), is
CIri (g1(X1); g2(X2)) ≥ CIri (X1;X2) . (5.58)
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In fact, (5.58) holds with equality: We claim that any choice of rvs U r that satisfy
(P1)-(P3) also satisfy the following Markov relations:
U2i+1 −◦− g1(X1), U2i −◦− g2(X2), 0 ≤ i ≤ b(r − 1)/2c,
U2i −◦− g2(X2), U2i−1 −◦− g1(X1), 1 ≤ i ≤ br/2c,
g1(X1)−◦− U r −◦− g2(X2). (5.59)
It follows that
CIri (g1(X1); g2(X2)) ≤ I (g1(X1), g2(X2) ∧ U r) ≤ I (X1, X2 ∧ U r) , (5.60)
and consequently,
CIri (g1(X1); g2(X2)) ≤ CIri (X1;X2) .
Thus, by (5.58),
CIri (g1(X1); g2(X2)) = CI
r
i (X1;X2) . (5.61)
Taking the limit r →∞ we get
CIi (g1(X1) ∧ g2(X2)) = CIi (X1 ∧X2) .
It remains to establish (5.59); instead, using induction we establish the following
stronger Markov relations: For 1 ≤ i ≤ r,
Ui −◦− g1(X1), U i−1 −◦−X2, i odd,
Ui −◦− g2(X2), U i−1 −◦−X1, i even,
X1 −◦− g1(X1), U i −◦−X2 and X1 −◦− g2(X2), U i −◦−X2. (5.62)
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Clearly, (5.62) implies the first two Markov relations in (5.59). The last Markov
chain in (5.59) follows upon observing
0 = I (X1 ∧X2 | U r) ≥ I (g1(X1) ∧ g2(X2) | U r) .
To see that (5.62) holds for i = 1 note that
I (X1 ∧X2 | g1(X1), U1) ≤ I (X1 ∧X2 | g1(X1)) + I (U1 ∧X2 | g1(X1), X1) = 0,
and
I (X1 ∧X2 | g2(X2), U1) ≤ I (X1 ∧X2 | g2(X2)) + I (U1 ∧X2, g2(X2) | X1) = 0.
Next, assume that (5.62) holds for an even i. Then, from (P1) we get:
I
(














X2 ∧X1 | g1(X1), U i
)
= 0,
where the last equality follows from (5.62). From the last inequality above we have
Ui+1 −◦− g1(X1), U i −◦−X2 and X1 −◦− g1(X1), U i+1 −◦−X2.
Furthermore, it also follows from (5.62) that
I
(












Ui+1 ∧X2 | X1, U i
)
= 0,
where the last equality follows from (P1). Thus, we have
X1 −◦− g2(X2), U i+1 −◦−X2,
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establishing the validity of (5.62) for i+ 1. The proof of (5.59) can be completed by
induction by using a similar argument for odd i.
5.6 Discussion
5.6.1 Local randomization
Although independent local randomization was not allowed in our formulation, our
main result characterizing RSK holds even when such randomization is available.
Consider a model where terminals 1 and 2, in additional to their respective obser-
vations Xn1 and X
n
2 , have access to finite-valued
1 rvs T1 and T2, respectively. The




2 ) are mutually independent. The SK capacity is defined as
before, with Xn1 and X
n
2 now replaced by (X
n
1 , T1) and (X
n
2 , T2), respectively. It
is known [48, 2] that even with randomization the SK capacity equals I(X1 ∧X2).
For this model, denote the minimum rate of r-interactive communication required
to generate an SK of rate I(X1 ∧X2) by R̃rSK .




To see this, we define quantities R̃rCI and C̃I
r





with Xn1 and X
n
2 replaced by (X
n
1 , T1) and (X
n
2 , T2), respectively. Note that this
substitution is made even in condition (5.1), i.e., the CR J and the communication
1The cardinalities of the range spaces of T1 and T2 are allowed to be at most exponential in n.
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F now are required to satisfy:
1
n
I (Xn1 , T1 ∧Xn2 , T2 | J,F) ≤ ε. (5.63)
We observe that (5.8) still holds, with (Xn1 , T1) and (X
n
2 , T2) replacing, respectively,
Xn1 and X
n






i − I(X1 ∧X2). (5.64)
By its definition R̃rCI ≤ RrCI , since L = (J,F) = L(Xn1 , Xn2 ) satisfying (5.1) will
meet (5.63) as well. We claim that R̃rCI ≥ RrCI , which by (5.64) and Theorem 5.1
implies Lemma 5.9. Indeed, consider CR J recoverable from F such that (J,F)
attain R̃rCI . Then, the condition (5.63) gives
1
n
I (Xn1 ∧Xn2 | J,F, T1, T2) ≈ 0.
So, there exist t1, t2 such that conditioned on T1 = t1, T2 = t2 the CR J is still
recoverable from F, and
1
n
I (Xn1 ∧Xn2 | J,F, T1 = t1, T2 = t2) ≈ 0.
Thus, with T1 = t1, T2 = t2 fixed, (J,F) constitutes a feasible choice in the definition
of RrCI . Since the number of values taken by F can only decrease upon fixing T1 =
t1, T2 = t2, we get R̃
r
CI ≥ RrCI . Therefore, the availability of local randomization
does not decrease the rate of communication required for generating an optimum
rate SK.
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5.6.2 Less-than-optimum rate secret keys
SK generation is linked intrinsically to the efficient generation of CR. For ρ ≥ 0, a
rate R ≥ 0 is an achievable CR rate for ρ if for every 0 < ε < 1 there exists, for
some n ≥ 1, an ε-CR L with
1
n
H(L) ≥ R− ε,
recoverable from an r-interactive communication F, for arbitrary r, of rate
1
n
H(F) ≤ ρ+ ε;
the maximum achievable CR rate for ρ is denoted by CR(ρ). Similarly, denote by
C(ρ) the maximum rate of an SK that can be generated using a communication as
above. It can be shown in a straightforward manner that
C(ρ) = CR(ρ)− ρ. (5.65)
The graph of CR as a function of ρ is plotted in Fig. 5.1. CR(ρ) is an increasing
and a concave function of ρ, as seen from a simple time-sharing argument. Since
RSK is the minimum rate of communication required to generate a maximum rate
SK, CR(ρ)− ρ = I(X1 ∧X2) for ρ ≥ RSK . Thus, our results characterize the graph
of CR(ρ) for all ρ ≥ RSK . The quantity RSK is the minimum value of ρ for which
the slope of CR(ρ) is 1; CR (RSK) is equal to the interactive CI CIi(X1 ∧ X2).
Furthermore, from the proof of Theorem 5.1, a CR L that satisfies (5.1) must yield
an optimum rate SK. Thus, any CR recoverable from a communication of rate less
than RSK cannot satisfy (5.1). A characterization of CR(ρ) for ρ < RSK is central
128
I(X ∧ Y )
I(X ∧ Y )
RSK H(X|Y ) +H(Y |X)
H(X,Y )
CR(ρ)
ρmin{H(X|Y ), H(Y |X)}
min{H(X), H(Y )}
CIi(X ∧ Y )
Figure 5.1: Minimum rate of communication RSK for optimum rate SK generation
to the characterization of C(ρ), and this, along with a single-letter characterization
of RSK , is an open problem.
We close this chapter by remarking that an extension of the results of this
chapter to the case of multiple terminals is not known. In particular, an appropriate
notion of interactive CI for multiple terminals, with connections to the minimal
communication for optimum rate SK generation, is unavailable. The identification
of such a notion of multiterminal interactive CI will lead to a characterization of the
CR underlying optimum rate SK generation for multiple terminals and shed light





A set of m terminals, observing correlated signals, communicate interactively to
generate common randomness for a given subset of them. Knowing only the com-
munication, how many direct queries of the value of the common randomness will
resolve it? A general upper bound, valid for arbitrary signal alphabets, is developed
for the number of such queries by using a query strategy that applies to all com-
mon randomness and associated communication. When the underlying signals are
i.i.d. repetitions of m correlated random variables, the number of queries can be
exponential in signal length. For this case, the mentioned upper bound is tight and
leads to a single-letter formula for the largest query exponent, which coincides with
the secret key capacity of a corresponding multiterminal source model. In fact, the
upper bound constitutes a strong converse for the optimum query exponent, and
implies also a new strong converse for secret key capacity.
The problem formulation and our main result characterizing the optimum
query exponent are given in the next section. Simple and essential technical tools
are presented in Section 6.3. Achievability is proved in Section 6.4. The less com-
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plex converse proof for the case A = {1, ...,m} is given in Section 6.5. However,
this proof does not extend to an arbitrary A ⊆ {1, ...,m}, for which a different
converse is provided in Section 6.6. Section 6.7 contains the strong converse result
for SK capacity. A converse for the optimum query exponent for rvs with arbitrary
alphabets is proved in Section 6.8, with jointly Gaussian rvs as a special case. The
results of this chapter were reported in [66, 65].
6.2 Main result: How many queries will resolve common
randomness?
Consider the multiterminal source model of Section 2.2. The terminals communicate
interactively with each other over a public communication network, as described in
Definition 2.1, in order to generation a CR (see Definition 2.2). For simplicity, we do
not allow independent local randomization UM. However, our results do not change
if such randomization is allowed; see Section 6.9.
A querier observing the communication F wants to resolve the value of this CR
L by asking questions of the form “Is L = l?” with yes-no answers. While queries of
this form have been termed “guessing” [47, 4, 5, 34], we use the terminology “query”
since our approach covers a broader class of query strategies; see Section 6.9.
Definition 6.1. For rvs U, V with values in the sets U ,V , a query strategy q for
U given V = v is a bijection q(·|v) : U → {1, ..., |U|}, where the querier, upon
observing V = v, asks the question “Is U = u?” in the q(u|v)th query.
Thus, a query strategy q for resolving a CR L on the basis of an observed
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communication F = i is an ordering of the possible values of L. The terminals
seek to generate a CR L for A using communication F so as to make the task of the
querier observing F as onerous as possible. For instance, if L were to be independent
of F, then the querier necessarily must search exhaustively over the set of possible
values of L, which can be exponentially large (in n).
Definition 6.2. Given 0 < ε < 1, a query exponent E > 0 is ε-achievable if for every
0 < ε′ < 1, there exists an ε-CR L = L(n) (XnM) for A ⊆ M from communication
F = F (XnM) such that for every query strategy q for L given F,
P
(
q(L | F) ≥ exp(nE)
)
> 1− ε′, (6.1)
for all n ≥ N(ε, ε′). The ε-optimum query exponent, denoted E∗(ε), is the supremum
of all ε-achievable query exponents; E∗(ε) is nondecreasing in ε. The optimum query




Remark. Clearly, 0 ≤ E∗ ≤ log |XM|.
Condition (6.1) forces any query strategy adopted by the querier to have an ex-
ponential complexity (in n) with large probability; E∗ is the largest value of the
exponent that can be inflicted on the querier.
Our main result is a single-letter characterization of the optimum query expo-
nent E∗.
Theorem 6.1. The optimum query exponent E∗ equals




λBH (XB | XBc) , 0 < ε < 1. (6.2)
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Remarkably, the value of E∗ coincides with the SK capacity of a multiterminal
source model; see (2.12). In fact, the achievability proof of Theorem 6.1 is straight-
forward and employs, in effect, an SK in forming an appropriate CR L. We show
that for such a CR L, any query strategy is tantamount to an exhaustive search
over the set of values of the SK, a feature that is apparent for a “perfect” SK with
I(K ∧ F) = 0. The difficult step in the proof of Theorem 6.1 is the converse part
which involves an appropriate query strategy, for arbitrary L and F, that limits the
incurred query exponents. Our strong converse yields a uniform upper bound for
E∗(ε), 0 < ε < 1.
We shall see that while the expression for E∗ in (6.2) lends itself to the achiev-
ability proof of Theorem 6.1 in Section 6.4, alternative forms are suited better for






λBH (XBc)− (λsum − 1)H (XM)
]
, (6.3)
which is used in the converse proof for an arbitrary A ⊆ M in Section 6.6. The
converse proof for the case A =M is facilitated by the further simplification pointed
out in (2.15).
6.3 Technical tools
The following simple observation relates the number of queries in a query strategy
q to the cardinality of an associated set.
133
Proposition 6.2. Let q be a query strategy for U given V = v, v ∈ V. Then,
|{u ∈ U : q(u|v) ≤ γ}| ≤ γ.
Proof. The claim is straightforward since q(·|v) is a bijection.
For rvs U, V , finding a lower bound for q(U |V ) involves finding a suitable upper
bound for the conditional probabilities PU |V (· | ·). This idea is formalized by the
following lemma.
Lemma 6.3. Given γ > 0 and 0 < δ < 1/2, let the rvs U, V , satisfy
P
({




≥ 1− δ. (6.4)
Then for every query strategy q for U given V ,
P (q(U |V ) ≥ γ) ≥ 1− ε′, (6.5)
for all ε′ ≥ 2δ.











Proof. Suppose (6.4) holds but not (6.5). Then there exists q with
P (q(U |V ) < γ) > ε′. (6.7)
From (6.4) and (6.7)
P
({
(u, v) : PU |V (u|v) ≤
δ
γ
, q(u|v) < γ
})
> 1− δ + ε′ − 1
= ε′ − δ. (6.8)
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, by Proposition 6.2
= δ,
which contradicts (6.8) since ε′ ≥ 2δ.
For the converse, suppose that (6.6) does not hold; then, we show that a query
strategy q0 exists which violates (6.5) when 0 < ε
′ ≤ (1 −
√









which, by a reverse Markov inequality1 [41, p. 157] (see also [26, p. 153]), gives a
set V0 ⊆ V with













δ, v ∈ V0. (6.10)
Denoting by Uv the set {·} in (6.10), we have




1The reverse Markov inequality states that for rvs U, V with P ((U, V ) ∈ S) ≥ 1 − ε for some
S ⊆ U×V, there exists V0 ⊆ V such that P ((U, V ) ∈ S | V = v) ≥ 1−
√




|Uv| < γ, v ∈ V0. (6.11)
For each v ∈ V0, order the elements of U arbitrarily but with the first |Uv| elements
being from Uv. This ordering defines a query strategy q0(·|v), v ∈ V0; for v /∈ V0, let
q0(·|v) be defined arbitrarily. Then for v ∈ V0, u ∈ Uv,
q0(u|v) < γ
by (6.11), so that













Finally, the following simple observation will be useful.
Proposition 6.4. For pmfs Q1, Q2, on V,
Q1 ({v : Q1(v) ≥ δQ2(v)}) ≥ 1− δ, 0 < δ < 1.






δ Q2(v) ≤ δ.
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6.4 Proof of achievability
Denoting the right-side of (6.2) by C, we claim, for 0 < ε < 1, 0 < δ < 1/2, β > 0,
the existence of an ε-CR L = XnM for A from F with
P
({
(xnM, i) : PL|F (x
n
M | i) ≤ δ exp [−n(C − β)]
})
≥ 1− δ, (6.13)
for all n sufficiently large. Then the assertion of the theorem follows by applying
the first part of Lemma 6.3 with U = L, V = F, γ = exp[n(C − β)], to conclude
from (6.5) that
E∗(ε) ≥ C,
since β > 0 was chosen arbitrarily.
Turning to the mentioned claim, it is shown in [20, Proposition 1], [21, Theo-












for all n sufficiently large. Using Proposition 6.4 with Q1 = PF and Q2 being the
uniform pmf over the range of F, we get
PF
({


























for all n sufficiently large. Denoting by I0 the set on the left-side of (6.15), it follows
that
P (XnM ∈ Tn,F ∈ I0) ≥ 1− δ. (6.17)
The claim results from (6.15)-(6.17) upon observing that for (xnM, i) ∈ T n × I0,
PXnM|F (x
n
M | i) =
PXnM ((x
n












≤ δ exp[−n(C − β)],
for all n large enough, where the last inequality is by (6.14).
Remark. The achievability proof brings out a connection between a large probability
uniform upper bound κ for PL, the size ‖F‖ of the communication F, and the
associated number of queries needed. Loosely speaking, the number of queries is
approximately 1‖F‖κ , which reduces to
‖L‖
‖F‖ if L is nearly uniformly distributed.
6.5 Proof of converse for A =M
Recalling the expression for E∗ in (2.15), given a partition π of M with |π| = k,
2 ≤ k ≤ m, we observe that for a consolidated source model with k sources and
underlying rvs Y1, ..., Yk where
2 Yi = Xπi , the ε-optimum query exponent E
∗
π(ε) can
be no smaller than E∗(ε) (since the terminals in each πi coalesce, in effect).
2 For specificity, the elements in each πi are arranged in increasing order.
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Theorem 6.5 establishes, in view of (2.15), the converse part of Theorem 6.1 when
A =M.
The proof of Theorem 6.5 relies on the following general result, which holds
for queries of CR generated in a multiterminal source model with underlying rvs
Y1, ..., Yk for n = 1.
Theorem 6.6. Let L = L (Y1, ..., Yk) be ε-CR for {1, ..., k} from interactive com-
munication F = F (Y1, ..., Yk), 0 < ε < 1. Given δ > 0 such that δ +
√
δ + ε < 1, let
θ be such that
P
({
(y1, ..., yk) :




≥ 1− δ. (6.18)
Then, there exists a query strategy q0 for L given F such that
P
(







≥ (1− δ −
√
δ + ε)2. (6.19)
Proof of Theorem 6.5. We apply Theorem 6.6 to n i.i.d. repetitions of the rvs
Y1, ..., Yk. Denoting by T ′n the set of PY1,...,Yk-typical sequences with constant δ, we
have
PY n1 ,...,Y nk (T
′
n) ≥ 1− δ,
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and for (yn1 , ..., y
n
k ) ∈ T ′n,
PY n1 ,...,Y nk (y
n
1 , ..., y
n
k )∏k
























for all n large enough. Thus, the hypothesis of Theorem 6.6 holds with














If E is an ε-achievable query exponent (see Definition 6.2), then there exists an ε-CR
L = L (Y n1 , ..., Y
n
k ) from communication F = F (Y
n
1 , ..., Y
n
k ) such that (6.1) holds for
the query strategy q0 of Theorem 6.6 for this choice of L and F. In particular for
ε′ < (1− δ −
√
δ + ε)2, we get from (6.19) and (6.1) that
P
(
















≥ (1− δ −
√
δ + ε)2 − ε′ > 0, (6.20)











k − 1 .
Since E was any ε-achievable query exponent and δ > 0 was chosen arbitrarily, the
assertion of Theorem 6.5 is established.
Proof of Theorem 6.6. Denote by L the set of values of the CR L. Using the
hypothesis (6.18) of the Theorem, we shall show below the existence of a set Io of
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values of F and associated sets L(i) ⊆ L, i ∈ I0, such that for every i ∈ I0










and PF (I0) ≥ 1− δ −
√
ε+ δ. (6.23)
Then, we consider a query strategy q0 for L given F as in the proof of converse part
of Lemma 6.3, with L, F, I0, L(i) in the roles of U, V, V0, Uv, respectively. Thus,
for all i ∈ I0, l ∈ L(i),







and so, as in (6.12), we get by (6.21)-(6.23),
P
(







≥ (1− δ −
√
δ + ε)2,
thereby establishing the assertion (6.19).
The existence of the sets I0 and {L(i), i ∈ I0} satisfying (6.21)-(6.23) is argued
in three steps below.
Step 1. First, we note the following simple property of interactive communication:
if rvs Y1, ..., Yk are mutually independent, they remain mutually independent when
conditioned on an interactive communication F.





Then, for i = F (y1, ..., yk), we have
P̃Y1,...,Yk|F (y1, ..., yk | i) =
k∏
j=1
P̃Yj |F (yj | i) . (6.25)
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Proof. The proof follows upon observing that
IP̃ (Yj ∧ Y1, ..., Yj−1, Yj+1, ..., Yk | F) ≤ IP̃ (Yj ∧ Y1, ..., Yj−1, Yj+1, ..., Yk) = 0, j = 1, ..., k,
(6.26)
where the first inequality is by [1, Lemma 2.2] upon choosing U = Yj, V =
(Y1, ..., Yj−1, Yj+1, ..., Yk), Φ to be the communication from terminal j, and Ψ to
be the communication from the remaining terminals.
Hereafter in this proof, we shall select
P̃Yj = PYj , j = 1, ..., k. (6.27)
Step 2. In this step, we select the aforementioned set of communication values
I0. Let Lj = Lj (Yj,F) denote an estimate of CR L at terminal j, j = 1, ..., k
(see Definition 2.2). Denote by T0 the set {·} on the left side of (6.18). For each
realization (l, i) of (L,F), denote by Al,i ⊆ Y1 × ...× Yk the set
Al,i = T0 ∩ {(y1, ..., yk) : F (y1, ..., yk) = i, Lj (yj, i) = L (y1, ..., yk) = l, j = 1, ..., k} .
(6.28)
Since L is ε-CR from F, we have from (2.1) and (6.18) that
P ((Y1, ..., Yk) ∈ AL,F) ≥ 1− ε− δ.
By a reverse Markov inequality, there exists a set I1 of values of F with




P ((Y1, ..., Yk) ∈ AL,F | F = i) ≥ 1−
√
ε+ δ, i ∈ I1. (6.30)
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Next, denote by I2 the set of values of F such that
δP̃F (i) ≤ PF (i) , i ∈ I2, (6.31)
where P̃F is, as usual, the distribution of F under P̃. From Proposition 6.4 with
Q1 = PF, Q2 = P̃F, we have
PF (I2) ≥ 1− δ. (6.32)
Thus, by (6.29) and (6.32), I0 , I1 ∩ I2 satisfies (6.23).
Step 3. In this step, we identify sets L(i) that satisfy (6.21) and (6.22). For each
i ∈ I0, the sets Al,i corresponding to different values l are disjoint. Upon defining
the nonnegative measure3 µ on L for each i ∈ I0 by





PY1,...,Yk|F (Al,i | i)




by (6.30). Applying Lemma 2.8 (i) with L in the role of U , we set L(i) = Uδ, and so
µ(L(i)) ≥ µ(L)− δ
≥ 1− δ −
√
ε+ δ (6.34)
3Although µ depends on i, our notation will suppress this dependence.
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and
|L(i)| ≤ δ−α/(1−α) exp (Hα(µ)) , 0 ≤ α < 1. (6.35)
It follows from (6.34) that
PL|F (L(i) | i) ≥
∑
l∈L(i)
PY1,...,Yk|F (Al,i | i)
= µ(L(i))




Finally, we obtain an upper bound on exp (Hα(µ)) for α =
1
k
, which will lead
to (6.22). Denote by Ajl,i ⊆ Yj the projection of the set Al,i ⊆ Y1 × ... × Yk along
the jth coordinate, j = 1, ..., k. The sets Ajl,i are disjoint for different values of l, by
























where the last step follows from Hölder’s inequality4 [35, Section 2.7]. Using (6.25),










which is bounded below by
[∑
l∈L





4See [71, equation (33)] for an early use of Hölder’s inequality in a CR converse proof.
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since
Al,i ⊆ A1l,i × ...× Akl,i. (6.39)
Upon noting that Al,i ⊆ T0, for all (y1, ..., yk) ∈ Al,i, it follows that
P̃Y1,...,Yk|F (y1, ..., yk | i) =










≥ PY1,...,Yk (y1, ..., yk)
θ P̃F (i)
≥ PY1,...,Yk|F (y1, ..., yk | i)
δ−1 θ
,
where the third equality and the subsequent inequalities are by (6.27), (6.18) and












































The previous bound, along with (6.35), gives (6.22).
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6.6 Proof of converse for arbitrary A ⊆M
The converse technique of the previous section for A = M can be extended to
an arbitrary A ⊆ M, yielding an analogous upper bound for E∗(ε) in terms of
divergences. However, the resulting upper bound is inadequate as it is known to
exceed the expression in the right-side of (6.3) (see [10]). In this section, we develop
a new converse technique that targets directly the latter.
The main steps of the general converse proof for the caseA ⊆M are analogous
to those in the previous section. The central step is the counterpart of Theorem 6.6,
which is given next. Given a fractional partition λ as in (2.11), its dual partition is
λ = λ(λ) =
{






, B ∈ B, (6.40)
where B is defined in (2.10) and λsum is given by (2.13). It is known from [46], and






















[λsum − 1] = 1, i ∈M, (6.41)
so that λ, too, is a fractional partition of M.
Theorem 6.8. Let L = L (Y1, ..., Ym) be ε-CR for A from interactive communication
F = F (Y1, ..., Ym), 0 < ε < 1. Given δ > 0 such that δ+
√
δ + ε < 1 and a fractional
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partition λ ∈ Λ(A), let θBc , B ∈ B, and θ0 be such that
P
({
yM : PYM (yM) ≤
1
θ0
, PYBc (yBc) ≥
1
θBc
, B ∈ B
})








there exists a query strategy q0 for L given F such that
P
(





≥ (1− δ −
√
δ + ε)2, (6.44)
where κ(δ) = (m2m)−m δm+1.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 6.6, the assertion (6.44) will follow upon
showing the existence of sets I0 and L(i) ⊆ L, i ∈ I0, such that (6.21) and (6.23)






, i ∈ I0. (6.45)
To this end, we provide here appropriate replacements for the three steps in the
proof of Theorem 6.6.
Step 1. For each B (M, consider the pmf P̃BYM defined by
P̃BYM (yM) = PYB (yB) PYBc (yBc) (6.46)




, B ∈ B
}
serve as a replacement
for the pmf P̃ in (6.24).
For the pmf P̃B in (6.46), we note that
IP̃B (YB ∧ Fkj | Φkj) = 0, j ∈ Bc, (6.47)
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since Fkj = fkj (Yj,Φkj) and YBc is independent of YB conditioned on Φkj. The
following Lemma serves the role of Lemma 6.7.
Lemma 6.9. For B (M and i = F (yM), we have










where i−kj denotes the past values of communication in i for round k and terminal j.
Proof. Note that
P̃BYB |F (yB | i) =
P̃BF|YB (i | yB) P̃BYB (yB)
P̃BF (i)
=
P̃BF|YB (i | yB) PYB (yB)
P̃BF (i)
, (6.49)
where the previous step is by (6.46). Furthermore,






















































Then (6.49), along with (6.50) and (6.51), gives (6.48).
Step 2. Denoting by T0 the set {·} on the left-side of (6.42), for each L = l,F = i,
define
Al,i = T0 ∩ {yM : F (yM) = i, Lj (yj, i) = L (yM) = l, j ∈ A} . (6.52)
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Analogous to the proof of Theorem 6.6, the set I1 of values of F with
P (YM ∈ AL,F | F = i) ≥ 1−
√
ε+ δ, i ∈ I1,
satisfies
PF (I1) ≥ 1−
√
ε+ δ.


























































































= (m2m)−1 δ, (6.54)
where the first inequality is by (6.53), and (6.54) holds since the summand is a pmf







PF (I2) ≥ 1− δ.
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The set I0 is defined as I1 ∩ I2, and satisfies (6.23).
Step 3. Finally, we define sets L(i) ⊆ L, i ∈ I0 that satisfy (6.21) and (6.45). For
each i ∈ I0, let
µ(l) = PYM|F (Al,i | i) , l ∈ L. (6.55)
Then, the sets L(i) satisfying (6.21) are obtained by an application of Lemma 2.8
(i) as in (6.34) and (6.35) above.












To do so, first note that for each B ∈ B, the set Bc ∩ A is nonempty. Thus, by
(6.52), the projections AB
c
l,i of Al,i along the coordinates in B
c ( M are disjoint








































































































































PF (i) , (6.60)

















































PYM|F (Al,i | i) . (6.62)
151










 ≥ 1, (6.63)













The previous inequality implies (6.57) since
α
1− α = λsum − 1.
6.7 Strong converse for secret key capacity
A byproduct of Theorem 6.1 is a new result that establishes a strong converse for
the SK capacity of a multiterminal source model, for the terminals in A ⊆ M. In
this context, we shall consider the security requirement (2.9), i.e.,
lim
n
nsvar(K; F) = 0.
Definition 6.3. Given 0 < ε < 1, R ≥ 0 is an ε-achievable SK rate for A ⊆ M if
for every ρ > 0, there is an N = N(ε, ρ) such that for every n ≥ N , there exists an
ε-CR K = K (XnM) for A from F satisfying
1
n







The supremum of ε-achievable SK rates is the ε-SK capacity, denoted C(ε).
The SK capacity is the infimum of C(ε) for 0 < ε < 1. We recall the following.
Theorem 6.10. [20] The secret key capacity for A ⊆M is




λBH (XB | XBc) , 0 < ε < 1.
Remark. The (new) secrecy requirement (2.9) is not unduly restrictive. Indeed,
the achievability proof of Theorem 6.10 [20] holds with sin(K; F) vanishing to zero
exponentially rapidly in n, which, by Pinsker’s inequality (cf. [18]), implies (2.9).





I(K ∧ F) = 0, (6.66)
which, in turn, is implied by (2.9) by a simple application of [20, Lemma 1].
The strong converse for SK capacity, valid under (2.9), is given next.
Theorem 6.11. For every 0 < ε < 1, it holds that
C(ε) = C. (6.67)
Remark. It is not known if the strong converse in Theorem 6.11 holds under (6.66).
Proof. Theorem 6.10 [20] already provides the proof of achievability, i.e.,
C(ε) ≥ C. The converse proof below shows that if R is an ε-achievable SK rate,
then R is an ε-achievable query exponent. Therefore,
R ≤ E∗(ε) = C, 0 < ε < 1, (6.68)
where the equality is by (6.2). Specifically, for every ρ > 0, suppose that there exists
K = K (XnM) and communication F satisfying (6.64) and (6.65) for all n sufficiently
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large. We claim that the hypothesis (6.4) of Lemma 6.3 holds with U = K, V = F
and γ = exp[n(R−2ρ)] for every 0 < δ < 1/2, when ρ is sufficiently small. Therefore,
by (6.5), R− 2ρ is an ε-achievable query exponent which leads to (6.68) since ρ can
be chosen arbitrarily small.
Turning to the claim, observe that
P
({

















[∣∣ log ‖K‖PK|F (K | F)
∣∣] ,
where the first and the last inequality above follow from (6.64) and the Markov
inequality, respectively.
Next, we show that
E
[∣∣ log ‖K‖PK|F (K | F)













for all n sufficiently large; the claim follows upon taking n → ∞ and ρ → 0. To





∣∣ log 1∣∣t1 − t2
∣∣ . (6.71)
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Then, for F = i,
∑
k
PK|F (k | i)





∣∣∣∣PK|F (k | i) log PK|F (k | i) + PK|F (k | i) log ‖K‖+
1

























‖K‖∣∣∣PK|F (k | i)− 1‖K‖
∣∣∣
, (6.72)
where the previous inequality uses (6.71) with t1 = PK|F (k | i) and t2 = ‖K‖−1 for
every value k of K. Finally, (6.69) follows upon multiplying both sides by PF (i),
summing over i and using the log-sum inequality [18].
Observe that the proof of Theorem 6.11 does not rely on the form of the rvs
K,F, and is, in effect, a statement relating the size of any achievable SK rate under
the svar-secrecy requirement (2.9) to the query exponent. As a consequence, also
the SK capacity for more complex models in which the eavesdropper has additional
access to side information can be bounded above by the optimum query exponent
when the querier, too, is given access to the same side information.
6.8 General alphabet converse for A =M
In this section, we present a converse technique for the optimum query exponent
for rvs with general alphabets, with jointly Gaussian rvs as a special case. No
corresponding general claim is made regarding achievability of the exponent. Our
technique also leads to a new strong converse for Gaussian SK capacity [51].
Let Yi be a complete separable metric space, with associated Borel σ-field σi,
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1 ≤ i ≤ k; a special case of interest is Yi = Rni . Denote by Yk the set Y1 × ...×Yk





. The interactive communication {Fji : 1 ≤ j ≤ r, 1 ≤ i ≤ k} is
specified as in Definition 2.1, with the rv Fji taking values in, say, (Zji,Fji), and
being σi-measurable for each fixed value of the preceding communication
Φji = (Fst : 1 ≤ s < j, 1 ≤ t ≤ k or s = j, 1 ≤ t < i) .




conditioned on σ(F), denoted PY1,...,Yk|F (cf. [6, Chapter 6]). The notation Qi will
be used interchangeably for the probability measure PY1,...,Yk|F (· | i). We make the
following basic assumption of absolute continuity:
Qi << PY1,...,Yk , PF a.s. in i, (6.73)
i.e., (6.73) holds over a set of i with PF-probability 1. Assumption (6.73) is satisfied
by a large class of interactive communication protocols including F taking countably





= 0, PF a.s. in i, (6.74)
dQi
dP
(yk) = 0, for yk ∈ F−1(i)c, PF a.s. in i. (6.75)
Next, we define ε-CR L from F and its local estimates Li, respectively, as
rvs taking countably many values, measurable with respect to σk and σi × σ(F),
5Hereafter, the term “product σ-field” of σ-fields σ1, ..., σk, will mean the smallest σ-field
containing sets from σ1 × ... × σk, and will be denoted, with an abuse of notation, simply as
σk = σ1 × ...× σk.
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1 ≤ i ≤ k, and satisfying
P (L = Li, 1 ≤ i ≤ k) ≥ 1− ε.
The main result of this section, given below, extends Theorem 6.6 to general mea-
sures as above.
Theorem 6.12. For 0 < ε < 1, let L be ε-CR from interactive communication F.





P̃ (A1 × ...× Ak) =
k∏
i=1
PYi (Ai) Ai ∈ σi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k. (6.76)
Assuming that P << P̃, and given δ > 0 such that δ+
√








≥ 1− δ. (6.77)
Then, there exists a query strategy q0 for L given F such that
P
(







≥ (1− δ −
√
δ + ε)2. (6.78)
The proof of Theorem 6.12 is deferred to the end of this section. At this point,
we present its implications for a Gaussian setup. Let X
(n)
i be an Rn-valued rv,










be jointly Gaussian N (0,Σ(n)), where
Σ(n) is a positive definite matrix. We remark that X
(n)
M need not be independent
or identically distributed across n. The notion of an ε-optimum query exponent
E∗(ε), 0 < ε < 1, is exactly as in Definition 6.2, even though the underlying CR
now can take countably many values. Also, given a partition π of M with |π| = k,
2 ≤ k ≤ m, the quantity E∗π(ε) is defined as in Section 6.5.
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Proposition 6.13. For X
(n)















|Σ(n)| , 0 < ε < 1,
where Σ
(n)
πi is the covariance matrix of X
(n)
πi , i = 1, ..., |π|, and | · | denotes determi-
nant.
Corollary 6.14. When X
(n)









|Σ| , 0 < ε < 1.
Proof. Proceeding as in the proof of Theorem 6.5, we apply Theorem 6.12 to
the rvs Yi = X
(n)
πi , 1 ≤ i ≤ |π|. Specifically, we show that the hypothesis (6.77) is
satisfied with








where 0 < δ < 1/2 is arbitrary. Then, the Proposition follows from the definition
of E∗(ε) and (6.79) as in the proof of Theorem 6.5. The Corollary results by a
straightforward calculation. It remains to verify that (6.77) holds for θ in (6.79).
For B (M, B 6= ∅, let gB denote the density of the Gaussian rv X(n)B . From the


















)∣∣∣∣ > τ, for some ∅ 6= B ⊆M
)
< 2m exp(−c(τ)n), τ > 0,
(6.80)
where h denotes differential entropy and c(τ) > 0 is a positive constant that does
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∣∣, 1 ≤ i ≤ |π|,
using the upper and lower bounds from (6.80) that hold with significant probability
for all n sufficiently large, we get that (6.77) holds with θ as in (6.79), for 0 < δ <
1/2.
As an application of the Corollary above, we establish a new strong converse
for SK capacity when the underlying rvs X
(n)
M are i.i.d. Gaussian in n; for this
model, the SK capacity was established in [51]. The notions of ε-achievable SK rate,
ε-SK capacity C(ε) and SK capacity C are as in Definition 6.3, with condition (6.64)
replaced by
range(K) = {1, ..., bexp(nR)c}, (6.81)
which rules out such rvs K as take infinitely many values.
Proposition 6.15. When X
(n)









|Σ| , 0 < ε < 1. (6.82)
Proof. That C(ε) is no smaller than the right-side of (6.82) follows from the
achievability proof in [51].
The proof of the reverse inequality is along the lines of the proof of Theorem
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and noting that Lemma 6.3 can be extended straightforwardly to an arbitrary rv V
(with the explicit summations in the proof of that Lemma written as expectations),
provided that the rv U is finite-valued.
Proof of Theorem 6.12. In the manner of the proof of Theorem 6.6, it suffices
to identify measurable sets I0 and L(i) ⊆ L, i ∈ I0, such that (6.21)-(6.23) are
satisfied. Below we generalize appropriately the steps 1-3 in the proof of Theorem
6.6.
Step 1. The following claim is an extension of Lemma 6.7.
Lemma 6.16. Given measurable sets Ai ∈ σi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, for P̃ in (6.76),
P̃Y1,...,Yk|F (A1 × ...× Ak | i) =
k∏
j=1
P̃Yj |F (Aj | i) , PF a.s. in i, (6.83)
where P̃Y1,...,Yk|F is the regular conditional probability on (Yk, σk) conditioned on
σ(F).
The proof uses the interactive property of the communication and is relegated to
the Appendix F.
Step 2. Next, we identify the set I0. The following technical observation will be
used.
Lemma 6.17. For every A0 ∈ σk such that
dP
d P̃
(yk) > 0, yk ∈ A0, (6.84)
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it holds that








d P̃, P̃F a.s. in i (6.85)
The proof is given in the Appendix F. Denoting by T0 the set
{













= L(yk) = l, 1 ≤ j ≤ k
}
, l ∈ L.
Then, for Al,i , Al ∩ F−1(i), (6.74), (6.75) and Lemma 6.17 imply








d P̃, P̃F a.s. in i. (6.86)
Below we restrict attention to the set of values of F for which (6.86) holds for every
l ∈ L; this set has P̃F measure 1 by (6.85) since the set L is countable. Proceeding
along the lines of the proof of Theorem 6.6, we define I1 as the set of those i for
which
PY1,...,Yk|F (Al,i | i) ≥ 1−
√
ε+ δ. (6.87)









and by a reverse Markov inequality, that
PF (I1) ≥ 1−
√
ε+ δ. (6.88)
Furthermore, for the set I2 of values i of F satisfying
dPF
d P̃F
(i) ≥ δ, (6.89)
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it holds that











Define I0 = I1 ∩ I2; (6.23) follows from (6.88) and (6.90).
Step 3. Since Lemma 2.8 (i) applies to a countable set U = L, defining the non-
negative measure µ on L as in (6.33) for each i ∈ I0 and using (6.87), the sets L(i)









To do so, denote by Ajl,i the projection of Al,i along the jth coordinate, 1 ≤

























































































































































which is the same as (6.91) with α = 1/k.
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6.9 Discussion
The description of the optimum query exponent in Definition 6.2 can be refined
to display an explicit dependence on ε′. Let E∗(ε, ε′) denote the optimum query
exponent for fixed 0 < ε, ε′ < 1. Our proofs establish E∗(ε, ε′) equals the right side
of (6.2) for ε′ < (1−√ε)2 (see (6.20)). For ε′ > 1− ε, the following construction of L
renders E∗(ε, ε′) unbounded: Choose L = 0 with probability (1 − ε) and uniformly
distributed on a sufficiently large set with probability ε. For the remaining values
of ε, ε′, E∗(ε, ε′) is not known.
A less restrictive model for querying than that in Section 6.2 can be consid-
ered, allowing general queries with binary answers. Such a query strategy can be
represented as a search on a binary tree whose leaves correspond to the values of the
CR L. The query strategies considered in this dissertation correspond to the case
where the search tree is a path with leaves attached to each node. For a general tree
model, our results can be adapted to show that the maximum number of queries
that can be inflicted on a querier grows only linearly in n at a rate that is equal to
the expression for E∗ in (6.2).
We remark also that allowing randomness at the terminals inM for interactive
communication and CR recovery, does not improve the optimum query exponent.
Such randomization is described by mutually independent rvs W1, ...,Wm, where
each Wi is distributed uniformly on the (finite) set {1, ..., wi}, and the rvs W1, ...,Wm
are independent of XnM. The claim of the remark is seen from the converse result in
Theorem 6.8. Indeed, the assertion (6.44) of Theorem 6.8 remains unchanged upon
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B ∈ B; and observing that in (6.43), the wi- terms cancel in the numerator and the
denominator.
Finally, Lemma 6.3, which considered rvs U, V , can be used to characterize the
optimum query exponent Γ∗ for a family of finite-valued rvs {Un, Vn}∞n=1 with asso-
ciated probability measures {Pn}∞n=1 (which are not necessarily consistent). Here,




− log PUn|Vn (Un | Vn)
n
≤ Γ∗ ≤ Pn- lim sup
n
− log PUn|Vn (Un | Vn)
n
where the left and right limits equal, respectively, the left- and right-sides of (2.33)
with µn = Pn and
Zn =





Conclusion: Principles of Secrecy Generation
Would I not have to be a barrel of memory if
I wanted to carry my reasons around with me?
- Nietzsche’s Zarathustra
We conclude this dissertation by hypothesizing three principles of multitermi-
nal secrecy generation that have emerged from our research. The results reported in
the previous chapters provide important instances that affirmatively support these
principles. We conjecture that these basic principles go beyond the models studied
here and will apply in a broader setting for appropriately defined notions of security.
The first principle we state applies to secure computing with public commu-
nication when the privacy of a given function g0 must be maintained.
Principle 1. If the value of a function g0 of the data can be recovered se-
curely at a terminal, then the entire data can be recovered at the terminal using a
communication that does not give away the value of g0.
If the entire data can be recovered at a terminal using communication that does not
give away the value of g0 then clearly the function g0 can be securely computed at
that terminal. The principle above claims that the converse is also true. Indeed, once
the value of g0 is recovered at the terminal, the terminals can communicate further to
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attain omniscience at that terminal using communication that is independent jointly
of the previous communication and the function g0. Specifically, for the cases when
we have a single-letter characterization for secure computability, the quantity R∗
in Theorem 4.1 remains unchanged if the terminal computing the function g0 is
required to recover the entire data; this includes the special case studied in Chapter
3. In fact, R∗ remains roughly the same with such a replacement for all the cases
studied in Chapter 4, thus providing credence to the conjecture that computing the
private function securely at a terminal is as hard as recovering the entire data at that
terminal without giving away the value of the private function to the eavesdropper.
The next principle captures the structure of all protocols that can generate an
optimum rate SKs for two terminals by characterizing the CR that is established
when such a protocol is executed.
Principle 2. A CR corresponds to an optimum rate SK if and only if it
renders the observations of the two terminals (almost) conditionally independent.
Clearly, a CR resulting from an optimum rate SK must render the observations
almost conditionally independent as otherwise we can exploit the residual correlation
to enhance further the SK rate. In Chapter 5 we have established the converse
statement for i.i.d. observations1. We conjecture that in fact, such a structural
equivalence between optimum rate SKs and a CR that renders the observations
conditionally independent holds for more general distributions.
1 Although our actual proof entailed going to multiple blocks, an alternative single-shot proof
can also be provided using a very interesting construction suggested by Braverman and Rao in [9,
Theorem 4.1] in place of Lemma 5.4.
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Finally, our last principle conjectures that the almost independence secrecy
criterion imposed on an SK is equivalent to an alternative criterion requiring a large
number of queries with probability close to 1 for resolving the value of the SK based
on the public communication (see 6.1).
Principle 3. Imposing an almost independence secrecy criterion is equivalent
to imposing a lower bound on the complexity of a querier of the secret.
Thus, a largest size SK makes the task of a querier the most onerous. It is clear
that almost independence between a CR and the associated public communication
will ensure that a querier has no option but to retort to exhaustive search of the
CR space. It is the converse that we assert here, i.e, forming a CR that necessitates
a certain number of queries is tantamount to generating an SK of size equal to the
number of queries. In Chapter 6, we proved this principle for i.i.d. observations in
an asymptotic sense as the number of observations tends to infinity. We conjecture
that a direct correspondence can be obtained between almost independence and
lower bounds on the complexity of a querier by connecting both these notions to




We prove Lemma 3.2 based on [26, Lemma, Section 4], which is paraphrased first.
Let the rvs Q and R take values in the finite set Q and R, respectively. For a
stochastic matrix W : Q → Q, let {D̃1, ..., D̃l} be the ergodic decomposition (into
communicating classes) of Q based on W (cf. e.g., [41, pp. 157 and 28–42]). Let
D̃(n) denote a fixed ergodic class of Qn (the n-fold Cartesian product of Q) on the
basis of W n (the n-fold product of W ). Let D(n) andR(n) be any (nonempty) subsets
of D̃(n) and Rn, respectively.
Lemma GK. [26] For D̃(n),D(n),R(n) as above, assume that
P
(


















) ≥ exp[−nκεn log2 εn], (A.2)
for a (positive) constant κ that depends only on the pmf of (Q,R) and on W .
A simple consequence of (A.2) is that for a given ergodic class D̃(n) and disjoint
subsets D(n)1 , ...,D(n)t of it, and subsets R(n)1 , ...,R(n)t (not necessarily distinct) of Rn,
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such that D(n)t′ ,R
(n)
t′ , t
′ = 1, ..., t, satisfy (A.1), it holds that
t ≤ exp[nκεn log2 εn]. (A.3)




P (Q = q | R = r)P (R = r | Q = q′) , q, q′ ∈ Q
corresponds to the set of values of mcfn(Q,R) defined by (3.10) [26]. Next, pick




P (Q = q | mcf(Q1, ..., Qm−1) = α)×
P (mcf(Q1, ..., Qm−1) = α | Q = q′) , q, q′ ∈ Q. (A.4)
The ergodic decomposition of Qn on the basis of W n (with W as in (A.4)) will
correspond to the set of values of mcfn(Q1, ..., Qm), recalling (3.9). Since ξ
(n) is





also is ε-recoverable in the same sense, recalling Definition 3.5. This implies the
existence of mappings ξ
′(n)














≥ 1− ε. (A.5)









(qn1 , ..., q
n




Let C(ε) denote the set of c’s such that
P
(





Rn ∈ R(n)c | Qn ∈ D(n)c
)
≥ 1−√ε. (A.6)





≥ 1− 4√ε. (A.7)
Next, we observe for each fixed c2, that the disjoint sets D(n)c1,c2 lie in a fixed ergodic
class of Qn (determined by c2). Since (A.6) are compatible with the assumption
(A.1) for all n sufficiently large, we have from (A.3) that
‖{c1 : (c1, c2) ∈ C(ε)}‖ ≤ exp[nκεn log2 εn], (A.8)


























| mcfn(Q1, ..., Qm)
)









≤ H(mcf(Q1, ..., Qm)) + δn,
where lim
n
δn = 0 by (A.7) and (A.8).
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Appendix B
Aided Secret Key Capacity
We prove Theorem 3.13. Considering first the achievability part, fix δ > 0. From
the result for a general source network [17, Theorem 3.1.14] it follows, as in the
proof of [20, Proposition 1], that for RM ∈ R (A′, ZA′) and all n sufficiently large,
there exists a noninteractive communication F(n) = (F
(n)

























, i ∈ A′. The last step takes recourse to Lemma
2.7. Specifically, choose
U = U ′ = {mcf ((XMt, Zit)i∈A′)}nt=1 , U0 = U , V = constant,
h = F (n), d = n [H (mcf ((XM, Zi)i∈A′))− δ] ,














Lemma 2.7 implies the existence of a φ, and thereby an ASK








In particular, we can choose
m∑
i=1




Since δ was arbitrary, this establishes the achievability part.
We shall establish a stronger converse result by requiring the ASK as in Defi-
nition 3.3 to satisfy the weaker secrecy condition (2.6), or by allowing the ASK to
depend explicitly on the randomization UM but enforcing the strong secrecy condi-
tion (2.2). Let K = K(n) (UM, XnM, Z
n
A′) be an εn-ASK for A′, achievable using ob-
servations of length n, randomization UM, public communication F = F (UM, XnM)





H(K | F) + εn. (B.1)




A′) denote the random value of the ASK for a fixed UM = u.




i ) for each i ∈ A′,
PUM ({u : (XnM, Ku) is
√




i ) for each i ∈ A′})
≥ 1−√εn. (B.2)
Also, for each UM = u
1
n





by independence of UM and (XnM, Z
n




H (XnM, K | UM = u) ≤ H (mcf ((XM, Zi)i∈A′)) + δn, (B.3)
for all n sufficiently large and where lim
n








H (UM) +H (mcf ((XM, Zi)i∈A′)) + δn +
√
εn log (|XM||ZA′ |) , (B.4)
by (B.2) and (B.3). The proof is now completed along the lines of [20, Lemma 2
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n
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.




j ) andH(Fν |UBc , XnBc) =
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i | F, K, U[1,i−1], Xn[1,i−1]
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It follows from (B.1) and (B.4)-(B.6) that
1
n
H(K) ≤H (mcf ((XM, Zi)i∈A′))−
m∑
i=1
Ri + εn + δn
+




εn log (|XM||ZA′ |) , (B.7)
where RM ∈ R (A′, ZA′) from (B.6), and therefore
m∑
i=1
Ri ≥ RCO (A′, ZA′) . (B.8)
Then, (B.7), (B.8) imply
1
n
H(K) ≤ C (A′, ZA′) + εn + δn +




εn log (|XM||ZA′|) . (B.9)
If K = K (XnM, Z
n
A′) as in Definition 3.3, then |K| ≤ (|X ||ZA′ |)n and the converse
part follows from (B.9). On the other hand, for K = K (UM, XnM, Z
n
A′), the proof is





We provide a proof of Lemma 2.7. Using the condition (i) in the definition of U0,





























P (U ′ = u′ | h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0)−
1
r
∣∣∣∣∣ < 12λ, (C.1)



























q + (1− q),





For u ∈ U0 and v ∈ V satisfying








P (U = u|V = v) > 1
d
.
























The bound in (C.3) will now play the role of [20, inequality (50), p. 3059] and the
remaining steps of our proof, which are parallel to those in [20, Lemma B.2], are
provided here for completeness.
















(j, v) : P (h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0) ≥
λ
r′
P (V = v, U ∈ U0)
}
,
it holds for (j, v) ∈ E,
P (U = u|h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0) ≤
r′
λ











P (V = v, U ∈ U0)
≤ λ. (C.6)
Further, for (j, v) ∈ E, if
P (U = u|h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0) >
3r′
λd(1− λ2) (C.7)
then from (C.5), we have
P (U = u|V = v, U ∈ U0) >
3
d(1− λ2) . (C.8)
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Therefore, denoting by I(j, v) the event {h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0}, and recalling
the conditions that define U0 in (2.22), we have for (j, v) ∈ E ∩D that
∑
u′∈U ′:
P(U ′=u′| I(j,v))> 3r′
λd(1−λ2)















where the first equality is by (2.22), the second equality is due to U ′ being a function
of U , and the previous inequality is by (C.7), (C.8) and the definition of the set D.
Also, using (C.4), (C.6), we get
∑
(j,v)∈E∩D
P (h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0) ≥ 1− 2λ. (C.10)






























Using (C.9), the family of pmfs {P (U ′ = (·)|h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0) , (j, v) ∈ E ∩
D} satisfies the hypothesis (2.20) of Lemma 2.6 with d replaced by λ(1−λ2)d
3r′
and ε
replaced by 5λ/2; assume that 0 < λ < 2/45 so as to meet the condition following
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for a constant c. This completes the proof of (C.1), and thereby the lemma.
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Appendix D
Sufficiency Proof of Theorem 4.1




< H (XnM | Gn0 ,F) ,
where R1, ..., Rm satisfy conditions (1a) and (1b). For each i and Ri ≥ 0, consider
a (map-valued) rv Ji that is uniformly distributed on the family Ji of all mappings
X nki → {1, . . . , dexp(knRi)e}, i ∈ M. The rvs J1, ..., Jm, XnkM are taken to be
mutually independent.
Fix ε, ε′, with ε′ > mε and ε + ε′ < 1. It follows from the proof of the general














≥ 1− ε, (D.1)









, m0 < j ≤ m.
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Below we shall establish that
P
({












for all k sufficiently large, to which end it suffices to show that
P
({


























































Then it would follow from (D.1), (D.2), and definition of ZM that
P
({




















≥ 1− ε− ε′.
This shows the existence of a particular realization F′ of JM that satisfies (4.26)
and (4.27).
It now remains to prove (D.3). Defining
J̃i =
{















≥ 1− ε. It follows that
P
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− ε, jM\{i} ∈ J̃i, (D.4)
for all k sufficiently large. Fix jM\{i} ∈ J̃i. We take recourse to Lemma 2.7 and set
U = XnkM , U





, h = jM\{i}, and
U0 =
{












M) 1 (m0 < i ≤ m)
)}
for some mapping ψi. By the definition of J̃i,
P (U ∈ U0) ≥ 1− ε,
so that condition (2.22)(i) preceding Lemma 2.7 is met. Condition (2.22)(ii), too,











in (2.23), the hypotheses of Lemma 2.7 are satisfied, for appropriately chosen λ, and
for sufficiently large k. Then, by Lemma 2.7, with







and with Ji in the role of φ, (D.4) follows from (2.24) and (2.25).
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Appendix E
Proof of (5.28) and (5.31)
It remains to prove that there exists ε-CR J , recoverable from F such that J,F
satisfy (5.28) and (5.31). We provide a CR generation scheme with r stages. For
1 ≤ k ≤ r, denote by Ek the error event in the kth stage (defined below recursively in
terms of Ek−1), and by E0 the negligible probability event corresponding to Xn1 , Xn2
not being PX1X2-typical.
Consider 1 ≤ k ≤ r, k odd. For brevity, denote by V the rvs Uk−1 and by U
the rv Uk; for k = 1, V is taken to be a constant. Suppose that conditioned on Eck−1
terminals 1 and 2 observe, respectively, sequences x1 ∈ X n1 and x2 ∈ X n2 , as well
as a common sequence v ∈ Vn such that (v,x1,x2) are jointly PV X1X2-typical. For
δ > 0, generate at random exp [n(I(X1, X2 ∧ U | V ) + δ)] sequences u ∈ Un that
are jointly PUV -typical with v, denoted by uij, 1 ≤ i ≤ N1, 1 ≤ j ≤ N2, where
N1 = exp [n (I(X1 ∧ U | X2, V ) + 3δ)] , N2 = exp [n (I(X2 ∧ U | V )− 2δ)] .
The sequences uij are generated independently for different indices ij. Denote by
L(k)(v,x1) a sequence uij, 1 ≤ i ≤ N1, 1 ≤ j ≤ N2, that is jointly PUV X1-typical
with (v,x1) (if there exist more than one such sequences, choose any of them).
The error event when no such sequence is found is denoted by Ek1; this happens
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with probability vanishing to 0 doubly exponentially in n. The communication
Fk(v,x1) is defined to equal the first index i of uij = L
(k)(v,x1). Upon observing
Fk(v,x1) = i, the terminal 2 computes L
(k)
2 (v,x2, i) as the unique sequence in
{uij, 1 ≤ j ≤ N2}, that is jointly typical with (v,x2). If no such sequence is found
or if several such sequences are found an error event Ek2 occurs. Clearly, the rate of
communication Fk is bounded above by
1
n
logN1 = I(X1 ∧ U | X2, V ) + 3δ = I(X1 ∧ Uk | X2, Uk−1) + 3δ, (E.1)





log(1 +N1N2) ≤ I(X1, X2 ∧ U | V ) + 2δ
= I(X1, X2 ∧ Uk | X2, Uk−1) + 2δ. (E.2)




not being jointly PUV X1X2-typical.
The error event Ek is defined as Ek = Ek−1 ∪ Ek1 ∪ Ek2 ∪ Ek3. Then, conditioned
on Eck the terminals share sequences (uij,v) that are jointly typical with (x1,x2).
In the next stage k + 1, the sequence (uij,v) plays the role of the sequence v.
The scheme for stages with even k is defined analogously with roles of X1 and X2
interchanged. We claim that L(1), ..., L(r) constitutes the required CR along with
the communication F = F1, ..., Fk. Then, (5.31) follows from (E.1), and the second
inequality in (5.28) follows from (E.2). Moreover, for every realization u1, ...,ur of
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L(1), ..., L(r), with E = 1Er we have,
P
(
L(1), ..., L(r) = u1, ...,ur | E = 0
)
≤ P ({(x1,x2) : (u1, ...,ur,x1,x2) are jointly PUrX1X2 typical})
≤ exp [−n(I(X1, X2 ∧ U r)− δ)] ,
for n large, which further yields
1
n






H(L(1)...L(r) | E = 0)− P (Er) log |X1||X2|
≥ I(X1, X2 ∧ U r)− δ − P (Er) log |X1||X2|.
Thus, the claim will follow upon showing that P (Er)→ 0 as n→∞. In particular, it
remains to show that P (Ek2)→ 0 and P (Ek3)→ 0, k = 1, ..., r, as n→∞. As before,
we show this for odd k and the proof for even k follows mutatis mutandis. To that
end, note first that for any jointly PUV X1-typical (u,v,x1), the set of x2 ∈ X n2 such
that (u,v,x1,x2) are jointly typical with (u,v,x1) has conditional probability close
to 1 conditioned on Un = u, V n = v, Xn1 = x1, and so by the Markov relation X2−◦−
V,X1−◦ U , also conditioned on V n = v, Xn1 = x1. Upon choosing u = L(k)(v,x1) in
the argument above, we get P (Ek2)→ 0. Finally, we show that P (Ek3) will be small,
for large probability choices of the random codebook {uij}. Specifically, for fixed
typical sequences (v,x1,x2), the probability P (Ek3 | V n = v, Xn1 = x1, Xn2 = x2) is
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bounded above exactly as in [2, equation (4.15)]:










(uij,v,x1) jointly PUV X1-typical, (uil,v,uil) jointly PUV X2-typical
)
≤ N1N22 . exp[−n(I(X1 ∧ U | V ) + I(X1 ∧ U | V ) + o(n))]
≤ exp[−nδ + o(n)],
for all n sufficiently large. Note that the probability distribution in the calculation
above comes from codebook generation, and in particular, the second inequality
above uses the fact that uil and uij are independently selected for l 6= j. Thus,
P (Ek3 | Ek2)→ 0 for an appropriately chosen codebook, which completes the proof.
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Appendix F
Properties of Interactive Communication
We prove two basic properties of interactive communication that were used in the
general converse proof in Section 6.8. We retain the notation introduced therein.
Lemma F.1. For every A0 ∈ σk such that
dP
d P̃
(yk) > 0, yk ∈ A0, (F.1)
it holds that








d P̃, P̃F a.s. in i (F.2)
Proof. It suffices to show that the right-side of (F.2) constitutes a version of















P̃F (d z) , (F.3)

















PF (dz) , (F.4)
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where the previous step uses the assumption (6.73). Using Fubini’s and Tonelli’s























PF (dz) , P a.s., (F.5)
since the set A ∈ σk was arbitrary. Next, for every B in the range σ-field of F, it






























PF (dz) d P̃. (F.6)
The claim (F.3) follows upon interchanging the order of integrals in (F.6).
Lemma F.2. Given measurable sets Ai ∈ σi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, for P̃ in (6.76),
P̃Y1,...,Yk|F (A1 × ...× Ak | i) =
k∏
j=1
P̃Yj |F (Aj | i) , PF a.s. in i, (F.7)
where P̃Y1,...,Yk|F is the regular conditional probability on (Yk, σk) conditioned on
σ(F).
Proof. For 1 ≤ l ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, denote by Φlj the interactive communication
preceding Flj, by Flj the rv (Flj,Φlj), and by ilj a realization of Flj. Without loss
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= 0, P̃Flj a.s., (F.8)
for all 1 ≤ l ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ k. The following property of interactive communication is









1 × ...× A′k, A′j ∈ σj, 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
We prove the claim by induction upon observing that P̃Y k|Flj can be obtained by
conditioning P̃Y k|Φlj on the rv Flj.
Formally, denote by σk(i−lj) = σ1(i
−
lj) × ... × σk(i−lj) the σ-field induced by σk




the smallest sub-σ-field of σk(i−lj) with respect
to which Flj is measurable (for i
−
lj fixed). Using (F.8), we choose a version of P̃Y k|F
such that for each 1 ≤ l ≤ r and 1 ≤ j ≤ k, P̃Y k|Flj (· | ilj) is the regular conditional
probability on the probability space
(

















(ilj), A ∈ σk, (F.9)
where the underlying σ-field for the conditional expectation is σk(i−lj). For this
version of P̃Y k|F, we show below that if (F.7) holds with Φlj in the role of F, then
it holds with Flj in the role of F. Lemma F.2 then follows by induction since (F.7)
holds with F = ∅.
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Then, using the notation Q̃i−lj
and Q̃t
i−lj









, 1 ≤ t ≤ k, respectively, our induction hypothesis
states
Q̃i−lj(A1 × ....× Ak) =
k∏
t=1




























where the first equality uses (F.8) and the second uses (F.10). Defining






, A ∈ σt(i−lj), 1 ≤ t ≤ k,
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P tlj(At ∩ A′t) d Q̃i−lj ,
where the second equality uses (F.10). Thus, by (F.9),
P̃Y k|Flj (A1 × ...× Ak | ilj) =
k∏
t=1
P tlj(At ∩ A′t), P̃Flj a.s. in ilj. (F.12)
Since by (F.8) P tlj(A
′
t) = 1, 1 ≤ t ≤ k, it follows from (F.12) that





A′1 × ...× A′t−1 × At × A′t+1 × ...× A′k | ilj
)
= P̃Yt|Flj (At | ilj) .
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[26] P. Gács and J. Körner. Common information is far less than mutual informa-
tion. Problems of Control and Information Theory, 2(2):149–162, 1973. [9, 20,
27, 28, 47, 48, 135, 169, 170, 171]
195
[27] R. G. Gallager. Finding parity in a simple broadcast nework. IEEE Trans. Inf.
Theory, 34(2):176–180, March 1988. [7]
[28] B. Gassend, D. Clarke, M. van Dijk, and S. Devadas. Silicon physical random
functions. Proc. ACM Conference on Computer Communications and Security,
pages 148 –160, November 2002. [1]
[29] A. Giridhar and P. R. Kumar. Computing and communicating functions over
sensor networks. IEEE Journ. on Select. Areas in Commun., 23(4):755–764,
April 2005. [7]
[30] B. Girod, A. Margot, S. Rane, and D. Rebollo-Monedero. Distributed video
coding. Proc. IEEE, 93(1):71–83, January 2005. [1]
[31] A. A. Gohari and V. Anantharam. Information-theoretic key agreement of
multiple terminalspart i. IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, 56(8):3973 – 3996, August
2010. [63]
[32] T. S. Han. Information-Spectrum Methods in Information Theory [English
Translation]. Series: Stochastic Modelling and Applied Probability, Vol. 50,
Springer, 2003. [38]
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